Municipalities secession and uncertainty on public goods provision

This paper investigates the causes of municipalities secession in Brazil. The theoretical model proposes that the median voter is not fully informed about the efficiency effect of secession on public good provision and uses the break up decision undertaken by neighbor’s municipalities within the state to account for his voting. Our empirical results confirms that prediction

A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game.

Integrability and the demand for monetary assets: an alternative approach to an old problem

This note provides necessary and su¢cient conditions for some speci…c multidimensional consumer’s surplus welfare measures to be well posed (path independent). We motivate the problem by investigating partial-equilibrium measures of the welfare costs of in‡ation. The results can also be used for checking path independence of alternative de…nitions of Divisia indexes of monetary services. Consumer theory classically approaches the integrability problem by considering compensated demands, homothetic preferences or quasi-linear utility functions. Here, instead, we consider demands of monetary assets generated from a shopping-time perspective. Paralleling the above mentioned procedure, of …nding special classes of utility functions that satisfy the integrability conditions, we try to infer what particular properties of the transacting technology could assure path independence of multidimensional welfare measures. We show that the integrability conditions are satis…ed if and only if the transacting technology is blockwise weakly separable. We use two examples to clarify the point.

Forecasting electricity demand using generalized long memory

This paper studies the electricity hourly load demand in the area covered by a utility situated in the southeast of Brazil. We propose a stochastic model which employs generalized long memory (by means of Gegenbauer processes) to model the seasonal behavior of the load. The model is proposed for sectional data, that is, each hour’s load is studied separately as a single series. This approach avoids modeling the intricate intra-day pattern (load profile) displayed by the load, which varies throughout days of the week and seasons. The forecasting performance of the model is compared with a SARIMA benchmark using the years of 1999 and 2000 as the out-of-sample. The model clearly outperforms the benchmark. We conclude for general long memory in the series.

Forecasting electricity load demand: analysis of the 2001 rationing period in Brazil

This paper studies the electricity load demand behavior during the 2001 rationing period, which was implemented because of the Brazilian energetic crisis. The hourly data refers to a utility situated in the southeast of the country. We use the model proposed by Soares and Souza (2003), making use of generalized long memory to model the seasonal behavior of the load. The rationing period is shown to have imposed a structural break in the series, decreasing the load at about 20%. Even so, the forecast accuracy is decreased only marginally, and the forecasts rapidly readapt to the new situation. The forecast errors from this model also permit verifying the public response to pieces of information released regarding the crisis.

Exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty: recursive equilibrium and survival

This paper analyses general equilibrium models with finite heterogeneous agents having exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty. It is shown that there exists a recursive equilibrium with the state space consisting of the past aggregate portfolio distribution and the current state of the nature and that it implements the sequential equilibrium. We establish conditions under which the recursive equilibrium is continuous. Moreover, we use the continuous recursive relation of the aggregate variables to prove that if the economy has two types of agents, the one who commits persistent mistakes on the expectation rules of the future endogenous variables is driven out of the market by the others with correct anticipations of the variables, that is, the rational expectations agents.

A economia da arbitragem: escolha racional e geração de valor

Este texto analisa a arbitragem e suas relações com a jurisdição a partir do conceito de custo de transação. Seu objetivo é mostrar como a arbitragem é capaz de reduzir os custos de transação de um determinado ambiente normativo e contribuir para aperfeiçoar as instituições. Os custos relacionados ao uso da arbitragem e da jurisdição funcionam como um preço: quanto maior o custo, menor a procura por eles (e viceversa). potencialmente, a arbitragem pode permitir a redução dos custos de transação em razão (a) da relativa agilidade com que é concluída, (b) da relativa imparcialidade do árbitro e (c) da especialização dos árbitros. Além disso, a utilização da arbitragem pode criar melhores incentivos para o adimplemento das obrigações contratuais. Isso porque a inclusão da cláusula arbitral em um contrato dá às partes a possibilidade de regular o ambiente normativo a que se submeterão em caso de disputas. a falta de clareza sobre a legalidade dos procedimentos arbitrais aumenta os custos de transação impostos pelo ambiente normativo. Quanto maior o grau de incerteza, tanto maiores serão os incentivos para que os indivíduos alterem seus padrões negociais ou simplesmente reduzam sua participação em atividades econômicas, reduzindo-se, conseqüentemente, o potencial de geração de riqueza para a sociedade.

Three essays on local demand for public services

Local provision of public services has the positive effect of increasing the efficiency because each locality has its idiosyncrasies that determine a particular demand for public services. This dissertation addresses different aspects of the local demand for public goods and services and their relationship with political incentives. The text is divided in three essays. The first essay aims to test the existence of yardstick competition in education spending using panel data from Brazilian municipalities. The essay estimates two-regime spatial Durbin models with time and spatial fixed effects using maximum likelihood, where the regimes represent different electoral and educational accountability institutional settings. First, it is investigated whether the lame duck incumbents tend to engage in less strategic interaction as a result of the impossibility of reelection, which lowers the incentives for them to signal their type (good or bad) to the voters by mimicking their neighbors’ expenditures. Additionally, it is evaluated whether the lack of electorate support faced by the minority governments causes the incumbents to mimic the neighbors’ spending to a greater extent to increase their odds of reelection. Next, the essay estimates the effects of the institutional change introduced by the disclosure on April 2007 of the Basic Education Development Index (known as IDEB) and its goals on the strategic interaction at the municipality level. This institutional change potentially increased the incentives for incumbents to follow the national best practices in an attempt to signal their type to voters, thus reducing the importance of local information spillover. The same model is also tested using school inputs that are believed to improve students’ performance in place of education spending. The results show evidence for yardstick competition in education spending. Spatial auto-correlation is lower among the lame ducks and higher among the incumbents with minority support (a smaller vote margin). In addition, the institutional change introduced by the IDEB reduced the spatial interaction in education spending and input-setting, thus diminishing the importance of local information spillover. The second essay investigates the role played by the geographic distance between the poor and non-poor in the local demand for income redistribution. In particular, the study provides an empirical test of the geographically limited altruism model proposed in Pauly (1973), incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers (Van de Wale, 1998). First, the discussion is motivated by allowing for an “iceberg cost” of participation in the programs for the poor individuals in Pauly’s original model. Next, using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and a panel of municipalities based on the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) from 2001 to 2007, all the distance-related explanatory variables indicate that an increased proximity between poor and non-poor is associated with better targeting of the programs (demand for redistribution). For instance, a 1-hour increase in the time spent commuting by the poor reduces the targeting by 3.158 percentage points. This result is similar to that of Ashworth, Heyndels and Smolders (2002) but is definitely not due to the program leakages. To empirically disentangle participation costs and spatially restricted altruism effects, an additional test is conducted using unique panel data based on the 2004 and 2006 PNAD, which assess the number of benefits and the average benefit value received by beneficiaries. The estimates suggest that both cost and altruism play important roles in targeting determination in Brazil, and thus, in the determination of the demand for redistribution. Lastly, the results indicate that ‘size matters’; i.e., the budget for redistribution has a positive impact on targeting. The third essay aims to empirically test the validity of the median voter model for the Brazilian case. Information on municipalities are obtained from the Population Census and the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court for the year 2000. First, the median voter demand for local public services is estimated. The bundles of services offered by reelection candidates are identified as the expenditures realized during incumbents’ first term in office. The assumption of perfect information of candidates concerning the median demand is relaxed and a weaker hypothesis, of rational expectation, is imposed. Thus, incumbents make mistakes about the median demand that are referred to as misperception errors. Thus, at a given point in time, incumbents can provide a bundle (given by the amount of expenditures per capita) that differs from median voter’s demand for public services by a multiplicative error term, which is included in the residuals of the demand equation. Next, it is estimated the impact of the module of this misperception error on the electoral performance of incumbents using a selection models. The result suggests that the median voter model is valid for the case of Brazilian municipalities.

Demand aggregation and credit risk effects in pooled procurement: evidence from the Brazilian public purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies

Pooled procurement has an important role in reducing acquisition prices of goods. A pool of buyers, which aggregates demand for its members, increases bargaining power and allows suppliers to achieve economies of scale and scope in the production. Such aggregation demand e ect lowers prices paid for buyers. However, when a buyer with a good reputation for paying suppliers in a timely manner is joined in the pool by a buyer with bad reputation may have its price paid increased due to the credit risk e ect on prices. This will happen because prices paid in a pooled procurement should refect the (higher) average buyers' credit risk. Using a data set on Brazilian public purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, we nd evidence supporting both e ects. We show that the prices paid by public bodies in Brazil are lower when they buy through pooled procurement than individually. On the other hand, federal agencies (i.e. good buyers) pay higher prices for products when they are joined by state agencies (i.e. bad buyers) in a pool. Such evidence suggests that pooled procurement should be carefully designed to avoid that prices paid increase for its members.

Low expectations, low demand : when should the government intervene?

Este trabalho estuda o impacto de diferentes políticas que procuram mitigar falhas de coordenação em um ambiente macroeconômico. Abordamos questões relativas ao timing dos estímulos econômicos. Quando o governo deveria começar a incentivar a economia? Deveria gastar mais para prevenir crises ou para tirar a economia da recessão quando os fundamentos estão melhorando? Como o estímulo deve alterar a complementaridade estratégica? Para responder a estas perguntas, construímos um modelo macroeconômico dinâmico com concorrência monopolística e decisões de investimento sequenciais. Aplicando resultados da literatura teórica de jogos dinâmicos com fricções, selecionamos um único equilíbrio neste modelo, nos dando um instrumental tratável para a análise de políticas. Nossos resultados sugerem que o governo não deveria viesar incentivos nem para a prevenção de crises nem para resgatar a economia quando esta já está em crise.

Aggregate uncertainty, disappointment aversion and the business cycle

We investigate the eff ect of aggregate uncertainty shocks on real variables. More speci fically, we introduce a shock in the volatility of productivity in an RBC model with long-run volatility risk and preferences that exhibit generalised disappointment aversion. We find that, when combined with a negative productivity shock, a volatility shock leads to further decline in real variables, such as output, consumption, hours worked and investment. For instance, out of the 2% decrease in output as a result of both shocks, we attribute 0.25% to the e ffect of an increase in volatility. We also fi nd that this e ffect is the same as the one obtained in a model with Epstein-Zin- Weil preferences, but higher than that of a model with expected utility. Moreover, GDA preferences yield superior asset pricing results, when compared to both Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences and expected utility.

Estimation of random coefficients logit demand models: an application to the Brazilian fixed income fund market

Estimation of demand and supply in differentiated products markets is a central issue in Empirical Industrial Organization and has been used to study the effects of taxes, merges, introduction of new goods, market power, among others. Logit and Random Coefficients Logit are examples of demand models used to study these effects. For the supply side it is generally supposed a Nash equilibrium in prices. This work presents a detailed discussion of these models of demand and supply as well as the procedure for estimation. Lastly, is made an application to the Brazilian fixed income fund market.

Investment coordination failures and the confidence channel of fiscal policy

Este trabalho desenvolve um novo "canal de Confiança" da política fiscal e caracteriza a política ótima quando esse canal é levado em consideração. Para esse objetivo, utilizamos um modelo estático com (i) concorrência monopolística, (ii) custos de ajustamento fixos para investir, (iii) complementaridade estratégica devido a informação imperfeita com respeito a produtividade agregada, e (iv) bens privados como substitutos imperfeitos de bens privados. Este arcabouço acomoda a possibilidade de falhas de coordenação nos investimentos, mas apresenta um equilíbrio único. Mostramos que a política fiscal tem efeitos importantes na coordenação. Um aumento dos gastos do governo leva a uma maior demanda por bens privados. Mais importante, este também afeta as expectativas de ordem superior com relação a demanda das demais firmas, que amplifica os efeitos do aumento inicial da demanda devido a complementaridade estratégica nas decisões de investimento. Como as demais firmas estão se deparam com uma demanda maior, espera-se que estas invistam mais, que por sua vez, aumenta a demanda individual de cada firma, que aumenta os incentivos a investir. Denominamos isto como o "canal de confiança" da política fiscal. Sob a ameaça de falhas de coordenação, a política fiscal ótima prescreve produzir além do ponto em que o benefício marginal resultante do consumo de bens públicos é igual ao custo marginal desses bens. Este benefício adicional vem do fato de que a política fiscal pode ampliar a coordenação dos investimentos.

The access to demand

In this paper I argue that, in developing countries, sufficient aggregate demand is not enough to motivate investment and achieve full employment. Besides, according to the Keynesian developmental macroeconomics under construction, competent business enterprises must have access to that demand –access which is denied to most of them because developing countries face the tendency to the cyclical and chronic overvaluation of the exchange rate

Predicting Amazon Deforestation through the deterninants of demand for agricultural land

This paper develops a model of deforestation pressure in the Amazon. It is based on the determinants of demand for agricultural land, i.e. the interactions between population dynamics, urbanization and the growth of local markets, land prices, and government spending and policies. The mo deI is estimated using data from the period 1970 - 1985, and predictions for the period 1985 - 2010 are made under explicit assumptions about the underlying factors of deforestation. The predictions indicate that economic growth in the Amazon is likely to continue at high rates even if the federal government abandons its aggressive development policy. Deforestation will be much smaller if they do, though, since the active development policies tend to promote wasteful use of land.