Political patriotism

As evidenced by the reactions to Martha Nussbaum’s famous essay of 1996, patriotism is a contested notion in moral debate. This paper explores the suggestion made by Stephen Nathanson that patriotism might be understood as “love of one’s country”, and suggests that this phrase is misleading. It suggests that patriotism, like love, is not rational, and it fails to distinguish two kinds of object for that love: one’s cultural community and one’s political community. Accordingly, this phrase can lead to a kind of nationalism which involves chauvinism and militarism and that is, therefore, morally objectionable. The problem arises from ambiguities in the notion of “country” which is said to be the object of such love. Moreover, “love” is not the appropriate term for a relationship whose central psychological function is that of establishing an individual’s identity as a citizen. I suggest that the proper mode of attachment involved in patriotism is identification with one’s political community, and that the proper object of a patriot’s allegiance is the political community thought of without the emotional, nationalistic and moralistic connotations that often accompany the concept of community. The “political patriotism” that arises from such an attitude is sceptical of “the national interest” and does not accept that our moral responsibilities to others stop at national borders. In this way political patriotism is consistent with a cosmopolitan stance towards human rights and global justice.

Well-being achievement in Pacific Asia

The world has undergone rapid and tremendous change in recent decades. While many nations have achieved ever-higher per capita incomes, and higher well-being according to traditional measures, they have also experienced profound internal change. This change has lead to widespread concerns regarding social exclusion, human security, levels of personal satisfaction and happiness. Other countries have faired much less well, as according to many well-being measures they are worse off than they were 10 or 20 years ago. Life expectancies, for example, have fallen dramatically in many countries and are likely to fall substantially in others. The incidence of income poverty is higher today in many countries than it was ten years ago. Worldwide, more than a billion people currently live on less than one dollar per day. Social science research on living standards, human well-being and quality of life has come a long way over recent years, altering in response to changing global conditions, new research priorities, new conceptualisations and improved data resources. Twenty five years ago, national well-being achievement comparisons relied very heavily, and in some circles exclusively, on measures of income per capita. The same exercise would today be based a range of indicators, including summary measures of human well-being such as the well-known Human Development Index (UNDP, 2005). This is consistent with the commonly accepted view that human well-being is best treated as a multidimensional concept along the lines advocated by Sen (1985, 1993), Stewart (1985), Doyal & Gough (1991), Ramsay (1992), Cummins (1996), Narayan et al. (2000) or Nussbaum (2000) and others, as summarised in Alkire (2002). This view tends not to reject the relevance of income based or economic measures per se, simply positing that there is more to well-being achievement than simply increasing incomes. The widespread acceptance that well-being is multidimensional has more recently been accompanied by another important recognition. This relates not so much to current levels of well-being, but to the likelihood of declines in future levels. This recognition has spawned a rapidly growing literature on what is now termed as ‘vulnerability’. The vulnerability literature has primarily been concerned with the likelihood of individuals falling below the poverty line, be it defined in terms of income, consumption or health. Among the influential early vulnerability studies are Ravallion (1998), Jalan & Ravallion (1998) and Dercon & Krishnan (1999), each of which distinguished between transient and chronic poverty.

The changing nature of Islamic mission: The cases of Tablighi Jama’at and the Gülen movement

David Tittensor, argues for the role of faith in development to be reconsidered in relation to the issue of bias in the provision of aid. In doing so, he draws on the works of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum that seek to expand conventional understandings of aid to include wellbeing, and cites the cases of both Tablighi Jamaat and the Gülen Movement – from India and Turkey respectively – and how their religious interventions are at times precisely what Muslims are looking for.

There is not just a war: recalling the therapeutic metaphor in western metaphilosophy

This paper offers a critical response to the claims of Sivin and Lloyd (2002) and Mattice (2014) to the effect that Greek and Roman philosophy was characterised by a predominance of combat metaphors. Drawing on Plato and Plutarch, as well as contemporary studies led by Nussbaum (1993), I argue that a host of different metaphors was demonstrably used in the Greek tradition to describe philosophy and its subjects, led by the therapeutic or medicinal metaphor of philosophy as ‘therapy of desire’ or of desiderative opinion. I propose that it was the sophists like Protagoras, at least as they are depicted by Plato, who sought to conceive of philosophising as a strategic, warlike activity. In conclusion, I reflect on the invisibility of the medicinal metaphor, outside of certain dedicated studies in the history of ideas, in contemporary thinking about Western philosophy and its past.

What place discourse, what role rigorous argumentation? Against the standard image of Hadot's conception of philosophy as a way of life

After an introduction situating the piece in light of debates surrounding Hadot et al's work on the history of philosophy, Part I of what follows lays out, as briefly as possible, the 'standard view' of Hadot promoted by the texts that have been translated hitherto, and which has attracted Cooper, Nussbaum et al’s criticisms about misrepresenting--or dismissing-the place of rational argument in philosophy 'comme manière de vivre'. In Part II, will we see how several of Hadot’s as-yet-untranslated pieces, led by 'La Philosophie Antique: Une Éthique ou une Pratique?', indicate his own much more qualified perspectives about the place of discourse in ancient philosophy conceived as a way of life. To argue that philosophy included the paranoetic prescription of imaginative, mnemic, and even somatic exercises to rehape subjects' beliefs, habits, and desires is not to deny that these exercises were justified rationally, or based in rigorous theoretical accounts of the human being and its place in the cosmos.