‘Interest’ in Kierkegaard’s structure of consciousness
Data(s) |
01/12/2008
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Resumo |
Kierkegaard’s identification of “consciousness” with “interest” (interesse) in his unfinished work Johannes Climacus adds a distinctive dimension to his phenomenology of subjectivity. Commentators, however, have largely identified interesse with lidenskab (“passion”), a conflation I argue to be mistaken, or have otherwise failed to note the structural implications of interesse for Kierkegaard’s account of cognition. I draw out these implications and argue that the Climacan account of interest as the experience of finding ourselves in-between ideality and reality implies, in the context of Kierkegaard’s trichotomous ontology of consciousness, a form of non-thetic self-referentiality built into cognition itself. This self-referentiality also has the intriguing implication of making consciousness itself inherently teleological. |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
Philosophy Documentation Center |
Relação |
http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30063328/stokes-interestinkierkegaards-2008.pdf |
Palavras-Chave | #Kierkegaard #interest |
Tipo |
Journal Article |