Quality testing and product rationing by input suppliers

Quality testing by suppliers has significant ramifications for downstream supply chain participants and retail consumers. This article focuses on such implications accounting for the fact that suppliers often enjoy discretion in quality testing and reporting. Under a discretionary testing and reporting environment, we show that a supplier can improve the market's perception of product quality by engaging in self-imposed production cuts. Production cuts dampen supplier incentives to engage in excessive quality testing, putting the supplier and the market on a more equal information footing. This reduces the market's need to skeptically discount product quality to protect itself. The improved market perception, then, reduces quality testing demand, introducing cost savings. The result that costly production cuts can improve quality perceptions indicates that the groundwork for influencing market perceptions may have to be laid upfront, even prior to acquiring private information, providing a contrast to routine signaling models.

Socially optimal criminal court waiting times : a partial investigation

Criminal courts provide a forum for conducting prosecutions with a guilty plea or a trial. Since queues are used as the basis for rationing scarce court facilities delays are inevitable, however courts are invariably criticised as being inefficient as a consequence. This focus on court delay defined as the time elapsing between the listing of the case in the court list and its final disposition is misleading. Rather, attention should be drawn to the considerably longer period between the initiation of proceedings and the conclusion of the case. In the case of defendants not granted bail, this pre-trial delay confers both costs and benefits on society and this observation can be used to ascertain socially optimal pre-trial waits.

Indirect government controls over Australia's social security expenditure : a Foucauldian analysis

Purpose – The aim of this study is to examine how the use of indirect government control mechanisms is used as a means of holding government agencies such as job network providers and recipients of social security benefits accountable. The mechanisms of indirect government will be examined using Michel Foucault's discourses on disciplinary power, surveillance and normalisation.

Design/methodology/approach – The mechanisms of indirect government are investigated through a survey questionnaire and focus group interviews. The questionnaire is assessed and analysed using descriptive statistics and principal component analysis with varimax rotation.

Findings – It is found that the rationing and disciplinary mechanisms of the breaching regime, through a process of disciplinary power, surveillance and normalisation, combine to help hold government agencies and recipients of social security benefits accountable, which in turn helps control the level of social security expenditure.

Originality/value – The current study extends our understanding of the functions of indirect government by providing an applied example of how the process of government works indirectly through government agencies and the abundant rules and regulations that underpin such bureaucracies.