Pierre Hadot (1922-2010)

Pierre Hadot, classical philosopher and historian of philosophy, is best known for his conception of ancient philosophy as a bios or way of life (manière de vivre). His work has been widely influential in classical studies and on thinkers, including Michel Foucault. According to Hadot, twentieth- and twenty-first-century academic philosophy has largely lost sight of its ancient origin in a set of spiritual practices that range from forms of dialogue, via species of meditative reflection, to theoretical contemplation. These philosophical practices, as well as the philosophical discourses the different ancient schools developed in conjunction with them, aimed primarily to form, rather than only to inform, the philosophical student. The goal of the ancient philosophies, Hadot argued, was to cultivate a specific, constant attitude toward existence, by way of the rational comprehension of the nature of humanity and its place in the cosmos. This cultivation required, specifically, that students learn to combat their passions and the illusory evaluative beliefs instilled by their passions, habits, and upbringing. To cultivate philosophical discourse or writing without connection to such a transformed ethical comportment was, for the ancients, to be as a rhetorician or a sophist, not a philosopher. However, according to Hadot, with the advent of the Christian era and the eventual outlawing, in 529 C.E., of the ancient philosophical schools, philosophy conceived of as a bios largely disappeared from the West. Its spiritual practices were integrated into, and adapted by, forms of Christian monasticism. The philosophers’ dialectical techniques and metaphysical views were integrated into, and subordinated, first to revealed theology and then, later, to the modern natural sciences. However, Hadot maintained that the conception of philosophy as a bios has never completely disappeared from the West, resurfacing in Montaigne, Rousseau, Goethe, Thoreau, Nietzsche, and Schopenhauer, and even in the works of Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Heidegger.

Hadot’s conception of ancient philosophy and his historical narrative of its disappearance in the West have provoked both praise and criticism. Hadot received a host of letters from students around the world telling him that his works had changed their lives, perhaps the most fitting tribute given the nature of Hadot’s meta-philosophical claims. Unlike many of his European contemporaries, Hadot’s work is characterized by lucid, restrained prose; clarity of argument; the near-complete absence of recondite jargon; and a gentle, if sometimes self-depreciating, humor. While Hadot was an admirer of Nietzsche and Heidegger, and committed to a kind of philosophical recasting of the history of Western ideas, Hadot’s work lacks any eschatological sense of the end of philosophy, humanism, or the West. Late in life, Hadot would report that this was because he was animated by the sense that philosophy, as conceived and practiced in the ancient schools, remains possible for men and women of his era: “from 1970 on, I have felt very strongly that it was Epicureanism and Stoicism which could nourish the spiritual life of men and women of our times, as well as my own” (PWL 280).

Controlling the philosophical imaginary: reading Pierre Hadot with Luiz Costa Lima

This essay proffers a critical complement to Luiz Costa Lima's claims concerning the nature, history, and control of the imagination in Western culture. Accepting the wide scope of Costa Lima's critical claim about the socio-political control of imaginative literature in Western history, we claim that Pierre Hadot's work on philosophy as a bios in the ancient West cautions us lest we position philosophy in this history as always and necessarily an agency of control. At different times, philosophy has rather stood as an ally in practicing and promoting forms of criticity, and the playful, creative, and transformative envisaging of alternative ways of experiencing the world Costa Lima theoretically celebrates in literary fiction. Any critique of philosophy as always opposed to the critical imagination can only stand, we have argued, relative to philosophy as conceived on what Hadot suggests is but one, albeit the now hegemonic model: namely, as a body of systematic rational discourses, including discourses about the literary, poetics, and imaginary. What this vision of philosophy misses, Hadot shows, is how the ancient conception of philosophy (which survives in figures like Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Goethe) as a way of life promoted distinctly literary, aesthetic, and imaginative practices; first, to assist in the existential internalisation of the schools' ideas; secondly, to envisage in the sage and utopias edifying counterfactuals to help students critically reimagine accepted norms; and thirdly, in the conception of a transformed way of living and perceiving ‘according to nature’, whose parameters of autonomy and pleasurable contemplation of the singularity of the present experiences anticipate the experiences delineated in modern aesthetic theory.

To not forget: Pierre Hadot’s last book on Goethe. Pierre Hadot, N’oublie pas de vivre: pas de vivre: Goethe et la tradition des exercises spirituels (Albin Michel, 2008)

N’Oublie pas de vivre: Goethe et la tradition des exercises spirituels, which has remained untranslated, has hitherto attracted little scholarly recognition or critical notice, even in its native French. It is this situation that this review essay hopes to redress, in the small way permitted to any such piece of writing. In what follows, we examine in turn Hadot’s framing claims concerning the shaping ends and origins of Goethe’s species of neoclassicism (Part I), his claims concerning Goethe’s debt to the classical or Hellenistic tradition of spiritual exercises (Part II), before our closing remarks (Part III) challenge some of Hadot’s claims concerning the author of Faust, and then reflect on the significance of the fact that this last philosophical testament of Pierre Hadot’s was on a modern novelist, scientist, and poet, not an ancient philosopher.

Socratic ironies: reading Hadot, reading Kierkegaard

This paper examines the seemingly unlikely rapport between the ‘Christian existentialist’, radically Protestant thinker, Søren Kierkegaard and French classicist and historian of philosophy, Pierre Hadot, famous for advocating a return to the ancient pagan sense of philosophy as a way of life. Despite decisive differences we stress in our concluding remarks, we argue that the conception of philosophy in Hadot as a way of life shares decisive features with Kierkegaard’s understanding of the true ‘religious’ life: as something demanding existential engagement from its proponent, as well as the learning or recitation of accepted doctrines. The mediating figure between the two authors, the paper agrees with Irina (2012), is Socrates and his famous irony. In order to appreciate Kierkegaard’s rapport with Hadot, then (and in contrast to Gregor, who has also treated the two figures) we first of all consider Hadot’s treatment of the enigmatic ‘old wise man’ who remains central to Kierkegaard’s entire authorship. (Part 1) However, to highlight Hadot’s Socratic proximity to Kierkegaard (in contrast to Irina), we set up Hadot’s Socrates against the contrasting portrait readers can find in John M. Cooper’s recent work on Socrates and philosophy as a way of life. Part II of the essay turns back from Hadot’s and Kierkegaard’s Socrates towards Hadot’s own work, and argues—again moving beyond both Gregor and Irina’s works on Hadot and Kierkegaard—that the shape of Hadot’s ‘authorship’, including his remarkably classical style, can be understood by way of Kierkegaard’s notion of indirect communication. In our concluding remarks, in the spirit of Kierkegaard, we pinpoint the fundamental difference between the two thinkers, arguing that for Hadot in contrast to Kierkegaard, a stress on existential commitment in no way speaks against the philosophical defence of a form of rational universalism. Reading Hadot via Kierkegaard allows us to appreciate Hadot’s novelty as attempting to ‘squaring the circle’ between an emphasis on subjectivity and, as it were, the subjective dimensions of philosophers’ pursuit of rational universality.

What place discourse, what role rigorous argumentation? Against the standard image of Hadot's conception of philosophy as a way of life

After an introduction situating the piece in light of debates surrounding Hadot et al's work on the history of philosophy, Part I of what follows lays out, as briefly as possible, the 'standard view' of Hadot promoted by the texts that have been translated hitherto, and which has attracted Cooper, Nussbaum et al’s criticisms about misrepresenting--or dismissing-the place of rational argument in philosophy 'comme manière de vivre'. In Part II, will we see how several of Hadot’s as-yet-untranslated pieces, led by 'La Philosophie Antique: Une Éthique ou une Pratique?', indicate his own much more qualified perspectives about the place of discourse in ancient philosophy conceived as a way of life. To argue that philosophy included the paranoetic prescription of imaginative, mnemic, and even somatic exercises to rehape subjects' beliefs, habits, and desires is not to deny that these exercises were justified rationally, or based in rigorous theoretical accounts of the human being and its place in the cosmos.

Philosophy and the view from above in Alejandro's Amenabar's agora

 This paper examines the depiction of neoplatonic philosopher, geometer and astronomer Hypatia in Alejandro Amenabar's 2010 fil Agora.  The paper uses Pierre Hadot's work, and his arguments that ancient philosophy was conceived as a way of life, aiming at the ideal existence of the sage, and characterised by spiritual exercises.  The paper argues that Amenabar's film employs the technique of the view from above, one such spiritual exercise, wherein the agent relooks at his or life sub spaecie aeternitatis or 'from above', to frame Hypatia's life and death, and the end of the pagan epoch in Alexandria.

Georgics of the mind and the architecture of fortune: Francis Bacon's therapeutic ethics

This essay complements recent work by Soreana Corneanu situating Bacon’s epistemology in a larger lineage of literature concerning ‘cultura animi’ in early modern Europe, by focusing on Bacon’s conception of a therapeutic philosophical ‘Georgics of the mind’ in The Advancement of Learning, the Essays, and other texts. We aim to show firstly (in Part 2) how Bacon’s conception of human nature, and the importance of habit and custom, reflects the ancient pagan thinkers’ justifications of philosophical therapeutics. Attention will also be paid in this connection to Bacon’s sensitivity to another marker of ancient therapeutic philosophy as Pierre Hadot in particular has recently presented it: the proliferation of different rhetorical and literary forms aiming at different pedagogic, therapeutic, and psychogogic aims. Part 3 then will examine Bacon’s changes in practical or ‘magistral’ philosophy, carried out on the therapeutic ethical grounds which Part 2 has examined, but proposing a much more active ‘architecture of fortune’ to philosophical and political aspirants.

The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu and researching education policy

Bourdieu did not write anything explicitly about education policy. Despite this neglect, we agree with van Zanten that his theoretical concepts and methodological approaches can contribute to researching and understanding educational policy in the context of globalisation and the economising of it. In applying Bourdieu's theory and methodology to research in education policy, we focus on developing his work to understand what we call 'cross-field effects' and for exploring the emergence of a 'global education policy field'. These concepts are derived from some of our recent research concerning globalisation and mediatisation of education policy. The paper considers three separate issues. The first deals with Bourdieu' s primary 'thinking tools', namely practice, habitus,capitals and fields and their application to policy studies. The second and third sections consider two additions to Bourdieu's thinking tools, as a way to reconceptualise the functioning of policy if considered as a social field. More specifically, the second section develops an argument around cross-field effects, as a way to group together, research and describe policy effects. The third section develops an argument about an emergent global education policy field, and considers ways that such a field affects national education policy fields.

Book review: Picturing Algeria by Bourdieu, Pierre

A review of the 2012 English translation of Pierre Bourdieu's Picturing Algeria.
Picturing Algeria presents passages from the French sociologist's texts on Algeria with photographs taken during his period of national service in Algeria as a young academic and his subsequent appointment as a university lecturer in Algiers, and an interview conducted towards the end of his career.