Use of reference in the narratives of Kurdish-Persian bilingual children

This study investigates some of the differences and similarities between Kurdish-Persian bilinguals and Persian monolinguals with respect to the use of referring expressions in spoken narratives. The narratives were elicited from 36 participants, consisting of 24 bilinguals (groups 1 and 2) and 12 monolinguals (group 3) in the first four grades of primary school using the Mayer’s (1969) book ‘Frog, where are you?’. The results have revealed that group 1 (bilingual told the story in Kurdish) used definite noun phrases most frequently followed by zero anaphors, indefinite noun phrases and pronouns. Group 2 who narrated the story in Persian produced definite nouns most frequently followed by pronouns, zero anaphors and indefinite noun phrases and group 3 (Persian monolinguals) employed definite noun phrases followed by zero anaphors, pronouns, and indefinite noun phrases. The significant difference between groups 1 and 2 and groups 2 and 3 has been in indefinite noun phrases and between groups 1 and 3 in the use of pronouns. One reason is that children universally apply similar strategies regardless of their first language (Berman, 2001). The conclusion is that some of the differences are due to the difference in the structure between Persian and the dialects of Kurdish.

Mediated hegemony : interference in the post-Saddam Iraqi media sector

The toppling of Saddam in 2003 brought with it the re-emergence of the free press in Iraq. This has seen Iraq shift from only a handful of state media outlets that served as propaganda machines, to a vast array of Iraqi-owned newspapers, radio stations and television channels which are being fervently produced and avidly consumed across the nation. As is to be expected, there are several problems that have accompanied such a divergent, ad-hoc and highly volatile media landscape. Leaving aside important issues such as the dangers faced by Iraqi journalists and the lack of appropriate press laws, this paper focuses instead on the influence of both foreign and domestic political bodies on the post-Saddam Iraqi media sector. Among the foreign influences are Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States, all of which fund, control and manipulate various Iraqi media outlets. Not surprisingly, the United States has been the most active, using both overt and clandestine propaganda methods as well as forced closure to control the Iraqi media sector. Unfortunately, such measures are not limited to those governments which exist outside Iraq’s borders, with both the Iraqi government and the Kurdish regional authority having used similar means to control and even silence Iraq’s nascent public sphere. This paper concludes by noting the irony of limiting press freedoms in Iraq during this crucial phase in its transition from despotism to democracy.

Cultural destruction and identity politics : targeting the history of Iraq

Since its inception in 1921, a number of successive regimes have sought to politicize Iraq‟s cultural history in order to develop national identity and foster social cohesion across this rich and complex nation. Foremost among these were the Baath party, particularly under the rule of Saddam Hussein, who used much of the nation‟s Oil wealth to undergo an extensive nation-building campaign. However, identity in Iraq is far from monolithic and various factions have long resisted the state sanctioned version of “Iraqi” identity and asserted alternative histories and narratives to underpin their own identity politics. With the invasion of Iraq by Coalition forces in 2003, however, came an unprecedented era of cultural destruction. Following the devastation of the battle phase of the war, there were further attacks on Iraq‟s cultural heritage including everything from the carefully choreographed removal of the giant bronze statue of Saddam in Firdos square, through to military bases set up at sensitive archaeological sites such as the ancient city of Babylon. In addition, Iraqi civilians targeted the cultural history of their nation with wanton looting and arson, as well as systematic attacks on sites of archaeological or ethno-religious significance. More recently, the Shia and Kurdish dominated Iraqi Government have organised the “Committee for Removing Symbols of the Saddam Era” and drew up plans to purge the state of its Sunni dominated past.

This paper argues that the unprecedented scale and magnitude of the destruction of Iraq‟s cultural history has played a part in eroding the various intersecting and overlapping versions of identity politics in Iraq. In turn, this has provided fertile ground for terrorists and sectarians to plant the seeds of their own narrow and deadly ideologies. This has brought about the rise of ethno-religious based violence and seen a series of bloody and protracted conflicts emerge between previously peaceful and compatible factions. In this way, Iraq serves as a powerful case study in furthering academic discussion on the complex inter-relationships between cultural and historical destruction and identity politics, sectarianism, violence and democracy.

Targeting the cultural history of Iraq : implications for national identity and democracy

Since its inception in 1921, a number of successive regimes have sought to politicize Iraq’s cultural history in order to build nationalistic sentiment and social cohesion across this rich and complex nation. Foremost among these were the Baath party, particularly under the rule of Saddam Hussein, who used much of the nation’s Oil wealth to undergo an extensive nation-building campaign. However, with the invasion of Iraq by the US in 2003 came the deliberate destruction and blatant negligence of the occupying forces. In addition, Iraqi civilians targeted the cultural landscape of their nation with wanton looting and arson, as well as systematic attacks on sites of archaeological or ethno-religious significance. More recently, the Shia and Kurdish dominated Iraqi Government have organised the “Committee for Removing Symbols of the Saddam Era” and plan to purge the state of its Sunni dominated past. This paper argues that the destruction of Iraq’s cultural history has played a part in eroding the national identity that many of these symbols and institutions were designed to promulgate. In turn, this has brought about the rise of ethno/religious sectarianism in Iraq which has had particular implications for the nation’s fledgling democratic order.

Manufacturing consent in Iraq : interference in the post-Saddam media sector

The toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 saw Iraq's media sector shift from a handful of state-run media outlets that served as propaganda machines, to a vast array of Iraqi-owned newspapers, radio stations and television channels which are being fervently produced and avidly consumed nationally. Not unexpectedly, several problems have accompanied this divergent, ad-hoc and highly volatile mediascape. Although recognizing important factors, including dangers faced by Iraqi journalists, and the dearth of appropriate press laws, this article focuses instead on attempts by certain key foreign and domestic political bodies to manufacture consent in Iraq via their interference in the post-Saddam media sector. These foreign influences are Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States, each of which funds, controls and manipulates different Iraqi media outlets. Not surprisingly, the United States has been the most active in this respect, utilizing both overt and clandestine propaganda techniques as well as forced closures to control the Iraqi media sector. Unfortunately, measures such as these are not limited to foreign governments: both the Iraqi government and the Kurdish Regional Government have used similar means to control and silence Iraq's nascent public sphere. The article concludes by noting the irony of limited press freedom in Iraq during this crucial phase of its transition from despotism to democracy.

Succeeding and seceding in Iraq: the case for a Shiite State

The US project to democratize Iraq has given way to a dramatic upsurge in ethno-religious factionalism in which a series of groups have sought to use ‘democracy’ to create or exacerbate division. Among these divisive political elements a relatively fringe idea held mostly by power-hungry elites has become a central driving force of much political debate within Iraq: separatism. Although there are many examples of political factions within Iraq which have called for territorial separatism since 2003 (such as some Kurdish, Sunni, Assyrian and Turcoman political parties), this chapter focuses on the less known case for a Shiite state. Specifically, it concentrates on the Shia Arab Islamist political party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which differs from other Shia political factions in their calls for a decentralized federal Iraq with an autonomous Shia Islamic state in the south.

Conclusion : The Iraq legacies and the roots of the ‘Islamic State’

With the deadly ISIS advance, the sudden rousing of Shia militias and the threat of Kurdish secession, Iraq faces a host of deep-seated and intractable problems. Together, these events raise a number of serious questions, not just for Iraq and its future but also for the broader Middle East, the United States and its Coalition partners and the international community. While these challenges and questions will drive much academic debate, political analysis and media discussion in the months and years ahead, they are not the central purpose of this chapter. While there is always a risk in commenting on unfolding events, including the potential to overstate their significance and likely long-term impact, it is difficult to ignore the significance of the deadly ISIS advance and all that has happened since. This chapter argues that key to understanding these events is coming to terms with the three varied and complex legacies of the 2003 Iraq War. The first central legacy of the Iraq War is the ongoing consequences of several critical mistakes made by the US-led Coalition before, during and immediately after the 2003 intervention. The second legacy addressed here is the fact that the 2003 war shattered – perhaps irreversibly - Iraqis fragile cultural mosaic and its rich and complex history of overlapping and intersecting communities, ideologies and narratives. The third and final legacy of the 2003 Iraq War detailed in this chapter is its significant regional and global consequences – from spiralling sectarianism across the Middle East to a profound challenge to America’s status as the last remaining superpower and its use of military power for ‘humanitarian’ ends. The argument here is that these three important legacies set in train a sequence of events that have served as the collective catalyst for the expansion of the ‘Islamic State’ from mid-2014.