Supervision as control system : the design of supervision as a regulatory instrument in the social services sector in Sweden

In this article, the prevailing official view of supervision as a regulatory instrument is examined as it applies to the social services sector in Sweden. The study is based on a comparison of the views expressed on the design of supervision as a regulatory instrument by two government commissions, the Supervision Commission and the Commission on Supervision within the Social Services (UTIS), and on the positions taken by the Government regarding the definitions of the concept of supervision proposed by these commissions. The view of supervision as a regulatory instrument expressed in these policy documents is analysed with the help of a theoretical framework describing the components, their functions and the governance characteristics of control systems. In the framework separate interrelated characteristics of the components are identified and summarized into two models of control systems. The analysis shows that supervision in the Swedish social services sector can be described in terms of both a disciplinary and non-disciplinary system. By its system theoretical basis and the identification of interrelated characteristics the study contributes to a broadened understanding of the construction and functions of supervision as a regulatory instrument and of how supervision within the Swedish social sector is meant to be designed.

Are central bank independence reforms necessary for achieving low and stable inflation?

Using data on the occurence of central bank independence (CBI) reforms in 131 countries during 1980-2005, we test whether they were important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability. CBI reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average 3.31% when countries with historically high inflation rates are included. But countries with lower inflation have reduced it without institutional reforms granting central banks more independence, undermining the theoretical time-inconsistency case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI reforms have helped reduce inflation variability.

Determinants and effects of central bank independence reforms

This thesis consists of four empirically oriented papers on central bank independence (CBI) reforms.    Paper [1] is an investigation of why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to control the economy. A new data-set, including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during 1980-2005, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country had been characterized by high variability in inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries.    Paper [2], using a difference-in-difference approach, studies whether CBI reform matters for inflation performance. The analysis is based on a dataset including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during the period of 1980-2005. CBI reform is found to have contributed to bringing down inflation in high-inflation countries, but it seems unrelated to inflation performance in low-inflation countries.    Paper [3] investigates whether CBI-reforms are important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability, using a random-effects random-coefficients model to account for heterogeneity in the effects of CBI-reforms on inflation. CBI-reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average by 3.31 percent, but the effect is only present when countries with historically high inflation rates are included in the sample. Countries with more modest inflation rates have achieved low inflation without institutional reforms that grant central banks more independence, thus undermining the time-inconsistency theory case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI-reforms have contributed to lower inflation variability    Paper [4] studies the relationship between CBI and a suggested trade-off between price variability and output variability using data on CBI-levels, and data the on implementation dates of CBI-reforms. The results question the existence of such a trade-off, but indicate that there may still be potential gains in stabilization policy from CBI-reforms.

Effects of central bank independence reforms on inflation in different parts of the world

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of CBI-reforms on inflation in different parts of the world from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Compared to previous studies, this study focuses on whether CBI-reforms have different effects on reducing inflation in different parts of the world. The study is based on a 132 country data-set from 1980 to 2005 compiled by Daunfeldt et al. (2008). The result indicates that the reduction in inflation due to the CBI-reforms varies between 2.2 and 12.32 percentage points in Asia, Europe, South America and Oceania, supporting the claim that implementing CBI-reforms can be successful in reducing inflation in most of the parts of the world.