What place discourse, what role rigorous argumentation? Against the standard image of Hadot's conception of philosophy as a way of life

After an introduction situating the piece in light of debates surrounding Hadot et al's work on the history of philosophy, Part I of what follows lays out, as briefly as possible, the 'standard view' of Hadot promoted by the texts that have been translated hitherto, and which has attracted Cooper, Nussbaum et al’s criticisms about misrepresenting--or dismissing-the place of rational argument in philosophy 'comme manière de vivre'. In Part II, will we see how several of Hadot’s as-yet-untranslated pieces, led by 'La Philosophie Antique: Une Éthique ou une Pratique?', indicate his own much more qualified perspectives about the place of discourse in ancient philosophy conceived as a way of life. To argue that philosophy included the paranoetic prescription of imaginative, mnemic, and even somatic exercises to rehape subjects' beliefs, habits, and desires is not to deny that these exercises were justified rationally, or based in rigorous theoretical accounts of the human being and its place in the cosmos.