3 resultados para procurement model
em CentAUR: Central Archive University of Reading - UK
Resumo:
Procurement is one of major business operations in public service sector. The advance of information and communication technology (ICT) pushes this business operation to increase its efficiency and foster collaborations between the organization and its suppliers. This leads to a shift from the traditional procurement transactions to an e-procurement paradigm. Such change impacts on business process, information management and decision making. E-procurement involves various stakeholders who engage in activities based on different social and cultural practices. Therefore, a design of e-procurement system may involve complex situations analysis. This paper describes an approach of using the problem articulation method to support such analysis. This approach is applied to a case study from UAE.
Resumo:
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to propose a process model for knowledge transfer in using theories relating knowledge communication and knowledge translation. Design/methodology/approach – Most of what is put forward in this paper is based on a research project titled “Procurement for innovation and knowledge transfer (ProFIK)”. The project is funded by a UK government research council – The Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). The discussions are mainly grounded on a thorough review of literature accomplished as part of the research project. Findings – The process model developed in this paper has built upon the theory of knowledge transfer and the theory of communication. Knowledge transfer, per se, is not a mere transfer of knowledge. It involves different stages of knowledge transformation. Depending on the context of knowledge transfer, it can also be influenced by many factors; some positive and some negative. The developed model of knowledge transfer attempts to encapsulate all these issues in order to create a holistic framework. Originality/value of paper – An attempt has been made in the paper to combine some of the significant theories or findings relating to knowledge transfer together, making the paper an original and valuable one.
Resumo:
This article proposes an auction model where two firms compete for obtaining the license for a public project and an auctioneer acting as a public official representing the political power, decides the winner of the contest. Players as firms face a social dilemma in the sense that the higher is the bribe offered, the higher would be the willingness of a pure monetary maximizer public official to give her the license. However, it implies inducing a cost of reducing all players’ payoffs as far as our model includes an endogenous externality, which depends on bribe. All players’ payoffs decrease with the bribe (and increase with higher quality). We find that the presence of bribe aversion in either the officials’ or the firms’ utility function shifts equilibrium towards more pro-social behavior. When the quality and bribe-bid strategy space is discrete, multiple equilibria emerge including more pro-social bids than would be predicted under a continuous strategy space.