40 resultados para Common agency, public goods, incentive mechanisms.


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We develop a theory of public versus private ownership based on value diversion by managers. Government is assumed to face stronger institutional constraints than has been assumed in previous literature. The model which emerges from these assumptions is fexible and has wide application. We provide amapping between the qualitative characteristics of an asset, its main use - including public goods characteristics, and spillovers toother assets values - and the optimal ownership and management regime. The model is applied to single and multiple related assets. We address questions such as; when is it optimal to have one of a pair ofr elated assets public and the other private; when is joint management desirable; and when should a public asset be managed by the owner of a related private asset? We show that while private ownership can be judged optimal in some cases solely on the basis of qualitative information, the optimality of any other ownership and management regimes relies on quantitative analysis. Our results reveal the situations in which policy makers will have difficulty in determining the opimal regime.

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Local provision of public services has the positive effect of increasing the efficiency because each locality has its idiosyncrasies that determine a particular demand for public services. This dissertation addresses different aspects of the local demand for public goods and services and their relationship with political incentives. The text is divided in three essays. The first essay aims to test the existence of yardstick competition in education spending using panel data from Brazilian municipalities. The essay estimates two-regime spatial Durbin models with time and spatial fixed effects using maximum likelihood, where the regimes represent different electoral and educational accountability institutional settings. First, it is investigated whether the lame duck incumbents tend to engage in less strategic interaction as a result of the impossibility of reelection, which lowers the incentives for them to signal their type (good or bad) to the voters by mimicking their neighbors’ expenditures. Additionally, it is evaluated whether the lack of electorate support faced by the minority governments causes the incumbents to mimic the neighbors’ spending to a greater extent to increase their odds of reelection. Next, the essay estimates the effects of the institutional change introduced by the disclosure on April 2007 of the Basic Education Development Index (known as IDEB) and its goals on the strategic interaction at the municipality level. This institutional change potentially increased the incentives for incumbents to follow the national best practices in an attempt to signal their type to voters, thus reducing the importance of local information spillover. The same model is also tested using school inputs that are believed to improve students’ performance in place of education spending. The results show evidence for yardstick competition in education spending. Spatial auto-correlation is lower among the lame ducks and higher among the incumbents with minority support (a smaller vote margin). In addition, the institutional change introduced by the IDEB reduced the spatial interaction in education spending and input-setting, thus diminishing the importance of local information spillover. The second essay investigates the role played by the geographic distance between the poor and non-poor in the local demand for income redistribution. In particular, the study provides an empirical test of the geographically limited altruism model proposed in Pauly (1973), incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers (Van de Wale, 1998). First, the discussion is motivated by allowing for an “iceberg cost” of participation in the programs for the poor individuals in Pauly’s original model. Next, using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and a panel of municipalities based on the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) from 2001 to 2007, all the distance-related explanatory variables indicate that an increased proximity between poor and non-poor is associated with better targeting of the programs (demand for redistribution). For instance, a 1-hour increase in the time spent commuting by the poor reduces the targeting by 3.158 percentage points. This result is similar to that of Ashworth, Heyndels and Smolders (2002) but is definitely not due to the program leakages. To empirically disentangle participation costs and spatially restricted altruism effects, an additional test is conducted using unique panel data based on the 2004 and 2006 PNAD, which assess the number of benefits and the average benefit value received by beneficiaries. The estimates suggest that both cost and altruism play important roles in targeting determination in Brazil, and thus, in the determination of the demand for redistribution. Lastly, the results indicate that ‘size matters’; i.e., the budget for redistribution has a positive impact on targeting. The third essay aims to empirically test the validity of the median voter model for the Brazilian case. Information on municipalities are obtained from the Population Census and the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court for the year 2000. First, the median voter demand for local public services is estimated. The bundles of services offered by reelection candidates are identified as the expenditures realized during incumbents’ first term in office. The assumption of perfect information of candidates concerning the median demand is relaxed and a weaker hypothesis, of rational expectation, is imposed. Thus, incumbents make mistakes about the median demand that are referred to as misperception errors. Thus, at a given point in time, incumbents can provide a bundle (given by the amount of expenditures per capita) that differs from median voter’s demand for public services by a multiplicative error term, which is included in the residuals of the demand equation. Next, it is estimated the impact of the module of this misperception error on the electoral performance of incumbents using a selection models. The result suggests that the median voter model is valid for the case of Brazilian municipalities.

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O presente estudo procura identificar qual o impacto das transferências intergovernamentais, dadas algumas de suas características específicas, na formulação e implementação da política pública de educação. As transferências intergovernamentais são entendidas como um instrumento adotado por Estados federativos para corrigir distorções intrínsecas aos seus mecanismos de arrecadação e de execução de determinadas competências pelos seus entes federativos. Sendo assim, uma vez que é papel do Estado, enquanto provedor de serviços e bens públicos, otimizar a prestação dos mesmos, este trabalho procura entender como o mecanismo das transferências intergovernamentais adotado em sistemas federativos se reflete no orçamento municipal, bem como nas decisões de política pública, analisando-se, especificamente o caso da educação. Para tanto, utiliza-se o caso do município do Rio de Janeiro, ao longo do período 2002/2011, como referência para o estudo, uma vez que este é um município de relevância no cenário nacional e sua experiência pode refletir a situação vivida por outros municípios, bem como servir de inspiração para tantos outros. Este estudo possibilitou, por fim, entender como algumas opções de política são tomadas em razão dos mecanismos de financiamento utilizados pelos estados. Foi possível perceber que, embora haja um entendimento sobre a importância de se ter um projeto nacional de política pública, há uma distância considerável entre as percepções do governo central e dos entes subnacionais sobre a melhor forma de prestar determinado serviço, o que dificulta a otimização do uso dos recursos. O reconhecimento desta dificuldade é essencial para que seja possível melhorar a prestação dos serviços públicos pretendidos pelos Estados.

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This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent extraction of incumbent politicians. In order to identify reelection incentives, we use the existence of a term limit in Brazil’s municipal elections. We find that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and final term, there is significantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where mayors are in their first-term. In particular, in municipalities with second-term mayors there is, on average, R$188,431 more diversion of resources and the incidence of irregularities is 23% higher. We also find more pronounced effects where the costs of rent-extraction are lower (municipalities without media and judicial presence), and the density of pivotal voters is higher (more political competition). Finally, we show that first-term mayors, while less corrupt, have a larger incidence of poor administration suggesting that there may exist a trade-off between corruption and quality in public good provision.

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We analize a discrete type version of a common agency model with informed principals of Martimort and Moreira (2005) in the context of lobby games. We begin discussing issues related to the common values nature of the model, i.e.the agent cares directly about the principal’s utility function. With this feature the equilibrium of Martimort and Moreira (2005) is not valid. We argue in favor of one solution, although we are not able to fully characterize the equilibrium in this context. We then turn to an application: a modification of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of lobbying for tariff protection to incoporate assimetric information (but disconsidering the problem of common values) in the lobbies objective function. We show that the main results of the original model do not hold and that lobbies may behave less agressively towards the police maker when there is private information in the lobbies valuation for the tariffs.

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Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

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If urban planning is to support the equitable distribution of public goods and services, it must recognize and address the dismal condition of millions of poor people who are living in a city. The primary focus of contemporary planners and planning students should be on finding and advocating solutions that help eliminate the problems of today¿s cities. Any meaningful solution will need to be grounded in a thorough understanding of the social class inequities of citizens. With the rapid development of national economy and urbanization process in Brazil over the last two decades, the number of vehicles and their travels are dramatically increased. This is particularly evident in all large cities. Traffic congestion becomes more and more severe. Inadequate parking facilities often result in difficulty to find a parking space in large cities and many illegally parked vehicles can be seen on the crowed streets. These illegally parked vehicles further intensify traffic congestion and also pose a traffic safety hazard. The process of urbanization and motorization in Brazil is likely to continue in a rapid pace. The urban public passengers transport modes problems in large cities are likely to get even worse. There is an urgent need for the development of policy and criteria for public service of urban public passenger transport by bus in large cities. The purpose of survey is to develop policy guidelines for public transport services planning, design, construction and mobility management, that meet community needs for accessibility in large cities. So this thesis will present major comparative characteristics of urban mobility management, urban public passengers transport by bus services planning and the quality of social life in two towns of Brazil: Rio de Janeiro and Curitiba. The study case has been focused on Rio de Janeiro and Curitiba because of the major different results of the survey presented by the two cities. The objectives of this thesis are: a) to analyze and discus existing urban mobility related accessibility and economic development problems in large cities; b) to provide an overview of the relationship within city ¿ quality of social life ¿ urban mobility in Rio and Curitiba; c) to analyze and discuss existing urban mobility management related public transport services in Rio and Curitiba; d) to analyze and discuss existing quality of bus public transport services problems in Rio. Some preliminary recommendations for mobility management policies will also be presented.

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This paper aims to assess the performance of credit and fiscal mechanisms in attracting industrial investment to the state of Ceará during 1985-2002, a period characterized by the political and administrative continuity which begun with the implementation of the so-called "Plan of Changes", during the term in office of former state governor Tasso Jereissati. In order to accomplish that, a survey was conducted of the state's credit, fiscal and infrastructure incentive mechanisms, industrial policy and the period's political context, as well as data from the Department of Industry and Commerce and on the economic performance of the state of Ceará. Over 700 industrial businesses were found to have been attracted into the state by means of the Industrial Investment Attraction Program, which amounted to a process of industry expansion while the country as a whole was going through a period of deindustrialization. The analysis points out that, if on one hand, the industrialization model then adopted was able to generate economic growth, on the other hand, it increased income concentration and could not drive industry into the less developed areas across the state's interior, as expected by Ceará's state government officials.

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A proposta deste trabalho é avaliar a adoção da EC n° 37, de 12 de junho de 2002, regulada pela LC 116, em 31 de julho de 2003, como instrumentos de contenção da guerra fiscal entre os municípios. Desse modo, procura-se avaliar os impactos da adoção de uma alíquota de piso para o ISSQN sobre a arrecadação dos municípios, tomando os municípios que compõem a RMSP como principal objeto de análise. A importância do tema é identificada na relação entre entes federativos, a discussão em torno da autonomia financeira e tributária na federação brasileira e como estas questões impactam a oferta de bens públicos. Este trabalho se vale de um modelo simples elaborado para compreender a arrecadação tributária via ISSQN e procura inferir os resultados ocasionados pela adoção de uma medida externa de harmonização de alíquotas tributárias, resultados positivos e significantes são encontrados para tais efeitos. Espera-se que este trabalho contribua e aponte novas perspectivas de estudos na área de federalismo fiscal, especialmente para estudos voltados para governos locais no Brasil. Ao mesmo tempo, espera-se contribuir para o desenvolvimento de pesquisas em torno das alíquotas, da arrecadação, do modelo tributário nacional e para as discussões sobre alocação de competências entre os entes federativos.

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Este trabalho analisa uma das vantagens aclamadas da descentralização fiscal: a melhor adequação da cesta de bens públicos às preferências de seus moradores (TIEBOUT, 1956, OATES, 1972). Com base no método proposto por Ravallion (1999), utilizam-se dos sucessivos desmembramentos de municípios brasileiros na década passada (1016 municípios instalados) para verificar se a quebra em municípios menores resulta em melhor performance dos investimentos no provimento de serviços públicos. Assim, verifica-se, nesse aspecto restrito de descentralização, se há melhor desempenho da gestão dos serviços públicos em seus investimentos no que se refere a adequar-se às necessidades locais. Os resultados sugerem que municípios desmembrados investem mais e tem melhor resposta, em termos de investimento, a baixos indicadores de provisão de bens públicos comparativamente aos não-desmembrados. Não encontramos evidência de que os novos municípios invistam diferentemente dos municípios de origem.

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Há décadas os economistas se preocupam com o problema de calcular o Custo Marginal do Financiamento Público (MCF, em inglês). Um dos maiores sucessos nessa área é o modelo de provisão de bem público com taxação distorciva de Wildasin (1984). Nós generalizamos o modelo de Wildasin para incluir uma cesta de bens públicos, ao invés de um único bem. Em seguida realizamos várias estimativas do MCF para o Brasil, algumas inclusive sem a hipótese de independência entre o nível de bem público e a oferta de trabalho, usual na literatura. Os resultados mostram que o Custo Marginal do Financiamento Público no Brasil é relativamente pequeno, entre outras causas devido à pequena sensibilidade da oferta de trabalho ao gasto governamental

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This manuscript demonstrates that voters have nothing to be afraid of when new hard budget constraint legislation is implemented. Our claim is that this kind of legislation reduces the asymmetry of information between voters and incumbents over the budget and, as a consequence, the latter have incentives to increase the supply of public goods. As a nationwide institutional innovation, the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) is exogenous to all municipalities; therefore, there is no self-selection bias in its implementation. We show that public goods expenditure increases after the FRL. Second, this increase occurs in municipalities located in the country’s poorest region. Third, our findings can be extended to the supply of public goods because the higher the expenditure with health and education, the greater the probability of incumbents being re-elected. Finally, there exists a “de facto” higher supply of public goods in education (number of per capita classrooms) after the FRL.

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The increasing availability of social statistics in Latin America opens new possibilities in terms of accountability and incentive mechanisms for policy makers. This paper addresses these issues within the institutional context of the Brazilian educational system. We build a theoretical model based on the theory of incentives to analyze the role of the recently launched Basic Education Development Index (Ideb) in the provision of incentives at the sub-national level. The first result is to demonstrate that an education target system has the potential to improve the allocation of resources to education through conditional transfers to municipalities and schools. Second, we analyze the local government’s decision about how to allocate its education budget when seeking to accomplish the different objectives contemplated by the index, which involves the interaction between its two components, average proficiency and the passing rate. We discuss as well policy issues concerning the implementation of the synthetic education index in the light of this model arguing that there is room for improving the Ideb’s methodology itself. In addition, we analyze the desirable properties of an ideal education index and we argue in favor of an ex-post relative learning evaluation system for different municipalities (schools) based on the value added across different grades

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A necessidade de lidar com a identificação, o desenvolvimento, a formalização e a implementação de estratégias na Criminalística da Polícia Federal leva a questionamentos quanto à presença das condições necessárias para a implantação efetiva de um processo de planejamento estratégico institucional no ambiente considerado, e cuja resposta constituiu o objetivo da presente pesquisa. Neste contexto, combinam-se elementos ligados à natureza de organização pública da Criminalística e conceitos da Administração advindos do ambiente da iniciativa privada, assim como idiossincrasias da categoria profissional formada pelos peritos criminais. E, por ser o planejamento estratégico uma atividade insólita na organização, está sujeito a uma série de riscos e ameaças sobre os quais ainda não se tem conhecimento suficiente. Este estudo valeu-se de entrevistas semiestruturadas para avaliar, a partir da percepção dos próprios peritos criminais federais, se estão presentes fatores relacionados a três perspectivas de destaque identificadas na literatura acadêmica que poderiam viabilizar a implantação do planejamento estratégico na Criminalística da Polícia Federal. A primeira perspectiva se refere ao contexto mais amplo de organização, extraída a partir de uma abordagem integradora sobre o processo de formação da estratégia, que considera a visão como elemento agregador entre a racionalidade do planejamento estratégico formalizado e a participatividade geradora das estratégias emergentes. A segunda diz respeito ao contexto mais restrito que abrange as organizações do setor público, em que as dimensões de propriedade comum, financiamento público e controle político resultam em uma série de especificidades em relação ao setor privado. Por fim, a terceira perspectiva trata da caracterização da Criminalística como organização profissional, em que a tensão entre controle gerencial e autonomia profissional assume importância de destaque. O resultado, obtido a partir de análise interpretativa fenomenológica das entrevistas, revelou que a falta de um senso comum sobre a direção a ser seguida pela organização, associada ao baixo envolvimento dos peritos, constitui um fator condicionante do sucesso do planejamento estratégico na Criminalística.