Secure ownership transfer in multi-tag/multi-owner passive RFID systems

In this paper we propose a secure ownership transfer protocol for a multi-tag and multi-owner RFID environment. Most of the existing work in this area do not comply with the EPC Global Class-1 Gen-2 (C1G2) standard since they use expensive hash operations or sophisticated encryption schemes that cannot be implemented on low-cost passive tags that are highly resource constrained. Our work aims to fill this gap by proposing a protocol based on simple XOR and 128-bit Pseudo Random Number Generators (PRNG), operations that can be easily implemented on low-cost passive RFID tags. The protocol thus achieves EPC C1G2 compliance while meeting the security requirements. Also, our protocol provides additional protection using a blind-factor to prevent tracking attacks.

Dividends and family ownership: evidence from Indonesia

The thesis finds a significant negative association between family ownership and dividend payout in the Indonesian market. . It is revealed that the market does not disregard the existence of family ownership in reacting to dividend announcements. It documents dividend-paying family firms are associated with lower abnormal accruals as as a proxy of earnings management.

Ownership structure, corporate governance and bank performance: Evidence from gcc countries

The paper examines the effect of ownership structure and board characteristics on bank performance of GCC counties. Evidence indicates that the extent of the foreign ownership level has a significant positive association with the bank performance. However, concentrated ownership does appear to have a significant negative impact on performance and institutional ownership does not have any significant effect on performance. Other governance variables such as CEO duality and board size appear insignificant impact on performance. These results suggest a need to strengthen the internal control mechanisms within banks of GCC countries.

RFID tag ownership transfer protocol for a closed loop system

In the RFID system a tag is attached to an object which might own by a number of people during its life cycle. As a result, the RFID system requires to transfer ownership of the tag. The ownership transfer has to protect privacy of current and new owner. There are number of ownership transfer protocol proposed to achieve secure ownership transfer. However, most of them are impractical or insecure to implement on current passive RFID tags. We are presenting an ownership transfer protocol using timer based shared secret for closed loop RFID systems. The protocol will ensure security and privacy of involved parties in the idle circumstances. Our comparison shows that the proposed protocol is more secure and practical than existing similar ones.

Scenarios for an RFID tag ownership transfer protocol for a closed loop system

In RFID system a tag is attached to an object which might own by a number of owners during its life time. This requires the RFID system to transfer ownership of the tag to its new owner. The ownership transfer has to protect privacy of current and new owner. Many ownership tag ownership transfer exists in the literature, however, most of them are impractical or insecure to implement on current passive RFID tags. We are proposing a timer based ownership transfer protocol for closed loop RFID systems. The proposal in this paper includes two implement scenario to cover diverse tags type. The protocol will ensure security and privacy of involved parties in the idle circumstances. Our comparison shows that the proposed protocol is more secure and practical than existing similar ones.

Disproportionate ownership structure and IPO long-run performance of non-SOEs in China

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structures and IPO long-run performance of non-SOEs in China. Although non-SOEs underperform the market in general after IPO but the poor performance is mainly caused by the IPOs with ownership control wedge. Non-SOEs with one share one vote structure outperform those with control-ownership wedge by 30% for three years post-IPO performance in adjusted buy-and-hold returns. Non-SOEs with control-ownership wedge have higher frequency of undertaking value-destroying related party transactions. These findings suggest that non-SOEs need to improve corporate governance such as disproportionate ownership structure to better safeguard the interest of long-run shareholders.

Board composition, board activity and ownership concentration, the impact on firm performance

This paper provides a parallel investigation on the impact of board composition, board activity and ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese firms. We find that independent directors enhance firm performance effectively than other board factors. The frequency of shareholder meetings, rather than board meetings, is positively associated with firm value. Tradable share ownership concentration has a positive and linear relationship with firm value, while state and total share ownership concentration represent U(V) shapes. Importantly, companies with the highest levels of both total share and tradable share ownership concentration have a greater firm values than companies with the highest levels of only a single concentration.

Ownership structure and collateral requirements: Evidence from China’s listed firms

This paper examines the effect of ownership structure on collateral requirements using a sample of China's listed firms from 2007 to 2009. We find that compared to privately controlled companies, state-controlled companies are less likely to be required to pledge collateral, and such a difference is more pronounced for firms in troubled industries. The empirical results also show that the effect of state control on collateral requirements is weaker in companies with more foreign ownership. Moreover, the effect of state control on collateral requirements is weaker in companies with more third party guarantees. Finally, we find that the effect of state control on collateral requirements is more pronounced for firms operating in regions with more government intervention.

Does control-ownership divergence impair market liquidity in an emerging market? Evidence from China

This paper examines how institutional characteristics of emerging economies influence the effect of control-ownership divergence on market liquidity. We find that the divergence is negatively associated with liquidity and that this negative relationship is more pronounced in firms with more severe agency problems and information asymmetry. We argue that in an emerging market, the negative effect of the divergence on liquidity is worsened by state ownership and poorer shareholder protection, both of which result in more severe agency conflicts; we also find, however, that this effect is alleviated by the NTS reform, which aligns the interest of different shareholders.

Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship: evidence from China’s listed firms

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay–performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay–performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based pay–performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay–performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.

Managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value: Evidence from China’s civilian-run firms

This paper examines the influence of managerial ownership on firm performance through capital-structure choices, using a sample of China’s civilian-run firms listed on the Chinese stock market between 2002 and 2007. The empirical results demonstrate a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. Managerial ownership drives the capital structure into a nonlinear shape, but in an opposite direction to the effect of managerial ownership on firm value. The results of simultaneous regressions suggest that managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Our findings imply that the “interest convergence” and “entrenchment” effects of managers’ behaviour in terms of managerial ownership can also explain the agency-relevant situation of China’s civilian-run firms.

The effect of ownership structure on leverage decision: new evidence from Chinese listed firms

This paper examines the effect of state control and ownership structure on the leverage decision of firms listed in the Chinese stock market. Our results show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have higher leverage ratios than non-SOEs, and SOEs in regions with a poorer institutional environment have higher leverage ratios than SOEs in better regions. We also show that the largest shareholding (the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder) in the SOEs has a negative relationship with the leverage ratio, while the largest shareholding in non-SOEs has a non-linear relationship with the short-term and long-term debt ratios. Finally, this study also shows that the share split reform and the improvement of institutional environment both weaken the negative relationship and strengthen the positive relationship between largest shareholding and leverage of SOEs and non-SOEs to some extent. This paper documents how the financing behaviour of SOEs is more influenced by government intervention, while the financing behaviour of non-SOEs is more market oriented.