Self-interest and ideology : bureaucratic corruption in Vietnam

Remedies for corruption in socialist-transforming East Asia (China and Vietnam) primarily apply ‘public choice’ theory, invoking Weberian imagery of socially detached bureaucratic decision-making. However, as the episodes of corruption accumulate, it is becoming clear that existing legalistic conceptions of corruption must give way to analytical methods that take into account broader social and institutional perspectives. This article evaluates public choice theory by examining ideological explanations for bureaucratic corruption in Vietnam.

Corruption in the media's gaze

This paper examines a government's incentive to engage in corruption in the presence of independent media. Different versions of a sequential-move game show how collusion between a media-firm and a government as well as a government's ability to ‘spin’ the media allegations can undermine corruption deterrence. Further, because of gains from exposing scandal, the media-firm can face incentives to raise false allegations. The paper shows how such false allegations can provide perverse incentives that favor corruption.

The nature of corruption deterrence in a competitive media sector

This paper compares the deterrence provided by a competitive media sector towards government induced corruption with that of a media monopoly in a setting where the media might raise both true as well as false allegations of corruption. It finds that competition’s impact on corruption deterrence is not necessarily better than a monopoly but rather hinges on a delicate balance between government’s kickback from corruption and the media’s potential benefit from exposure. While the paper does identify conditions in which a competitive media sector would improve upon the deterrence provided by a monopoly, it also find conditions under which it would do no better than a monopoly and in some situations its strategic response could be even worse especially when it intensifies effort towards justifying false allegations.

Partners in crime : collusive corruption and search

This paper analyzes corruption as a collusive act which requires the participation of two willing partners. An agent intending to engage in a corrupt act must search for a like-minded partner. When many people in the economy are corrupt, such a search is more likely to be fruitful. Thus when an agent engages in a search, he raises the net benefit of searching for other similar agents in the economy, creating an externality. This introduces a non-convexity in the model, which consequently has multiple equilibria. The economy can be in stable equilibrium with a high or low level of corruption.

Starting from the high-corruption equilibrium, a sufficient increase in vigilance triggers a negative cascade, leading the economy to a new equilibrium in which no agent finds it profitable to search for corrupt partners. The no-corruption equilibrium continues to be stable if vigilance is then relaxed. This suggests that the correct way to deal with corruption is to launch a ``big push'' with large amounts of resources. Once the level of corruption declines, these resources can be withdrawn.

Corruption in business : management theory and practice

This paper discusses the concept of 'Corruption Related Decision-Making' (CRDM) in the context of management decision-making in corruption-related situations in business. CRDM is a potential contribution to the overall contemporary process of re-conceptualising the role of business and the market economy in management theory and practice. This paper addresses a significant gap in current management literature dealing with corruption in business.

Ethics and self-knowledge in corruption related decision making

The nature of corruption in international business is briefly considered and several types of bribes are distinguished. Two managerial decision-models are then proposed, in order to assist international managers faced with corruption-related situations. The first model is based upon an ethical analysis and it conditionally endorses some types of facilitating-payment. The second is based upon a psychological analysis and it involves identification and classification of the generic consequences of bribe payments. The two models are intended to form part of a wider and multifaceted approach to reducing corruption.

Reducing corruption in international business decisions : prospects, frameworks & techniques

This paper reports the results of a rare interview/questionnaire survey of 41 multinational business managers in India regarding their personal experiences of corrupt practices. Despite current trends and traditional scepticism, quite favourable prospects for reducing corruption are indicated, provided that multifaceted approaches are adopted that appeal to intrinsic and extrinsic motives. Accordingly, a corruption related decision-making model is proposed, for use as an heuristic guide in circumstances involving corrupt business practices.

Dealing with corruption/bribery in a host country

Multinational business managers and companies with an ethical bent of mind find it difficult to navigate bribery/corruption in a host country which has systemic or large scale corruption and often end up debating such decisions. This paper proposes the ‘stakeholder compliance approach’ as a decision-making guideline to assist the managerial decision making process in such situations.