On endogenous cost of altruism

The paper extends the cost of altruism model, analyzed in Lisboa (1999). There are three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, have to choose a non-observable leveI of effort, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides suflicient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows the optimal contract induces providers to care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature, which in Lisboa (1999) was stated as altruism assumption. Equilibrium is inefficient in comparison with the standard moral hazard outcome whenever high leveIs of effort is chosen precisely due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment for some signals. We show, however that an equilibrium is always constrained optimal.

Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.

Macroeconomic constraints to growth of Brazilian economy diagnosis and some policy proposals

The recent process of accelerated expansion of the Brazilian economy was driven by exports and fixed capital formation. Although the pace of growth was more robust than in the 1990´s, we can still witness the existence of certain macroeconomic constraints to its continuation in the long run such as, for instance, the exchange rate overvaluation in particular since 2005, and in general the modus operandi of monetary policy. Such constraints may jeopardize the sustainability of the current pace of growth. Therefore, we argue that Brazil still lies in a trap made up of high interest and low exchange rates. The elimination of the exchange rate misalignment would bring about a great increase in the rate of interest, which on its turn would impact negatively upon investment and hence upon the sustainability of long run economic growth. We outline a set of policy measures to eliminate such a trap, in particular, the adoption of an implicit target for the exchange rate, capital controls and the abandonment of the present regime of inflation targeting. Recent events seem to go in this direction.