Assessing competition in banking industry: a multiproduct approach

This paper aims to investigate the competition aspects of banking multiproduct operation. Based on an extension of Panzar and Rosse (1987)’s test to the case of a multiproduct banking firm, we take advantage of a new dataset constructed to Brazilian banking conglomerates to infer the impact of conglomeration on market power. We find that banks offering classic (i.e., loans and credit cards) and other bank products (i.e., brokerage services, insurance and capitalization bonds) have substantially higher market power than the ones which offer only classic products. Results suggest a positive bias on the traditional estimates of competition in which the multioutput actions are not taken into account.

Assessing competition in the banking industry: a multi-product approach

This paper investigates the competitive aspects of multi-product banking operations. Extending Panzar and Rosse (1987)’s model to the case of a multi-product banking firm, we show that the higher the economies of scope in multi-product banking are, the lower Panzar-Rosse’s measure of competition in the banking sector is. To test this empirical implication and determine the impact of multi-production/conglomeration on market power, we use a new dataset on Brazilian banking conglomerates. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we find that banks offering classic banking products (i.e., loans and credit cards) and other banking products (i.e., brokerage services, insurance and capitalization bonds) have substantially higher market power than banks that offer only classic products. These results suggest a positive bias in the traditional estimates of competition in which multi-output actions are not considered.

Information asymmetry and competition in credit markets: the pricing of overdraft loans in Brazil

This paper evaluates how information asymmetry affects the strength of competition in credit markets. A theory is presented in which adverse selection softens competition by decreasing the incentives creditors have for competing in the interest rate dimension. In equilibirum, although creditors compete, the outcome is similar to collusion. Three empirical implications arise. First, interest rate should respond asymmetrically to changes in the cost of funds: increases in cost of funds should, on average, have a larger effect on interest rates than decreases. Second, aggressiveness in pricing should be associated with a worseing in the bank level default rates. Third, bank level default rates should be endogenous. We then verify the validity of these three empirical implications using Brazilian data on consumer overdraft loans. The results in this paper rationalize seemingly abnormallly high interest rates in unsecured loans.

Sustainable miracles : protection and competition in the Brazilian oil industry

It is often suggested that competition improves productivity, however, the underlying support for this idea is surprisingly thin. This paper presents a case study examining the e ects of a change in the competitive environment on productivity at the Petrobras, Brazil's state-owned oil company. Petrobras had a legal monopoly on production, re ning, transportation and importation of oil in Brazil until it was removed in 1995. Even though Petrobras continues to have a de facto monopoly, the end of legal monopoly labor productivity growth rate more than doubled. A growth accounting of the industry shows that between 1977 and 1993 output growth rate (and productivity growth rate) is explained by the accumulation of capital, while Total Factor Productivity (TFP) decreased. Between 1994 and 2000 labor productivity growth rate is completely explained by the growth rate of TFP. The results suggest that the threat of competition alone is su cient to improve productivity. They also provide evidence that restricting competition help cause Brazil's depression of the 1980s.

Accountability and yardstick competition in the public provision of education

This paper explores the institutional change introduced by the public disclosure of an education development index (IDEB, Basic Education Development Index) in 2007 to identify the e ect of education accountability on yardstick competition in education spending for Brazilian municipalities. Our results are threefold. First, political incentives are pervasive in setting the education expenditures. The spatial strategic behavior on education spending is estimated lower for lame-ducks and for those incumbents with majority support at the city council. This suggests a strong relation between commitment and accountability which reinforces yardstick competition theory. Second, we nd a minor reduction (20%) in spatial interaction for public education spending after IDEB's disclosure | compared to the spatial correlation before the disclosure of the index. This suggests that public release of information may decrease the importance of the neighbors` counterpart information on voter`s decision. Third, exploring the discontinuity of IDEB`s disclosure rule around the cut-o of 30 students enrolled in the grade under assessment, our estimates suggest that the spatial autocorrelation | and hence yardstick competition | is reduced in 54%. Finally, an unforeseen result suggests that the disclosure of IDEB increases expenditures, more than 100% according to our estimates.

Volatility of returns, variations in prices and volume traded: evidence from the main stocks in Brazil

We study the relationship between the volatility and the price of stocks and the impact that variables such as past volatility, financial gearing, interest rates, stock return and turnover have on the present volatility of these securities. The results show the persistent behavior of volatility and the relationship between interest rate and volatility. The results also showed that a reduction in stock prices are associated with an increase in volatility. Finally we found a greater trading volume tends to increase the volatility.

Relations between regulation, competition policy and consumer protection in telecommunications, electricity and water supply

The purpose of this article is to discuss the relations between regulation, competition policy and consumer protection these relations in three key sectors of Brazil’s infrastructure: telecommunications, electricity and water supply. A study of the literature points to two general principles. First, the need for consumer protection depends on the “degree of sovereignty” enjoyed by consumers, defined in terms of the cost of consumer organization, consumers’ ability to evaluate services, and the level of competition in each sector. Second, the less sovereignty consumers enjoy the more consumer protection institutions are involved with regulation agencies. The evidence for the Brazilian case apparently corroborates these points. In addition, it is important to stress that consumer complaints in regulated sectors seem to have increased more intensely than in others. The article is divided into three sections. Section 1 presents theoretical elements and aspects of the relations between regulation, competition policy and consumer protection evidenced by international experience. Section 2 analyzes the Brazilian experience and in particular the available statistics on consumer complaints about telecommunications, electricity and water supply, submitted to Fundação Procon-SP during the nineties. The last section points to possible configurations of the institutional relations between competition policy, regulation and consumer protection, showing how the existing configuration of these areas in the three infrastructure sectors discussed confirms that the theoretical framework proposed has reasonable predictive power.

Retail competition and shelf space allocation

We develop a model to study shelf space allocation in retail. Retailers compete for consumers not only choosing prices but also by the space allocated to each product on shelves. Our approach depart from the existing literature on shelf allocation, as we model the problem of price setting and shelf allocation in an oligopolistic retail market. We present a simple model of retail competition in which prices are dispersed in the crosssection of stores but shelf allocation is not.

Essays on international prices and the subjacent market structure

Esta tese utiliza a informação contida em preços internacionais para identificar parâmetros de modelos de comércio sob competição imperfeita, desta forma permitindo inferência sobre o comportamento das exportações, sobre os ganhos de troca da abertura comercial e sobre a variedade de bens produzidos domesticamente. Em primeiro lugar, investigamos o repasse cambial, no longo prazo, para os preços praticados por exportadores brasileiros. O foco no longo prazo permite controlar os efeitos da rigidez de preço no curto prazo, de maneira que o repasse incompleto evidencie competição imperfeita com preços flexíveis. Em segundo lugar, calculamos os ganhos de troca de novas variedades de bens importados baseando-nos em estimativas para as elasticidades de substituição desagregadas. Finalmente, qualificamos a ênfase da literatura de comércio em ganhos de eficiência no lugar de ganhos de variedade, demonstrando que a variedade de bens produzidos domesticamente se amplia após aberturas comerciais desde que as firmas tenham uma margem de decisão em bens intermediários ou na qualificação da mão de obra.

Reinsurance in Brazil: what happened to prices?

Neste estudo investigamos a mudança no Brasil de um mercado fechado monopolista de resseguros para um mercado aberto. O foco tem sido sobre os prêmios, como a queda nos preços foi um dos benefícios mais antecipados da nova estrutura do mercado. Para comparar os preços de resseguro entre mercados o Índice Combinado foi usado. Ao comparar o Brasil ao Resto do Mundo, Índices Combinados significativamente menores foram observados para 2001 - 2007. No período 2008 - 2010, após a abertura, parece ter sido uma convergência dos Índices Combinados com os níveis no mundo. Confirma que os preços de resseguro eram altos no passado, e que ocorreu uma queda nos preços desde a abertura. No entanto estas conclusões devem ser tratados com alguma precaução uma vez que apenas 2,5 anos de experiência está disponível desde a abertura do mercado e outros fatores podem ter influenciado a evolução dos preços observados.

Optimal monetary policy under administered prices

This work aims to analyze the interaction and the effects of administered prices in the economy, through a DSGE model and the derivation of optimal monetary policies. The model used is a standard New Keynesian DSGE model of a closed economy with two sectors companies. In the first sector, free prices, there is a continuum of firms, and in the second sector of administered prices, there is a single firm. In addition, the model has positive trend inflation in the steady state. The model results suggest that price movements in any sector will impact on both sectors, for two reasons. Firstly, the price dispersion causes productivity to be lower. As the dispersion of prices is a change in the relative price of any sector, relative to general prices in the economy, when a movement in the price of a sector is not followed by another, their relative weights will change, leading to an impact on productivity in both sectors. Second, the path followed by the administered price sector is considered in future inflation expectations, which is used by companies in the free sector to adjust its optimal price. When this path leads to an expectation of higher inflation, the free sector companies will choose a higher mark-up to accommodate this expectation, thus leading to higher inflation trend when there is imperfect competition in the free sector. Finally, the analysis of optimal policies proved inconclusive, certainly indicating that there is influence of the adjustment model of administered prices in the definition of optimal monetary policy, but a quantitative study is needed to define the degree of impact.

Essays on competition and returns of inside money

In an early paper, Cavalcanti and Wallace (2001) showed, using a computable version of Cavalcanti-Wallace model (CW-1999), that optimal regulation induces banks to pay interests, instead of contracting the money supply in an inside money allocation. Here, we generalize CW in two fashions, assuming inside money allocations, so that banks are supposed to issue money as they find a potential producer wishing to produce. The first generalization allows for seasonality due to real shocks on preferences with persistence and for monetary policy improvement. We found an asymmetric path for interest rates when constraints matter, even when shocks are independent. The second generalization allows for bank competition, in the sense that banks can choose between two different banking nets. We proof the existence of simple stable and unstable equilibria and also verify the existence of multiple equilibria.

Como a utilização do leilão reverso eletrônico pode impactar as compras do setor hoteleiro brasileiro

Globalization, as an economic, social and cultural phenomenon, has profoundly changed the behavior of individuals, companies and nations. It is responsible for an increasingly borderless world and a significant increase in competition between companies, due to the rapid dissemination of information and technical and scientific advances. Every day at the global level, the growing competition between companies makes it more difficult for corporations to boost their earnings through added revenues, which makes it imperative to cut costs to be profitable. To this end, utilization of the reverse auction, which has emerged as a new purchasing tool in recent years, offers the possibility of a significant and immediate reduction in prices, as well as greater operational efficiency in purchasing. The Brazilian hotel industry has also experienced transformations with globalization. A business characterized in the 70s by small and medium-sized companies has developed into an economic segment that today includes large international chains and, therefore, also needs to cut costs to be profitable. Applying the case study approach, this research seeks to evaluate the impact that the utilization of a reverse auction as a purchasing tool has had on the hotel industry in Brazil.

Aspectos concorrenciais no mercado de leite fluido: um teste empírico no município de São Paulo

O objetivo deste trabalho é caracterizar o padrão de concorrência no mercado de leite fluido (longa vida e pasteurizado) na cidade de São Paulo a partir de evidências sobre os movimentos de preços no varejo e do comportamento das margens de mercado. Utilizou-se o modelo originalmente proposto por Houck (1977) acrescido das observações feitas por Carman e Sexton (2005). Essa abordagem separa as variáveis explicativas entre aumentos e diminuições de preços pagos ao produtor. Além de maior clareza na sua estrutura, essa construção permite comparar a defasagem entre esses dois movimentos e estudar a estratégia de preços dos agentes a partir das margens dos intermediários. O período analisado foi de dezembro de 1999 à dezembro de 2005, com dados de preços ao consumidor da FIPE e dados de preços ao produtor da CEPEA/ USP. Identificou-se que o padrão de concorrência do leite longa vida é bastante diverso do encontrado para o leite pasteurizado. Enquanto para o longa vida o padrão de concorrência é mais próximo do modelo competitivo, para o leite pasteurizado o padrão encontrado foi de pouca concorrência. Para compreender essas diferenças, foi discutido o aspecto locacional do varejo e a importância do mercado relevante geográfico. Os resultados permitem algumas inferências para análises setoriais e de políticas públicas voltadas à produção leiteira. O vertiginoso crescimento das vendas de leite longa vida, absorvendo grande parte do mercado antes abastecido pelo leite pasteurizado, trouxe maior concorrência nos segmentos de indústria e distribuição, assim como maior velocidade de transmissão de preços ao longo da cadeia produtiva. Entretanto, a precificação com markups com percentual fixo, observada no leite longa vida, indica que indústria e distribuição gozam de algum poder de mercado e que variações de custo da matéria-prima são repassadas mais que proporcionalmente, em termos absolutos, ao consumidor final.

Os efeitos da modalidade pregão na execução dos contratos continuados: um estudo de caso

O presente trabalho investiga os impactos das licitações do tipo menor preço, realizadas por meio de Pregão eletrônico, no desempenho das execuções dos contratos contínuos, efetivados pela Superintendência de Administração da AGU em Pernambuco - SAD/PE -, no período de 2006 a 2010. Teve como proposição a premissa de que a contratação do tipo menor preço pode, em função de suas próprias características, estimular uma redução excessiva nos preços ofertados pelos licitantes e originar contratações com valores muito baixos que interferem de forma negativa no desempenho da prestação dos serviços, gerando infrações contratuais e diminuindo a vida útil dos contratos contínuos. A aparente economia, consequência da acirrada competição nos leilões invertidos, que caracterizam a modalidade licitatória Pregão, em médio e longo prazo, pode ser questionada. Os resultados confirmaram a proposição, evidenciando um percentual de 55% dos contratos, oriundos de Pregão eletrônico, com infrações e 31%, rescindidos unilateralmente por descumprimento de cláusulas contratuais. Foi identificada uma relação, de força moderada, inversamente proporcional entre a economia inicial gerada na licitação e o tempo de execução dos contratos, sugerindo uma tendência no sentido de que - quanto maior a diferença entre o valor referencia e o contratado na licitação, menor o tempo de execução do contrato, pois, parte das contratações muito abaixo do preço de mercado, geraram contratos com pequena vida útil e com muitas infrações. As análises dos dados apontam para a necessidade de se relativizar a adoção da modalidade licitatória Pregão, repensando-se a sua indicação para serviços continuados