Does the concept of ″altered states of consciousness″ rest on a mistake?

Block (2002) has argued that the multiplicity of meanings ascribed to consciousness is due to the erroneous treatment of very different concepts as a single concept. Block distinguished four notions of consciousness intended to encapsulate the various meanings attributed to the term: phenomenal, access, self, and monitoring consciousness. We argue that what is common to all of these definitions is the implicit distinction between consciousness and the content of consciousness. We critically examine the term “altered state of consciousness” and argue that affixing the qualifier “altered state” to consciousness results in a theoretical confusion of consciousness and its content, that is, consciousness is mistaken for the content of consciousness. We refer to this as the consciousness/content fallacy and argue that it may be avoided if one supplants “altered states of consciousness” with “altered pattern of phenomenal properties,” an extrapolation of the term “phenomenal field.” Implications of the consciousness/content fallacy for theory and research are also considered.

Intimacy and making : thinking constellations of consciousness and the movements of invention

This paper takes up the three terms - creativity, consciousness and intimacy - and positions them as possible ‘ultimate terms’. Inquiring into the use of these terms to garner approval, status or power within cultural contexts, the paper attempts to unpack them, and simultaneously to seek out any structural similarities in the ways that they operate. The term ‘creativity’ is deconstructed via a Derridean framework, wherein ‘inventiveness’ is posited as a more rigorous alternative in most cases. Consciousness is read closely in relation to its association with notions of awareness and ‘enlightenment’. And ‘intimacy’ is playfully explored as an alternative term for enlightenment, a manoeuvre which brings to the fore some structural assumptions about that which intimacy might comprise. The assumption of intimacy as a spatially-dependent notion is also interrogated. The paper contends that intimacy may involve an unsettling of spatial assumptions proper, and therefore not be simply a function of closeness or distance. It draws on Serres’ notion of the angel as messenger and as analogy for the preposition, indicator of position, but occupant of none. Finally an example from art practice is offered, one that arguably performs the terms intimacy and creativity at once: an epistolary adventure in poetry and photographs, called The Post Project.

‘Interest’ in Kierkegaard’s structure of consciousness

Kierkegaard’s identification of “consciousness” with “interest” (interesse) in his unfinished work Johannes Climacus adds a distinctive dimension to his phenomenology of subjectivity. Commentators, however, have largely identified interesse with lidenskab (“passion”), a conflation I argue to be mistaken, or have otherwise failed to note the structural implications of interesse for Kierkegaard’s account of cognition. I draw out these implications and argue that the Climacan account of interest as the experience of finding ourselves in-between ideality and reality implies, in the context of Kierkegaard’s trichotomous ontology of consciousness, a form of non-thetic self-referentiality built into cognition itself. This self-referentiality also has the intriguing implication of making consciousness itself inherently teleological.

Antisubjectivism and the (spectral) return of consciousness in landscape research

This paper analyses the changing conceptions of consciousness within landscape research over a critical period from the late 20th century to the present. The 1980s and 1990s mark a radical shift in the framing of consciousness away from psychological, perceptual, or experiential perspectives towards an ontology of consciousness as signifier, cultural artifact, and ideology. In cultural geography and the visual arts, these reframings can be characterised as anti subjectivist in that they do not attempt to problematize human consciousness so much as deactivate it and disqualify it from discussion. I draw out the theoretical and critical foundations of these antisubjectivist approaches as well as the subsequent opening out of the notion of landscape in more recent discussion. This ‘opening out’ implicates a more complex reengagement with minds, bodies, and landscapes and with the contested distinctions between subject and object. At the same time however, consciousness is seldom formulated explicitly within the literature and hence consciousness often occupies a spectral presence in the landscape of landscape research. I use one of my own paintings, Dalek in Landscape, to presage the discussion and attempt to highlight the tensions between these ideological, cultural and biological dimensions of consciousness at play within the landscape idea. Given the broader adoption of these anti-subjectivist developments within the academy, the example of landscape serves as a potentially useful case study for thinking upon the changing conceptions of consciousness in cognate creative and academic disciplines.

Landscape and consciousness

Most conceptions of landscape tend to differentiate the term from mere land or territory by way of introducing an  intervening subject. In this respect, landscapes, whether “real” or depicted may be said to involve an encounter between subjectivity and an external space. What is largely absent from landscape literature however is an appreciation of this encounter or interaction in light of a 21st century conversation around consciousness.This paper asks: what is the relationship between consciousness and landscape and how can consciousness studies extend our interpretive and conceptual tools for both theorizing and creating landscapes? To explore this relationship, I draw on a familiar supposition of folk psychology: that experiences with landscape can enable states of heightened consciousness. I do this not to come to any firm conclusions on the matter but rather to address this broader question of relationships in a systematic way. The notion that an experience with a landscape quantitatively alters consciousness also prompts the counterintuitive possibility: that landscape diminishes rather than augments consciousness. In particular I draw on a hypothesis of the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC’s) developed by neuroscientist, Susan Greenfield. Greenfield proposes a quantitative model of subjective experience in which the subject’s sense of self exists not merely in on/off states but rather expands or diminishes from moment to moment and develops throughout one’s lifetime. The paper concludes that landscape may be regarded equally as a means by which consciousness is heightened or diminished. More broadly, the paper argues that both landscape and consciousness function as similar kinds of integrating/unifying/ defragmenting machines. They construct and preserve unity but do not necessarily put the subject “in touch” with reality.

Experimental study of ostensibly shamanic journeying imagery in naďve participants I: antecedents

The purpose of the present study was to investigate experimentally the antecedents of ostensibly shamanic journeying imagery associated with the Lower World in naïve participants. Forty six participants completed a composite questionnaire consisting of demographic items and the Tellegen Absorption Scale (Tellegen and Atkinson 1974). Participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions: Harner's (1990) shamanic journeying to the Lower World instructions coupled with monotonous percussion drumming at either 4 or 8 beats-per-second for either 10 or 15 minutes; and sitting quietly with eyes closed for 15 minutes. Participants' phenomenology was retrospectively assessed using the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (Pekala 1991) and a mental imagery checklist. The results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference between conditions with regards to the number of ostensibly shamanic journeying images. After adjusting for Harner's (1990) instructions, a significant main effect was found for both beats-per-second and time with regards to the number of ostensibly shamanic journeying images reported. There was a statistically significant relationship between condition and the tendency to report mental imagery associated with rocky ravines, predatory creatures, and rivers. Religious devotion was found to be a significant predictor of the number of ostensibly shamanic journeying images reported. Religious exposure and trait absorption were significant predictors of altered experience. Implications of the findings are discussed and suggestions for future research advanced.

Experimental study of ostensibly shamanic journeying imagery in naďve participants II: phenomenological mapping and modified affect bridge

This study develops the methodological framework advanced in Rock, Baynes, and Casey's (2005) experimental study of ostensibly shamanic journeying imagery in naïve participants. Specifically, the present study experimentally investigates the impact of the word landscape, featured in Harner's (1990) shamanic journeying to the Lower World instructions, on the number of landscape-related images reported; examines the origins of ostensibly shamanic journeying images; and maps the phenomenological state effects of shamanic journeying to the Lower World. Sixtyeight naïve participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: either the original or a revised version of Harner's (1990) instructions coupled with monotonous percussion drumming at 8 beats-per-second for 15 minutes, or sitting quietly with eyes open for 15 minutes. Each participant's subjective experience was retrospectively assessed using the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) (Pekala 1991) and a mental imagery checklist. Subsequently, participants were administered the Modified Affect Bridge for the purpose of exploring the origins of mental imagery experienced during the experimental conditions. The results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference between conditions with regard to the number of ostensibly shamanic journeying images reported, but not between treatment conditions with regard to the number of landscaperelated images reported. There were no significant relationships between condition and mental imagery derived from autobiographical memories. There were statistically significant differences between conditions with regard to the PCI dimensions of fear, altered state of awareness, and arousal.

Studio enquiry and new frontiers of research

Given the growing complexity of human existence, there is a need for new ways of representing ideas and of illuminating the world and domains of knowledge. A growing recognition of the limits of traditional ways of representing the world has given rise to a search for alternative approaches to transform and represent the contents of consciousness or what can be known of lived experience. Researchers are recognising that scientific inquiry is just one type of research and that ‘research is not merely a species of social science’ (Eisner 1997: 261). Dissatisfaction with positivism and behaviourism as reductive modes of knowing has also come from within the science disciplines themselves. In his work entitled, The Discontinuous Universe, (1972) Werner Heisenberg states that the knowledge of science is applicable only to limited realms of experience and the scientific method is but a single method for understanding the world. Moreover, the notion of scientifically-based knowledge as statements of ultimate truth contains an inner contradiction since ‘the employment of this procedure changes and transforms its object’ (Heisenberg 1972: 189). The work of Heisenberg and others including: Lincoln and Denzin (2003), Schwandt, (2001) and Schon (1983) reveals that knowledge is relational and that different models of inquiry will yield different forms of knowledge.

Conceptualizing craving : extrapolations from consciousness studies

The key definitional elements of the concept of craving remain highly contentious amongst addiction researchers. We argue that attempts to operationalize the craving construct may benefit from the conceptual and methodological advances that have occurred in the field of consciousness studies. Specifically, it is contended that the concept of craving cannot be fully articulated in the absence of a consideration of Husserl's notion of the intentional structure of human consciousness and related concepts such as phenomenology, discrete states of consciousness and altered states of consciousness. Extrapolating from the consciousness studies literature, we formulate numerous suggestions for future research intended to facilitate the operationalization of craving experiences.

The effect of Shamanic-like stimulus conditions and the cognitive-perceptual factor of schizotypy on phenomenology

Shamanism has remained an integral part of indigenous healing rituals since ancient times and is currently attracting interest as a complementary therapeutic technique in psychology. Recently, shamanic-like techniques have been used to facilitate changes in the phenomenology of nonshamans. However, such research has largely been delimited to a single shamanic-like technique (i.e., drumming), and the role of personality traits with regards to receptivity to this technique has been neglected. The purpose of the present study was to investigate experimentally the effect of different shamanic-like techniques and the cognitive-perceptual factor of the schizotypy construct on phenomenology. One hundred and four non-shamans were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: Drumming, Ganzfeld, or Sitting Quietly with Eyes Open. Participants' phenomenology was assessed using the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory, Phenomenology associated with shamanic-like techniques appeared to be statistically significantly different from phenomenology associated with sitting quietly with eyes open. Furthermore, high cognitive-perceptual participants reported significant alterations in phenomenology compared to their low cognitive-perceptual counterparts. Methodological shortcomings of the present study are discussed and suggestions for future research are advanced.

Quantitative analysis of research mediums' consious experiences during a discarnate reading versus a control task : a pilot study

Mediums claim to be able to report accurate and specific information about the deceased loved ones (termed discarnates) of living people (termed sitters) even without any prior knowledge about the sitters or the discarnates and in the complete absence of any sensory feedback. Despite recent proof-focused experimental research investigating this phenomenon (e.g., Beischel & Schwartz, 2007), no published studies have attempted to quantify the phenomenological effects of discarnate readings. The aim of the present study was, thus, to investigate experimentally the phenomenological differences that arose psychologically in accordance with the demands of a discarnate reading task versus a control task. Seven mediums were administered counter-balanced sequences of a discarnate reading and control condition. The discarnate reading condition consisted of a phone reading including questions about a discarnate where only a blinded medium and a blinded experimenter were on the phone. The control condition consisted of a phone conversation between the medium and the same experimenter in which the medium was asked similar questions regarding a living person s/he (i.e., the medium) knew. Mediums’ phenomenology during each condition was retrospectively assessed using the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI). Phenomenology associated with the discarnate reading condition appeared to be significantly different from phenomenology associated with the control condition. Future research might use the PCI to address whether the phenomenology reported by mediums during discarnate readings is quantitatively different from their experiences during psychic telepathy readings for the living.

The hybrid self and the ambivalence of boundaries

The paper outlines the main features of the contemporary discourse on hybrid subjectivity, a discourse which is internally differentiated along 'organic', 'intentional', and critical social theory lines. It then examines how these discourses can be applied to our understanding of hybrid cultures and identities. The article focuses on two central claims underlying the intentional approach: one, that cultural boundaries are theoretically and empirically problematic; and secondly, that a hybrid position provides the potential for an enlightened and critical world-view. In response, two contentions are articulated that will provide a more nuanced understanding of the hybrid self. Drawing on the work of Simmel and Park, the paper, in contrast to the intentional account, highlights the ambivalence of boundaries; secondly, a critical investigation of the enlightened hybrid consciousness is offered which suggests that this new form of consciousness underplays the role of prejudice and ambivalence. As a result of these discussions, the article demonstrates that the discourse on hybrid identity raises key theoretical issues either ignored or insufficiently addressed by existing scholarship.