Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation

The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of firms and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.

Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation

The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of fmns and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.

Profit sharing with heterogeneous entrepreneurial prowess

This paper analyzes the impact of profit sharing on the incentives that individuals face to set up their own business. It presents a model of capital accumulation in which individuals are equally skilled to be workers but differ in their abilities to manage a firm Given an exogenous profit sharing parameter, an individual chooses whether to be an employer or an employee in order to maximize his net income. It is shown that profit sharing can inhibit entrepreneurial initiatives, reducing the number of firms in operation, the aggregate output and the economy's long run capital stock.

Inflation and debt indexation : the equivalence of two alternative schemes for the case of periodic payments

The presence of inflation has induced the financial institutions to implement procedures devised to protect the real values of theirs loans. Two of such procedurcs, the floaaing rale scheme and the monetary correction mechanism, tend to lead to very different streams of payments. However, whenever the floating rate scheme follows the rule of Strict adhercnce to lhe Fisher equation, lhe two procedures are financially equivalent.

Sociabilidade homoerótica masculina no Rio de Janeiro na década de 1960: relatos do jornal O Snob

Este trabalho estuda uma rede de sociabilidade homoerótica na cidade do Rio de Janeiro na década de 1960 através da análise dos relatos contidos no jornal doméstico – produzido por um dos grupos e que circulava entre os participantes da rede – O Snob. A rede era composta por vários grupos de convivência que se vinham formando desde a década de 1950, e a maioria dos participantes elaborava suas identidades pessoais compartilhando com a sociedade maior a crença de que pertenceriam ao “terceiro sexo”, “sofrendo” inversão sexual. Assim se desenvolveu uma forma de sociabilidade peculiar, caracterizada por encontros festivos em domicílios como estratégia de sobrevivência, visto que as expectativas sociossexuais dos grupos eram envoltas em hostilidade da sociedade maior. Desta maneira esse estudo aponta processos de sociabilização empreendidos pela rede, moldados na invisibilidade, configurando-se, ainda que de maneira não articulada (ou involuntária), em experiência de conquistas dos direitos civis e sociais ao promover ações práticas que possibilitavam encontros de seus membros e que podem ser traduzidas como o direito de ir e vir, o direito de livre expressão, ainda que num espaço segregado (ou segredado?), direitos básicos, que, no entanto, não eram garantidos aos participantes da rede. Evidencia, nessa trajetória, os processos de ressignificação identitária que os grupos vivenciaram ao longo do período estudado.

Collateral avoids Ponzi schemes in incomplete markets

Without introducing neither debt constraints nor transversality conditions to avoid the possibility of Ponzi schemes, we show existence of equilibrium in an incomplete markets economy with a collateral structure.

A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

A model is presented in which banks accept deposits of fiat money and intermediate capital. Alt though theories about the coexistence of money and credit are inherently difficult, the model offers a simple explanation for the dual role of financial institutions: Banks are well monitored, and can credibly allow fiat-money withdraws to whom needs its, thus qualifying to become safe brokers of idle capital. The model shares some features with those of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).

Risk sharing and the household collective model

When the joint assumption of optimal risk sharing and coincidence of beliefs is added to the collective model of Browning and Chiappori (1998) income pooling and symmetry of the pseudo-Hicksian matrix are shown to be restored. Because these are also the features of the unitary model usually rejected in empirical studies one may argue that these assumptions are at odds with evidence. We argue that this needs not be the case. The use of cross-section data to generate price and income variation is based Oil a definition of income pooling or symmetry suitable for testing the unitary model, but not the collective model with risk sharing. AIso, by relaxing assumptions on beliefs, we show that symmetry and income pooling is lost. However, with usual assumptions on existence of assignable goods, we show that beliefs are identifiable. More importantly, if di:fferences in beliefs are not too extreme, the risk sharing hypothesis is still testable.

On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) showed that, without imposing any debt constraint, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with limited commitment when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples in which they argued that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. Moreover, they claimed that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is restored. This paper questions the validity of the claims made in Páscoa and Seghir (2009). First, we show that it is not true that harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes in the examples they have proposed. A competitive equilibrium with no trade can be supported due to unduly pessimistic expectations on asset deliveries. We subsequently refine the equilibrium concept in the spirit of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) in order to rule out spurious inactivity on asset markets due to irrational expectations. Our second contribution is to provide a specific example of an economy with moderate default penalties in which Ponzi schemes reappear when overpessimistic beliefs on asset deliveries are ruled out. Our finding shows that, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009), moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme.

Motivations for knowledge sharing in virtual social networks: a comparative study between Brazil and France

Sociedades pós-modernas caracterizam-se pela transição de economias baseadas em ativos tangíveis para economias de conhecimento, onde indivíduos vivenciam uma imprescindível conectividade, mas ao mesmo tempo, experimentam um enfraquecimento das estruturas sociais, que tem generado uma crescente necessidade de se criar bases cognitivas e afetivas para a vida (Rheingold, 1992; Wasko & Farah, 2005; Arvidsson, 2008). Nesse cenário se desenvolve o fenômeno das redes sociais virtuais, agregando milhões de pessoas que compartilham mensagens de texto, imagens e vídeos todos os dias (Nielsen, 2012) fazendo com que organizações privadas foquem cada vez mais seus investimentos para acompanhar as novas tendências (McWilliam, 2000; Reichheld & Schefter, 2000; Yoo, Suh & Lee, 2002; Arvidsson, 2008). Consequentemente, uma das mais importantes questões que vem ganhando importância no meio academico e entre profissionais da área é justamente: por que as pessoas compartilham conhecimento online? (Monge, Fulk, Kalman, Flanigan, Parnassa & Rumsey, 1998; Lin, 2001) Por meio de uma metodologia de estudo de caso conduzida no Brasil e na França, este estudo objetiva produzir uma relevante revisão teórica acerca do tema, trazendo novas idéias de diferentes contextos, e propondo um modelo para avaliar as principais motivações que conduzem indivíduos a compartilhar conhecimento em redes sociais virtuais. Essas razões foram estruturadas em cinco dimensões: capital estrutural, cognitivo e relacional, motivações pessoais e razões monetárias (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Wasko & Faraj, 2005; Chiu et al, 2006). As evidências sugerem que o processo de participar e compartilhar conhecimento em redes sociais virtuais é resultado de uma complexa combinação de motivações de orientação pessoal e coletiva, que parecem variar pouco de acordo com os diferentes objetivos e contextos dessas comunidades, onde as razões financeiras parecem ser secundárias.

OMG!: characterizing the role of emotions in the sharing of online commercial videos

"Se tornar viral" é visto pelos comerciantes como o novo Graal para alcançar grandes comunidades online. Neste contexto viral, vídeos têm um papel especial dada a forte capacidade deles de se espalhar exponencialmente pela internet através do compartilhamento social. Cada ano se vê a quebra de novos recordes através deste tipo de viralidade. Em março de 2012, o vídeo "Kony 2012" envolvendo a ação unida contra o líder de milícia Africano epônimo, atingiu mais de 34 milhões de visualizações em seu primeiro dia de lançamento. Em dezembro de 2012, o vídeo-clipe da música "Gangnam Style" tornou-se o primeiro vídeo do YouTube a alcançar mais de um bilhão de visualizações, totalizando mais de 1,4 bilhões de visualizações em março de 2013. Tais ilustrações mostram claramente a nova escala que a internet deu ao fenômeno do boca-a-boca. Os comerciantes entenderam o potencial fantástico dos vídeos virais e tentaram aproveitar o fenômeno de modo a reproduzi-lo para fins comerciais. Esta pesquisa oferece para os acadêmicos e os profissionais de marketing uma análise dos determinantes do compartilhamento de vídeos comerciais online. Mais especificamente, o foco da dissertação foi definido sobre o papel das emoções no compartilhamento, para identificar quais delas levam e como levam à partilha de vídeos comerciais online. A pesquisa foi realizada a partir de dois métodos científicos: uma pesquisa e uma análise de texto sobre a atribuição de emoções para comentários dos vídeos mais compartilhados do YouTube. A pesquisa confirma, com novos métodos, hipóteses previamente testadas e validadas por acadêmicos. Ela mostra que a positividade e a força das emoções são determinantes de compartilhamento maiores do que a negatividade e a fraqueza (Lindgreen and Vanhamme, 2005; Dobele et al., 2007). A dissertação também argumenta que o conteúdo do vídeo, bem como o contexto são determinantes significativos de compartilhamento de vídeo (Laskey et al., 1989; Taylor, 1999). Além de validar teorias existentes, a pesquisa trouxe novos conceitos para a discussão, especialmente o papel da dimensão força / fraqueza de emoções para analisar o fenômeno viral, e a importância de uma clara "chamada à ação" incluída no vídeo para aumentar a sua partilha. Estes novos conceitos enriquecem a literatura do tema – que evolui muito rapidamente – e preparam o caminho para futuras pesquisas.

Rent-sharing in Brazil: using trade liberalization as a natural experiment

This paper examines the extent of rent-sharing in Brazil, between 1988 and 1995, combining two different data sets: annual industrial surveys (pIA) and annual household surveys (PNADs). The aim is to use the trade liberalization policies that took place in Brazil in the early 1990s as a "natural experiment" to examine the impact ofproduct market rents on wages. We first estimate inter-industry wage differentials in Brazil, using the household surveys, afier controlling for various observable workers' characteristics. In a reduced form fixed effects equation, these controlled inter-industry differentials are seen to depend on the industries' rate of effective tariff. We also find that LSDV estimates of the effect of value-added per worker (computed using the industrial surveys) on the wage differentials are positive, but somewhat small. However, we find that instrumenting the valued-added with the effective tariffs more than doubles the estimated rent-sharing coefficient. The paper concludes that rent-sharing is prevalent in the Brazilian manufacturing sector, and this mechanism transferred part of the productivity gains due to trade liberalization to manufacturing workers in the form ofhigher (controlled) wage premium.

Asset pricing when risk sharing is limited by default: a theoretical framework

We study the asset pricing implications of an endowment economy when agents can default on contracts that would leave them otherwise worse off. We specialize and extend the environment studied by Kocherlakota (1995) and Kehoe and Levine (1993) to make it comparable to standard studies of asset pricillg. We completely charactize efficient allocations for several special cases. We illtroduce a competitive equilibrium with complete markets alld with elldogellous solvency constraints. These solvellcy constraints are such as to prevent default -at the cost of reduced risk sharing. We show a version of the classical welfare theorems for this equilibrium definition. We characterize the pricing kernel, alld compare it with the one for economies without participation constraints : interest rates are lower and risk premia can be bigger depending on the covariance of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Quantitative examples show that for reasonable parameter values the relevant marginal rates of substitution fali within the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds.

Profit sharing with heterogeneous entrepreneural prowess

This paper analyzes the impact of profit sharing on the incentives that individuals face to set up their own business. It presents a model of capital accumulation in which individuals are equally skilled to be workers but differ in their abilities to manage a firmo It is shown that profit sharing can inhibit entrepreneurial initiatives, reducing the number of firms in operation, the aggregate output and the economy's long run capital stock.

A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

Historically, payment systems and capital intermediation interact. Friedman (1959), and many observers of bank instabilities, have ad- vocated separating depositary from credit institutions. His proposal meets today an ever-increasing provision of inside money, and a short- age of monetary models of bank intermediation. In this paper, we eval- uate the proposal from a new angle, with a model in which isolating a safe payments system from commercial intermediation undermines information complementarities in banking activities. Some features of the environment resemble the models in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).