Subjects and expressive worlds in the work of Merleau-Ponty

Examines Merleau-Ponty's claim that the relationship between subjects, world and others is one of interdependence. Questions traditional accounts of subjectivity based on dichotomous schemas and expands into the expressive domains of art, language and sexuality. Gives some forward-looking reflections as regards ethics arising out of Merleau-Ponty's new ontology.

Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts

Having initially not had the attention of Sartre or Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty’s work is arguably now more widely influential than either of his two contemporaries. Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts presents an accessible guide to the core ideas which structure Merleau-Ponty’s thinking as well as to his influences and the value of his ideas to a wide range of disciplines. The first section of the book presents the context of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking, the major debates of his time, particularly existentialism, phenomenology, the history of philosophy and the philosophy of history and society. The second section outlines his major contributions and conceptual innovations. The final section focuses upon how his work has been taken up in other fields besides philosophy, notably in sociology, cognitive science, health studies and feminism.

Merleau-Ponty, naturalism and phenomenological ontology

 Dr Pollard’s thesis is entitled: Merleau-Ponty, Naturalism and Phenomenological Ontology.

Merleau-Ponty and Embodied Cognitive Science

What would the Merleau-Ponty of Phenomenology of Perception have thought of the use of his phenomenology in the cognitive sciences? This question raises the issue of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the relationship between the sciences and philosophy, and of what he took the philosophical significance of his phenomenology to be. In this article I suggest an answer to this question through a discussion of certain claims made in connection to the “post-cognitivist” approach to cognitive science by Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher and Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch. I suggest that these claims are indicative of an appropriation of Merleau-Ponty’s thought that he would have welcomed as innovative science. Despite this, I argue that he would have viewed this use of his work as potentially occluding the full philosophical significance that he believed his phenomenological investigations to contain.

Is Merleau-Ponty's position in phenomenology of perception a new type of transcendental idealism?

It has recently been suggested that Merleau-Ponty’s position in Phenomenology of Perception is a unique form of transcendental idealism. The general claim is that in spite of his critique of “Kantianism,” Merleau-Ponty’s position comes out as a form of transcendental idealism that takes the perceptual processes of the lived body as the transcendental constituting condition for the possibility of experience. In this article I critically appraise this claim. I argue that if the term “idealist” is intended in a sufficiently similar sense to Kant’s usage of the term in naming his position as a “transcendental idealism” then it is a misrepresentation to subsume Merleau-Ponty’s position under that term. This is because Merleau-Ponty rejects the transcendental metaphysics of the reflecting subject that underpins transcendental idealism. In its place he advocates a methodological transcendentalism that, whilst being anti-realist, is not idealist. Thus to call his position “a new kind of transcendental idealism,” as Sebastian Gardner has, is to misunderstand the significance of his existentialist break with what he sees as the “intellectualism” of this position.

Merleau-Ponty's conception of dialectics in phenomenology of perception

Although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach in Phenomenology of Perception has been discussed in recent Anglophone readings, there has not been an explicit clarification as to how his varying usages of the term hang together. Given his repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics, coupled with the fact that dialectics are not part of the Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerean existentialism from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much, the question of just what he does with the idea of dialectics presents itself. In this paper I argue that, in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty saw Hegel as providing a model for the conception of rationality and meaning that must underpin the existentialist response to the problems bequeathed him by Husserlian phenomenology: namely, the problems of embodiment, perception and the constitution of the world. In connection with this, I suggest an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's “existential dialectics” that focuses on his three principal uses of the term: 1) a “dialectic of objective thought,” 2) a set of existential-dialectical categories intended to capture the ontological structure of the “body-subject” as “being-in-the-world,” and 3) a dialectic at the cultural level concerning others and history.

Transcendental arguments about other minds and intersubjectivity

This article describes some of the main arguments for the existence of other minds, and intersubjectivity more generally, that depend upon a transcendental justification. This means that our focus will be largely on ‘continental’ philosophy, not only because of the abiding interest in this tradition in thematising intersubjectivity, but also because transcendental reasoning is close to ubiquitous in continental philosophy. Neither point holds for analytic philosophy. As such, this essay will introduce some of the important contributions of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Karl-Otto Apel, all of whom use transcendental reasoning as a key part of their analyses of intersubjectivity, and we also consider the work of Peter Strawson who does likewise in the analytic tradition.

Merleau-Ponty’s Gordian knot: transcendental phenomenology, science, and naturalism

In this paper, I explore a series of fertile ambiguities that Merleau-Ponty's work is premised upon. These ambiguities concern some of the central methodological commitments of his work, in particular his commitment (or otherwise) to transcendental phenomenology and how he transforms that tradition, and his relationship to science and philosophical naturalism and what they suggest about his philosophical methodology. Many engagements with Merleau-Ponty's work that are more ‘analytic’ in orientation either deflate it of its transcendental heritage, or offer a "modest" rendering of its transcendental dimensions. This is also true, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent, of the work of the more empirically-minded phenomenological philosophers who engage very seriously with Merleau-Ponty – e.g. Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, Alva Noë, and others. At the same time, many other scholars contest these proto-scientific and more naturalistic uses of Merleau-Ponty's work on hermeneutical and exegetical grounds, and they likewise criticise the deflated reading of his transcendental phenomenology that tends to support them. By working through some of the key passages and ideas, I seek to establish that the former view captures something pivotal to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. I extend these interpretations by arguing that, at least around the time of Phenomenology of Perception, his philosophy might be reasonably regarded as a form of minimal methodological naturalism.

The body keeps the score

American animator Robert Breer has been credited in introducing the first visual bomb to cinema in his loop film Image by Images I (1954), Two abstract animated films by Robert Breer are examined: 69 (1968 5 minutes) and Fuji (1974 10 minutes). Using Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological perspective, though these films are not representational or photographic in the traditional sense it is argued that they are still able to talk to us about real experiences because ‘the lived perspective, that which we actually perceive, is not a geometric or photographic one.’(Merleau-Ponty, 1964b: 14) 69 provides a metaphor for a system that collapses and Fuji as an articulation of that embodied seeing required for train travel. It is argued that Breer’s work in its explorations of style ahead of content is research into an act of viewing that offers a contemporary simulation of the impact of a traumatic experience on the body. Just as one cannot grab each object in the landscape at the speed of train travel nor can one grab or understand each frame that is presented to the retina of a Robert Breer film. What is required to attain “stillness” is a more dissociated way of looking that allows the images to wash over you. Such a “stillness” may be more about suppression than contemplation and could involve a process of metamorphosis.

The Chi complex and ambiguities of meeting

In his article "The Chi Complex and Ambiguities of Meeting" Paul Carter develops a discussion of interpersonal encounters by mobilizing an apparatus of references, ranging from Jean Genet to Lévinas, Derrida, Bachmann, Merleau-Ponty, and Arendt. The hypothesis is that meeting another person entails and subsumes a non-meeting; a resistance and a refusal. The article pursues the ambiguity at the heart of encountering the other through an investigation of the urban spaces that are allegedly designed to invite and facilitate meetings. The argument put forward is that these spaces are paradoxically designed to avert encounters. This is especially true in the context of a "new social, economic, and institutional life that seems to call into question the very existence of the collectivities referred to as 'community' or 'society'." The unfolding of this proposition describes a space and a topography that are open, supple, and capable of "mutual transformations." The Greek letter Chi, both in its meaning of chaos and Chora ("a process of cleavage in its double meaning"), is employed as a theoretical example of a place that defies rigidity and closeness and that invites us to linger and pause in order to allow the other to meet and be met.

Fly rhythm

This book contains 2 essays, a forward and 15 colour plates on hand made paper. The text supports research in the form of 13 images taken with a digital pinhole camera in an unconventional way ie with subject and author in motion.  The images are further removed from traditional photography by light distribution in Photoshop and printing methods displayed in the book. The essays and forward explore the phenomena of light, photography in a digital age, body memory and 'capture' of images contextualising the work in philosophical (Rosalind Krauss,Merleau Ponty) and art historical (James Turrel, Doug Wheeler) terms.

Earth-based spirituality in Australian outdoor & environmental studies

Australian Outdoor & Environmental Studies (OES), under the curriculum framework of Health and Physical Education (HPE), is influenced by dominant discourses of androcentric perspectives of wilderness. As such, inherent adventure hegemonies impact the type and depth of relationship that can emerge with nature. Through an eco-feminist lens, I will draw on the stories of three adolescent students and their encounters with spiritual pedagogy, namely meditation practices within Australian OES. These student stories, collected during a 5-day hiking expedition in a remote coastal environment in southern Victoria, demonstrated that ideas of ‘femininity’ are subjugated and inferiorised to ideas of ‘masculinity’ in the outdoors. Therefore, I call for OES pedagogical approaches to work towards a more robust integration of ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ psyches towards values of deep ecology. In this paper I will draw on Merleau - Ponty’s emotional embodiment theories and Jung’s psychological theories, to argue for a reshaping of OES pedagogical approaches that more thoroughly include spiritual and emotional inquiry, in order to create deeper connections to the natural world in the context of contemporary global environmental challenges.

Peeling the onion: understanding others' lived experience

BACKGROUND: Society and some healthcare professionals often marginalise pregnant women who take illicit substances. Likewise the midwives who care for these women are often viewed as working on the edge of society. The aim of this research was to examine the lived world of these midwives to gain insight into the world of their work.

DESIGN: A phenomenological study informed by Heidegger, Gadamer and Merleau-Ponty was chosen to frame these lived experiences of the midwives. Using face-to-face phenomenological interviews data were collected from 12 midwives whose work is only caring for women who take illicit drugs.

RESULTS: The 3 fundamental themes that emerged from the study were: making a difference, establishing partnerships: and letting go and refining practice. Conclusions and impetus for this paper: Lived experiences are unique and can be difficult for researchers to grasp. The stories told by participants are sometimes intangible and often couched in metaphor. This paper aims to discuss lived experience and suggests that like an onion, several layers have to be peeled away before meaning can be exposed; and like peeling onions, each cover reveals another layer beneath that is different from before and different from the next. Exemplars from this midwifery study are used to explain lived experiences.