Do investors value disclosed versus recognised employee share options differently?

Prior research provides evidence consistent with footnote disclosures are being valued by investors. However, there are arguments as to whether the market would acquire and/or process disclosed versus recognised information in the same way. Prior studies have been inconclusive on the findings. This research provides evidence for the conditions under which differential valuation exist. Three factors are examined. First, I investigate whether the differential valuation is related to the reliability of the accounting estimates. Second, due to higher processing costs on disclosures relative to “recognised” information, I investigate whether sophistication of investors contributes to the differential valuation. Finally, I examine systematic biases arisen from how investors process information due to limited attention paid to disclosures. The results show that the market does process information in a complicated way. Investors discern the reliability of accounting estimates and value them differently when processing the information.

Does the change of accounting regulation on employee share options give rise to greater scope for earnings management?

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to address the concern about the impact of accounting regulatory change pertaining to employee share options (ESOs) on earnings management. Following Australia’s adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005, companies are required to recognise the fair value of ESOs as expenses. Due to inherent imprecision in the estimate of ESO’s fair value, the regulatory change from disclosure to recognition was widely claimed to potentially give rise to an alternative mechanism to manage earnings. This study provides empirical evidence on whether the regulatory change leads to earnings management problems.

Design/methodology/approach – This study uses the regulatory change in accounting for ESOs to provide a direct test of earnings management between disclosed versus recognised regimes for the same sample of firms. The sample consists of Australian firms from S&P/ASX300 for the period from 2003 to 2006.

Findings – The results show that, although the accounting regulatory change from disclosure to recognition may provide an alternative earnings management vehicle, there is no evidence of this occurring. There could be several reasons for this finding. First, the statistical tests lack power. Second, there are stricter audit tests on recognised amounts than on disclosed amounts. Third, given the concern of excessive pay and the close scrutiny of compensation, managers may have already understated ESO values in the disclosure regime. Finally, managers have limited time and resources and the effort involved in the adoption of IFRS in 2005 could have restricted the time available to manage earnings via the ESO reporting channel.

Originality/value – This study adds to the limited research on whether a change in accounting regulation for employee share options from disclosure to recognition gives rise to greater scope for earnings management. One reason for the lack of empirical evidence in the research is due to the problem of designing a test. Bernard and Schipper suggest that within-firm studies have limitations for comparing the effects of recognition versus disclosure when the change is driven by an estimate becoming more reliable. A cross-sectional study is also problematic due to self-selection bias if firms can choose between disclosure versus recognition. This study circumvents potential design problems raised by Bernard and Schipper by setting a test using regulatory change which allows the test to be compared directly using the same company.

Managerial share ownership and discretionary accruals in Australia : do independent and executive directors have different incentives?

We examine the relation between managerial share ownership (MSO) and discretionary accruals in Australia. We find a positive relation between MSO and discretionary accruals up to a certain level of MSO followed by a negative relation (inverse U-shaped). We suggest that these unique results are a result of certain Australian institutional features that are markedly different to those in the US and the UK and imply that the ownership-discretionary accruals relation is context specific with the wider corporate governance systems influencing the theorised incentive effects. We also posit that executive directors and independent directors have different ownership-discretionary accruals incentives and report results consistent with this proposition.

Takeover deterrent effect of on-market share buyback in Australia

This study examines whether Australian firms use on-market share buybacks to deter unwanted takeover risk. We found a statistically significant and positive relationship between a firm’s ex-ante takeover probability and its on-market share buyback activities. Our result is robust to alternative modelling techniques, namely TOBIT and Censored Quantile Regressions. This paper found evidence that in a dividend imputation credit taxation system the yield of share buyback is positively related to dividend payments. However, on-market share buyback activity is closely related to temporary cash flows rather than to permanent operating cash flows. This might indicate that, besides dividend payments, Australian firms take advantage of the financial flexibility that comes with share buybacks to redistribute nonpermanent cash flows to their shareholders.

Share corporate social responsibility best practice and forgo competitive advantage

Cross-sector partnerships are capable of achieving solutions to large scale societal problems, which when successful, are well-publicized. Partnering organizations not only reap reputational acclaim but garner valuable organizational benefits. Membership within successful partnerships would undoubtedly be considered a competitive advantage, yet several of these successful relationships have chosen to forgo this valuable position. Instead of retaining intellectual property, partnering organizations are sharing successful processes and practices with peers and competitors. This research examined three examples of best practice cross-sector partnerships to identify relationship success factors, how they involved other organizations and why they shared successful social responsibility initiatives with others.

Managerial share ownership and operating performance : do independent and executive directors have different incentives?

We investigate the relationship between managerial share ownership (MSO) and earnings as a measure of operating performance in Australia. To mitigate potential earnings management, we also use discretionary accrual adjusted earnings as an alternative measure of performance. We document a negative relation between MSO and performance followed by a positive relation. We suggest that these unique results are an artefact of certain Australian institutional features and imply that the ownership–performance relation is context-specific, with the wider corporate governance systems influencing the theorised incentive effects. We also posit that executive directors and independent directors have different ownership–performance incentives. Our results are consistent with this proposition and suggest that independent directors may be immune to the theorised incentive alignment or entrenchment effects associated with share ownership.

The value of executive director share ownership and discretionary accruals

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between the value of executive director share ownership and discretionary accruals.

Design/methodology/approach – This study uses a dataset of 1,173 firm-year observations drawn from 188 Australian listed companies for the period 2000-2006. The analysis is based on multivariate regression analysis and ordinary least square models were used to investigate the relation between the value of managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. The issue of potential endogeneity is addressed by using a simultaneous equation system.

Findings – A negative relation is found between value of managerial share ownership and discretionary accruals at lower levels of value of ownership, which is consistent with the theorised incentive alignment that as the managers commit more resources to their firms, stakeholders impose less contractual constraints specified in terms of accounting numbers and managers make lower accrual adjustments. After a certain level of value of ownership is attained, a positive relations seen, consistent with increased discretionary accrual adjustments associated with stakeholders anticipating managerial entrenchment. Also, it is found that these results are driven by firms with income increasing, as opposed to income decreasing, discretionary accruals.

Practical implications – Shares and options are forming an increasing proportion of executive remuneration that continues to be the subject of much debate amongst regulators and in the media. Showing that the value of share ownership may be an effective internal governance mechanism to help align incentives adds to the debate and has policy implications.

Originality/value – The paper's primary contribution is finding that the value (as opposed to proportion) of share ownership, typically representing a sizeable proportion of managers' undiversified wealth, is a potentially direct driver of theorised incentive alignment and entrenchment effects associated with share ownership.

Factors affecting SME owner-managers' willingness to share knowledge online in rural local business networks

This article integrates typically separate SME research on e-commerce, business networking, and knowledge management into a model explaining factors influencing the willingness of SME owner-managers to share knowledge online in business networks in rural districts. This is important because e-commerce can assist owner-managers, often dispersed in rural districts, to share knowledge between face-to-face networking events. The main factors associated with willingness to share knowledge online were their willingness to share knowledge face-to-face and their intensity of Internet use. Entrepreneurial factors such as owner-managers' expectations of rapid growth, trading outside the district, and seeking information about customers/competitors were indirectly associated with online sharing via intensity of Internet use only. The model suggests network coordinators could encourage online knowledge sharing by assisting owner-managers to see the business value of e-commerce and by ensuring that networking events are suitable for owner-managers, whether or not they have entrepreneurial goals, to facilitate face-to-face knowledge sharing.