Removal of directors of public companies takes centre stage in Australia : an exploration of the corporate law and governance issues

Increasing attention is being given to the legal and governance issues relating to the removal of directors in Australian public companies. This has been due mainly to the difficulties experienced by the board of National Australia Bank in attempting to remove one of its fellow directors, and the subsequent development of public companies entering into so-called 'prenuptial agreements' with new directors, requiring that the director 'resign' if the board pass a vote of no-confidence in the director. In this article, the author revisits the area of director removal in Australian public companies for two reasons. The first reason, which covers the majority of the article, is to engage in a detailed analysis of whether the pre-nuptial agreements which some public companies have indicated that they support using to remove directors, are in fact enforceable under Australia's Corporations Act The second reason is to outline a law reform proposal to enable public companies to remove directors without requiring the vote of shareholders at a general meeting. The proposal involves providing Australia' corporate  regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) with the power to grant relief from the statutory removal provisions to public companies, but in a way which balances the competing objectives of commercial efficiency and shareholder participation and, very importantly, encourages good corporate governance practices by companies in relation to the performance assessment  of directors.

It is in the interests of both shareholders and directors to agree on a set of ground rules for the effective supervision of companies that reconciles the rights of the owners to overall control with the much tougher demands on modern directors

Opting out of shareholder governance rights: a new perspective on contractual freedom in Australian corporate law

One of the classic debates in corporate law relates to whether the rules of corporate law are ar should be 'mandatory', in that companies must comply, or 'enabling' - meaning a set of default rules which companies have the choice of adopting or 'opting out' of through alternative contractual arrangements. The so-called 'mandatory/enabling' debate has been especially prominent in the United States fro numerous reasons, yet has also received some attention in Australia. That said, the extent to which companies can 'opt out' of corporate law has rarely been considered as a practical issue in Australia - particularly whether Australian companies can 'opt out' of provisions under the Corporations Act ("the Act"). However, just recently, two high-profile events in Australia have made 'opting out' of corporate law a relevant issue, especially the question of whether companies are free to 'opt out' of provisions of the Corporations Act  which provide express governance rights to shareholders. These events were Boral's constitutional amendment in 2003 to restrict the ability of shreholders to propose amendments to the company's constitution, and the contemplation and introduction of so-called 'pre-nuptial' agreements- designed to by-pass the right of shreholders to vote on removing directors in public companies. In the light of these two recent events, in this article the authors revisit the mandatory/enabling debate. However, rather than going over old ground as to whether a mandatory or enabling approach to corporate regulation is desirable, the authors approach the issue from a fresh perspective: that Australian Securitiesand Investments Commission's ("ASIC") existing relief powers under the Act should be extended to provide a means for companies to opt out of provisions containing shareholder governance rights.

Regulatory and enabling approaches to corporate law enforcement : patterns of litigation 1986-2002 and the effect of recent reforms in New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom

Enforcement of corporate rights and duties may follow either a ‘regulatory’ or ‘enabling’ model. If a regulatory approach is taken, enforcement action will generally be undertaken by regulatory agencies such as, in New Zealand, the Registrar of Companies and Securities Commission, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) or the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the United Kingdom. If an enabling approach is chosen, enforcement action will more often be by private parties such as company shareholders, directors or creditors. When New Zealand's company law was reformed in 1993, a primarily private enforcement regime was adopted, consisting of a list of statutory directors' duties and an enhanced collection of shareholder remedies, based in part upon North American models and including a statutory derivative action. Public enforcement was largely confined to administrative matters and the enforcement of the disclosure requirements of New Zealand's securities law. While the previous enforcement regime was similarly reliant on private action, the law on directors' duties was less accessible, and shareholder action was hindered by the majority rule principle and the rule in Foss v Harbottle. This approach is in contrast with that used in Australia and the United Kingdom, where public agencies have a much more prominent enforcement role despite recent and proposed reforms to directors' duties and shareholder remedies. These reforms are designed to improve the ability of private parties to enforce corporate rights and duties. A survey of enforcement litigation in New Zealand since 1986 indicates that the object of a primarily enabling enforcement regime seems to have been achieved, and may well have been achieved even without the 1993 reform package. Private enforcement has, in fact, been much more prevalent than public enforcement since well before the enactment of the new legislation. Most enforcement action both before and after the reform was commenced by shareholders and shareholder/directors, and most involved closely held companies. Public enforcement was largely undertaken in areas such as securities law, where the wider public interest was affected. Similar surveys of Australian and United Kingdom enforcement litigation reveal a proportionally much greater reliance on public bodies to enforce corporate rights and duties, indicating a more regulatory approach. The ASIC and DTI enforced a wider range of provisions, affecting both closely and widely held companies, than those subject to public enforcement in New Zealand. Publicly enforced provisions in Australia and the United Kingdom include directors' duties and provisions dealing with disqualification from managing companies, as well as securities law requirements.

Reverberations after the HIH and other recent Australian corporate collapses: the role of ASIC

This article focuses on some of the litigation and other developments following the recent spate of corporate collapses in Australia. It gives a basic background to abuses of the 1980s, followed by a short description of some of ASIC's statutory powers. The remaining parts of the article focus on the role ASIC played in instituting actions against the directors of some of the collapsed corporations and in particular what ASIC seeks to achieve with high profile litigation. The article concludes that there is no doubt that in the aftermath of these massive corporate collapses ASIC fulfilled its role as the primary Australian corporate regulator with assiduousness. However, it also draws attention to the fact that the challenges for ASIC now will be to play a far more active role in assuring that signs of corporate collapses are detected at the earliest possible juncture. This will probably mean that ASIC's focus will have to be more and more on monitoring companies, rather than on its role as regulator and enforcer in the strict sense of the word.

Information disclosure and corporate governance in listed companies in China: from Yinguangxia to Enron

China's path to the development of a modern securities market has not been a smooth one. This article argues that efforts to impose Western securities market models on China have been fraught with difficulty. This is especially clear from the adoption of information disclosure principles and practices. While the integrity of disclosure practices is a fundamental element in maintaining investors' confidence in securities markets, disclosure practices need to be attuned to China '5 systemic features, especially in regard to its legal structure and rules. Market failures, such as the collapse of Enron in the United States, have led to a realisation that US disclosure models have their own difficulties and that these should not be uncritically used. This article reviews recent Chinese law andpractice (using the Yinguangxia false disclosure scandal as an example) in this area and calls for the adoption of a more critical approach towards the use of Western models with particular regard to China's own distinctive pathways of reform.

Receiving bankruptcy law into Vietnam

With assistance from foreign donors, countries in developing East Asia are rapidly replacing bureaucratic regulations with statutory norms mainly derived from international trade protocol (eg, WTO and AHA). Using imported legal norms, Vietnam enacted a Law on Business Bankruptcy (LBB) (Luat Pha San Doanh Nghiep) in 1993. By any measure, the [*2] transplanted bankruptcy principles have failed to take root. During the East Asian Economic Crisis (1997-2001) when non-performing business loans dramatically increased, cases heard by the bankruptcy courts in Vietnam declined. This article investigates the ways Vietnamese ideological, cultural and structural conditions have influenced the reception of the LBE. It is concluded that legal transfers are shaped more by political, economic and legal interactions, than by 'chance and prestige'.

Criminal responsibility based on complicity among corporate officers

In a 2001 Issues Paper entitled 'Sentencing: Corporate Offenders', the New South Wales Law Reform Commission outlined a number of reasons for not ascribing liability to individuals within a corporation for unlawful acts arising from the operation of the corporation. One of the reasons raised in the Issues Paper, a reason traditionally used to avoid liability being imposed on individuals for corporate crimes, is that it is conceptually difficult to look behind the form to the substance of a corporate crime in order to establish liability for individual acts, when on the surface the unlawful conduct was caused by a corporation as a collective body. In this article, the authors challenge this position by suggesting that the doctrine of complicity can be used to [*2] pierce the corporate veil and direct criminal liability to those individuals who control the actions of the company. This proposition that company officers can be found liable pursuant to the principles regarding accessorial responsibility is not novel. However, what is unusual is the infrequency with which this wide ranging doctrine is applied in the corporate setting. The focus of this article is to underline the relevance of this doctrine to corporate offenders and, in the process, to assert that the problems of punishing corporate offenders are in principle no different to punishing other crimes which are committed by more than the one offender and can be addressed by the proper application of existing legal principles.

Corporations law text and essential cases

Corporations Law: Text and Essential Cases is designed as a student text but will be a useful book for practitioners seeking a good, current, concise book on corporations law. Author Julie Cassidy is a proven, successful author and has carefully ensured that the case extracts in this book are long enough to be useful to lawyers needing to cite case authorities in opinions and court submissions.