Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.

Export-led recoveries in small open industrialized economies

This paper studies the role of Vertical Specialization-based trade and foreign damand push as elements capable of explaining export-led recoveries in small open industrialized economies. The empirical evidence on export-led recoveries is reviewed. Data supporting the growing importance of vertical specialization for international trade are presented. I compare the performance of two versions of a small open economy model, calibrated to mimic Canadian Business Cycles. The …rst one is based upon Schmitt-Grohe(1998). The second incorporates Vertical- Specialization-based trade. I show that an arti…cial economy featuring Vertical-Specializationbased trade in conjunction with an exogenous AR(2) process for foreign output displays improved impulse responses to a foreign output shock and is able to mimic the contribution of Canadian exports to output growth during economic recoveries.

Workplace diversity and incentive contracts : theory and evidence

This paper presents a simple theory of the provision of incentives in firms in which the principal optimally chooses both compensation contracts and the composition of the work force. Assuming that individuals display group loyalty, a less diverse (more homogeneous) work force will be more cooperative. Simple comparative statics provide some testable implications relating risk, diversity and incentive pay. I also analyze the case in which workers’ characteristics cannot be readily observed ex ante. The theory then predicts that firms are more likely to prevent workers from interacting with each other when workers are expected to have similar characteristics. This shows a surprising effect of diversity in the workplace: more diverse firms will promote more interactions between workers of different types, i.e. they will be less segregated. I test the main predictions of the model using a cross-sectional sample of corporate boards. I use the proportion of women on boards as a measure of diversity. There are three main empirical findings: (1) a significant negative correlation between firm risk and diversity, (2) a significant positive relationship between performance-based compensation and diversity and (3) a significant positive correlation between the number of board meetings (a measure of interactions among directors) and diversity. The evidence is broadly consistent with the implications of the theory.

WTO-plus commitments on the elimination of export duties: evidence of a two-tier membership?

This descriptive paper examines the prevalence of ‘WTO-plus’ commitments in accession protocols of newly acceded Members, with a focus on commitments on the elimination of export duties. It presents preliminary results of a mapping exercise carried out with respect to these commitments and seeks to answer two questions. First, can any general conclusions be drawn as to the prevalence of these commitments or are they, per definition, country-specific. Second, has the political nature of the WTO accession process allowed for the creation of a two-tier membership. The first question is answered by relying on data gathered as part of the ongoing PhD-research project conducted by the author. The project aims to construct a typology of WTO-plus commitments to allow for a more detailed analysis of the relationship between these commitments and the baseline obligations in the covered agreements. The accession of China to the WTO is commonly considered as the prime example of the inclusion of WTO-plus obligations in accession protocols. The paper tries to answer the question whether this particular accession was truly unique in nature, or whether the inclusion of “Plus” obligations is less exceptional than often assumed. Additionally, the accession protocols of other recently acceded-Members are examined to establish whether the hypothesis holds. In the PhD-research project this comparative methodology will also be applied to map WTO-plus commitments in other areas, such as anti-dumping and transparency. The second question will be answered in two stages. In a preliminary stage, international institutional law will be used to by analyzing the way in which the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body has dealt with this type of WTO-plus commitment in its jurisprudence. The second stage deals with the question of hierarchy: Accession Protocols are negotiated with the WTO Membership, by each country willing to accede to the WTO. This poses questions as to their exact position in the system of WTO law. To establish whether evidence of a two-tier membership is present, one first has to turn back to the question whether Accession Protocols are a separate (or independent) legal instrument or an “integral part” of the WTO system of covered agreements. If newly acceded Members do not benefit from the general exceptions in order to balance their more stringent, WTO-plus, obligations, this may support the conclusion that the membership of the World Trade Organization is becoming, in fact, two-tiered.

Trust-based trade

There is substantially more trade within national borders than across borders. An important explanation for this fact is the weak enforcement of international contracts. We develop a model in which agents build reputations to overcome this institutional failure. The model describes the interplay between institutional quality, reputations and the dynamics of international trade. It also rationalizes several empirical regularities. We find that history matters for trade volumes, but that its effects vary with the institutional setting of the country. The same is true for the efticacy of trade liberalization programs. Moreover, while stricter enforcement of contracts enhances trade in the short run, it makes it harder for individual traders to develop good reputations. We show that this indirect negative effect may produce an "institutional trap": for sufliciently low initial levels of contract enforcement, a small tightening in enforcement reduces future trade fiows. We find also that search frictions aggravate the problems created by weak enforceability of contracts, even if they impose no direct cost on agents. The model allows extensions in several directions. We outline two of them, indicating how one could study transnational networks and the effects of firm heterogeneity within our structure.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.

Improvement on the sales forecast accuracy for a fast growing company by the best combination of historical data usage and clients segmentation

Industrial companies in developing countries are facing rapid growths, and this requires having in place the best organizational processes to cope with the market demand. Sales forecasting, as a tool aligned with the general strategy of the company, needs to be as much accurate as possible, in order to achieve the sales targets by making available the right information for purchasing, planning and control of production areas, and finally attending in time and form the demand generated. The present dissertation uses a single case study from the subsidiary of an international explosives company based in Brazil, Maxam, experiencing high growth in sales, and therefore facing the challenge to adequate its structure and processes properly for the rapid growth expected. Diverse sales forecast techniques have been analyzed to compare the actual monthly sales forecast, based on the sales force representatives’ market knowledge, with forecasts based on the analysis of historical sales data. The dissertation findings show how the combination of both qualitative and quantitative forecasts, by the creation of a combined forecast that considers both client´s demand knowledge from the sales workforce with time series analysis, leads to the improvement on the accuracy of the company´s sales forecast.

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.

Exclusivity contracts and competition : the case of the Brazilian fuels market

Exclusivity contracts can help stations by providing brand-value that allows them to obtain higher profits, relative to unbranded retailers. However, branded retailers may have a stronger negative effect over its competitors’ profits. It is not clear which one of these two effects dominates (brand-value vs competition effect). Therefore, the impact of exclusivity over the number of participants in the downstream market is not determined. In this paper, I empirically study the effects of exclusivity agreements on competition in the Brazilian gasoline sector. In order to do so, I estimate an entry model of endogenous product-type choices using data of retailers’ locations and contract choices along with data from the 2010 Brazilian Census. I use my estimates to simulate entry decisions under two counterfactual scenarios: i) mandatory exclusivity and ii) no exclusivity.

Windows of opportunities and knowledge networks: implications for the catch-up in developing countries

This document represents a doctoral thesis held under the Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration of Getulio Vargas Foundation (EBAPE/FGV), developed through the elaboration of three articles. The research that resulted in the articles is within the scope of the project entitled “Windows of opportunities and knowledge networks: implications for catch-up in developing countries”, funded by Support Programme for Research and Academic Production of Faculty (ProPesquisa) of Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration (EBAPE) of Getulio Vargas Foundation.

Effect of price and in-store promotion on sales: a study of distinct regions in an emerging market

Increasing competition caused by globalization, high growth of some emerging markets and stagnation of developed economies motivate Consumer Packaged Goods (CPGs) manufacturers to drive their attention to emerging markets. These companies are expected to adapt their marketing activities to the particularities of these markets in order to succeed. In a country classified as emerging market, regions are not alike and some contrasts can be identified. In addition, divergences of marketing variables effect can also be observed in the different retail formats. The retail formats in emerging markets can be segregated in chain self-service and traditional full-service. Thus, understanding the effectiveness of marketing mix not only in country aggregated level data can be an important contribution. Inasmuch as companies aim to generate profits from emerging markets, price is an important marketing variable in the process of creating competitive advantage. Along with price, promotional variables such as in-store displays and price cut are often viewed as temporary incentives to increase short-term sales. Managers defend the usage of promotions as being the most reliable and fastest manner to increase sales and then short-term profits. However, some authors alert about sales promotions disadvantages; mainly in the long-term. This study investigates the effect of price and in-store promotions on sales volume in different regions within an emerging market. The database used is at SKU level for juice, being segregated in the Brazilian northeast and southeast regions and corresponding to the period from January 2011 to January 2013. The methodological approach is descriptive quantitative involving validation tests, application of multivariate and temporal series analysis method. The Vector-Autoregressive (VAR) model was used to perform the analysis. Results suggest similar price sensitivity in the northeast and southeast region and greater in-store promotion sensitivity in the northeast. Price reductions show negative results in the long-term (persistent sales in six months) and in-store promotion, positive results. In-store promotion shows no significant influence on sales in chain self-service stores while price demonstrates no relevant impact on sales in traditional full-service stores. Hence, this study contributes to the business environment for companies wishing to manage price and sales promotions for consumer brands in regions with different features within an emerging market. As a theoretical contribution, this study fills an academic gap providing a dedicated price and sales promotion study to contrast regions in an emerging market.