Directors' duties to creditors in Australia after spies v the Queen

In August 2000, the High Court handed down its decision in Spies v The Queen . According to most commentators, the decision ended a "quiet revolution" which had been underway since Walker v Wimborne by rejecting the suggestion that directors owe an independent duty to creditors. In this article, the writer responds to this commentary in two ways. First, by contending that the High Court's comments in Spies concerning directors' duties to creditors were merely obiter, thereby leaving open the possibility that an independent duty to creditors will be confirmed in a subsequent case. Secondly, by suggesting that if the commentary to date is correct, then the Spies decision has minimal impact in terms of creditor protection as directors' duties under the Corporations Act 2001 already provide sufficient protection for creditors.

Directors' duties to stakeholders : a reform proposal based on three false assumptions

The Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee has been asked to consider whether the duties of directors under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) should be broadened to require directors to take into account the interests of stakeholder groups other than shareholders when making corporate decisions. In this article, the author argues that the existing statutory duties of directors in Australia should remain unchanged. The existing duties of directors, in particular the overriding duty of directors to act in the best interests of the company, already accommodates consideration of stakeholder interests by directors if the decision is justifiable as being in the company's best interests. Furthermore, corporate culture and norms are moving towards embracing stakeholder engagement, again with the implicit recognition that integrating stakeholder considerations within the decision-making processes of companies is integral to achieving long-term sustainable growth.

The stakeholder debate and directors' fiduciary duties

It is usually said that a company is a legal entity separate from its management and shareholders and that the business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of its board. This implies various duties and responsibilities for directors.<br>Directors' duties traditionally include onerous fiduciary duties and obligations of care, skill and diligence in terms of the common law, various statutory provisions in the Companies Act 61 of 1973 requiring certain things of directors or preventing them from doing certain things (see, eg, ss 221-227 and 234-246 of the Act), and possible duties imposed by the articles of association or even separate agreements between directors and their companies.

Regulatory and enabling approaches to corporate law enforcement : patterns of litigation 1986-2002 and the effect of recent reforms in New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom

Enforcement of corporate rights and duties may follow either a ‘regulatory’ or ‘enabling’ model. If a regulatory approach is taken, enforcement action will generally be undertaken by regulatory agencies such as, in New Zealand, the Registrar of Companies and Securities Commission, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) or the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the United Kingdom. If an enabling approach is chosen, enforcement action will more often be by private parties such as company shareholders, directors or creditors. When New Zealand's company law was reformed in 1993, a primarily private enforcement regime was adopted, consisting of a list of statutory directors' duties and an enhanced collection of shareholder remedies, based in part upon North American models and including a statutory derivative action. Public enforcement was largely confined to administrative matters and the enforcement of the disclosure requirements of New Zealand's securities law. While the previous enforcement regime was similarly reliant on private action, the law on directors' duties was less accessible, and shareholder action was hindered by the majority rule principle and the rule in Foss v Harbottle. This approach is in contrast with that used in Australia and the United Kingdom, where public agencies have a much more prominent enforcement role despite recent and proposed reforms to directors' duties and shareholder remedies. These reforms are designed to improve the ability of private parties to enforce corporate rights and duties. A survey of enforcement litigation in New Zealand since 1986 indicates that the object of a primarily enabling enforcement regime seems to have been achieved, and may well have been achieved even without the 1993 reform package. Private enforcement has, in fact, been much more prevalent than public enforcement since well before the enactment of the new legislation. Most enforcement action both before and after the reform was commenced by shareholders and shareholder/directors, and most involved closely held companies. Public enforcement was largely undertaken in areas such as securities law, where the wider public interest was affected. Similar surveys of Australian and United Kingdom enforcement litigation reveal a proportionally much greater reliance on public bodies to enforce corporate rights and duties, indicating a more regulatory approach. The ASIC and DTI enforced a wider range of provisions, affecting both closely and widely held companies, than those subject to public enforcement in New Zealand. Publicly enforced provisions in Australia and the United Kingdom include directors' duties and provisions dealing with disqualification from managing companies, as well as securities law requirements.

Some care, little responsibility? Promoting directors'and managers' legal accountability for Occupational Health and Safety in the workplace

Health and safety at work remains a serious and under-recognised problem in Australia. This paper argues for the importance of increasing the individual responsibility and accountability of senior managers and directors of corporations for the development and maintenance of occupational health and safety (OHS) standards in the workplace. In order to do so, the paper first sets out the range of statutory and general law duties and liabilities to which directors and senior managers are subject, considers to what extent these obligations have relevance in the OHS area and argues for the extension of these duties and liabilities in some circumstances. The paper then goes on to argue for a better legislative model for the legal responsibility of managers and officers, supported by the increased prosecution of individuals in appropriate circumstances, as well as acknowledging the benefits of a broader range of non-legal strategies to improve board level commitment to OHS that will influence corporate compliance overall.

Models for reform : the directors’ duty of care in a modern commercial world

The Australian responses to corporate collapses in the modern commercial world have been
implemented at both judicial and legislative levels over a period of decades. South Africa has lagged behind the reform process, only recently reviewing its company laws with a view to legislatively incorporating, inter alia, its directors’ duties. The consequence of such review of the duty of care is found in subsection 76(3)(c) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. This article critically evaluates the existing South African common law and the new legislative directors’ duty of care in light of the equivalent duties in Australia and the United States. The analysis ultimately aims at determining whether the approach taken in any of these jurisdictions provides useful guidance in regard to reform options for the duty of care. While the Companies Act contains features that are preferable to the Australian Corporations Act 2001, the impact of the Companies Act on crucial features, such as the objectivity of the duty of care, is unclear and will have to await judicial review. It is concluded that while the South African measures at times echo Australian law in a positive manner, the Australian legislative regime is not without legitimate criticism as it can be unnecessarily complicated. Ultimately it is the United States and Australian common law duty of care that provides the best model for legislative reform.

Putting the spoils of litigation into the shareholders’ pockets: when can shareholders bring a personal action against the directors of their company?

company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other independent person with its rightsand liabilities appropriate to itself”.2 A consequence of this is the “proper plaintiff” principleestablished in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189: the proper plaintiff in an action inrespect of a wrong done to a corporation is the corporation itself.3 It is also a “hallowed rule” thatdirectors owe their duties to the company, not the shareholders,4 and so any loss accruing to thecompany as a result of the directors’ breach of their duties is recoverable only by the company.5An obvious problem with this state of affairs is that a company will be unlikely to initiateproceedings against its directors when the company is controlled by those directors.6 While there aregood economic reasons for this division of management and ownership,7 shareholders are left with acritical question: under what circumstances can they initiate proceedings to recover loss suffered as aresult of company directors’ breach of their duties? Although one writer has referred to the“expansive statutory and common law arsenals” available to aggrieved shareholders,8 it seems ratherthe case that there are few effective remedies. For shareholders have no contractual relationship withdirectors,9 and the personal rights conferred on shareholders by statute or general law are largelyprocedural10 and seem a rather ineffective basis for “scrutinising directorial performance”.

"Sexually transmitted debts":the scope of defences to directors' liability for insolvent trading

The recent demise of prominent Australian corporations, such as GIO Australia Holdings Ltd, One.Tel Ltd, HIH Insurance Ltd and Ansett Australia Ltd, have highlighted the relevance of, inter alia, the Australian insolvent trading provisions embodied in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (formerly Corporations Law). What may not be appreciated, however, is that insolvent trading is not only concerned with large public companies. Many of the insolvent trading cases that come before the courts involve small proprietary companies. Moreover, in many cases these are small “family” companies where there may only be one active director. This gives rise to a difficult issue as to the appropriateness of imposing liability for insolvent trading on a spouse who is, factually, merely a dormant director. This article explores the issue of spousal liability for insolvent trading, particularly focusing on the scope of the current defences to insolvent
trading under s 588H.

Removal of company directors in a climate of corporate collapses

The string of high-profile corporate collapses recently has provided a fresh insight into many important topics and issues in Australian corporations law. Notwithstanding this, one topic that continues to receive inadequate attention both in Australia and in foreign jurisdictions is the statutory removal of  directors. In an earlier article published in this journal, one of the present authors contributed towards addressing this lack of commentary on the topic by highlighting a number of peculiarities with the provisions under the then Corporations Law regulating the removal of directors in public and proprietary companies. Since that time, the CLERP amendments to the Corporations Law (now Corporations Act 2001) in 2000 introduced some interesting changes to the provisions dealing with the removal of directors in public and proprietary companies. In this article, the authors provide an explanation and critical analysis of these changes, and consider the recent Western Australian Supreme Court decision of Allied & Mining Process Ltd v Boldbow Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 195, which deals with some of the issues raised by the authors in relation to the CLERP amendments. According to the authors, whilst some of the peculiarities raised in the earlier article no longer exist post-CLERP, the current removal provisions still raise some important questions of interpretation.

Directors' duty to use their powers for proper or permissable purposes

This article focuses generally on the interaction among several internal company law doctrines such as the supremacy of the articles of association; that other organs cannot interfere with powers exclusively conferred upon a particular organ; that courts will not readily interfere with internal company matters; that directors are under a duty to act in good faith and in the best interest of the company as a whole and under a duty to use their powers for proper or permissible purposes; and that there are some remedies available to shareholders if directors did not perform their powers for a proper or permissible purpose. The specific aim with the article is to establish when and why the courts will be prepared to set aside decisions by directors if they have taken them for an improper or impermissible purpose. The article concludes that the courts will be prepared to set the decisions of directors aside when they have used a particular power substantially or primarily for an improper or impermissible purpose. When the exercise of directors' powers is challenged under circumstances where there were both permissible and impermissible purposes for exercising a particular power, there is no alternative for the court but to inquire into the complex area of the state of mind of those who acted and the motive on which they acted. This is, in fact, second-guessing the decisions of directors.

Privatising human rights: what happens to the state`s human rights duties when services are privatised?

Human rights law has traditionally focused on the obligations of states in fulfilment of human rights - how a state-focused approach fits in a world where social services are frequently privatised or contracted out - examples of social service provision, health, education and prisons, and inquiries into the obligations of the state and the private operators in relation to these services - private providers of social services have certain human rights obligations within their respective spheres of activity - the state retains an obligation to guarantee the protection and realisation of human rights of everyone under its jurisdiction, regardless of the character of the service provider.

Why all directors should be shareholders in the company: the case against "independence"

It is argued that the shift towards more 'independent' directors, in the wake of corporate collapses, is a fundamentally bad move, undermining the rights and powers of minority shareholders - entrenches a second-rate corporate governance model, separation of ownership and control, in company law - rather than suggest cosmetic reform in an attempt to address the problem, it is proposed that all directors must have significant interest in the company they serve - directors' self-interests and the best interests of the company become intertwined - this is a more effective way of tackling the problem of separation of ownership and control

Ambiguities and inconsistencies in relation to the obligations of proxies under corporations law: a model for reform

This article reconsiders the important question which came to light as a result of the controversial 2002 Coles Myer annual general meeting: do directors that are appointed as proxy have an obligation to vote as directed (and indeed should they)? A recent decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court, which was subsequently approved on appeal, stands for the proposition that proxy holders are agents of the shareholders that appointed them. However, currently the Corporations Act only requires a Chairman appointed as proxy to vote as directed — not an ordinary director. This article briefly explains the present state of the law in Australia on this issue, and then explores some interesting recent judicial remarks which may suggest that ordinary directors appointed as proxy must vote as directed in order to satisfy their director’s duties (both common law and statutory) to the company. We finally outline a proposed statutory reform initiative which seeks to remove the present uncertainty in the law by introducing a blanket requirement that all proxy holders must vote as directed.