How individuals judge the fairness of pay

International survey data and case studies explore how individuals come to regard some ways of deciding pay as fair and others as unfair. Individuals, motivated by material and psychological self interest, but limited by social reality, interpret pay to maximise perceptions of entitlement while maintaining a positive and coherent self concept.

Interview with Samson Akunaii

Samson Akunaii is a Papua New Guinean who studied in Australia at James Cook University in Townsville, Queensland 1987-1989. He was awarded an AusAID scholarship through his employer the PNG Institute of Medical Research (IMR) and completed an MBA. His wife and three daughters accompanied him to Australia. He returned to Goroka in PNG and currently works in Corporate Affairs for the IMR. The interview was conducted by Dr Jonathan Ritchie of Deakin University and Dr Musawe Sinebare of Pacific Adventist University. The interview was recorded on 9 July 2014. This set comprises: An interview recording, timed summary of the interview, and photograph of Samson Akunaii.

A reputation-based trust model for agent societies

Trust and security issues are prevalent in agent societies, where agents are autonomously owned and operated in a networked environment. Nowadays, trust and reputation management is a promising approach to manage them. However, many reputation models su.ered from a major drawback – there is no mechanism to discourage agents from lying information when making a recommendation. Although some works do take into account of this issue, they usually do not penalize an agent for making poor referrals. Worse, some systems actually judge an agents referral reputation based on its service reputation. In situations where this is unacceptable, we need to have a mechanism where agents are not only discouraged from making poor referrals, but are also penalized when doing so. Towards this, we propose a reputation-based trust model that considers an agents referral reputation as a separate entity within the broader sense of an agents reputation. Our objective is not to replace any existing reputation mechanisms, but rather to complement and extend them.

Information signalling of common stock repurchase announcements: Australian evidence

Stock repurchases (or share buy-backs) have become increasingly popular among Australian companies. One of the main aims of announcing a stock repurchase by a listed company is signalling the market that its shares are currently underpriced. When market reacts to the signal, price of the shares is expected to increase immediately after the announcement. While there are several ways of repurchasing shares, 'on-market buy-backs' is the most popular method of stock repurchases in Australia. Australian listed companies have announced more than two hundred on-market share buy-backs over the past three years. The aim of this paper is to examine the information signalling effects of these on-market buy-back announcements. If the signal is considered positively (negatively) by the market, the price of the repurchasing company's shares should increase (decrease) immediately after the announcement. If there is no information content in the announcement, the price will remain the same. In this study, signalling effect of share buy-back announcements was examined using most recent Australian data. The total population of on-market buy-back announcements during the period from January 1, 2000 to March 10, 2003 was included. The abnormal market return over the short-run (announcement day and 9 trading days centred on the announcement date) was computed using the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index as the reference portfolio. The daily Abnormal Returns (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) during the event period were computed. The results strongly support the information-signalling hypothesis of share buy..backs. Australian market generally considers announcement of on~market share repurchases as signalling of insider information that shares are currently underpriced.

Agency theory, national culture and management Control Systems

Management control system of an organization is the structured facet of management, the formal vehicle by which the management process is executed. In most organizations, systems exist for planning, organizing, directing, controlling and motivating. Depending on the level of appropriateness and quality of the management control systems, the task of management is either facilitated or hindered. The end goal of a management control system is achieving organizational objectives. Because employees (agents) do not always give their best efforts for achieving organizational objectives, management control systems need to strive for aligning goals of agents (e.g., employees, subordinates) with that of principals (e.g., senior management, owners). Agency theory and its extension, principal agent model, provide insights to the problem of goal congruence and suggest remedies, at least in the Western cultural context. Whether the agency theory presumptions, predictions and prescriptions are universally applicable is an important issue in management. Their validity in different cultural contexts is largely unknown. The available literature to date indicates the possibility that agency theory may not be valid in non-western cultures. However, further empirical research is needed in non-western cultures to shed more light to this issue.