Do smart grids offer a new incentive for SME carbon reduction?

Collectively small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are significant energy users although many are unregulated by existing policies due to their low carbon emissions. Carbon reduction is often not a priority but smart grids may create a new opportunity. A smart grid will give electricity suppliers a picture of real-time energy flows and the opportunity for consumers to receive financial incentives for engaging in demand side management. As well as creating incentives for local carbon reduction, engaging SMEs with smart grids has potential for contributing to wider grid decarbonisation. Modelling of buildings, business activities and technology solutions is needed to identify opportunities for carbon reduction. The diversity of the SME sector complicates strategy development. SMEs are active in almost every business area and occupy the full range of property types. This paper reviews previous modelling work, exposing valuable data on floor space and energy consumption associated with different business activities. Limitations are seen with the age of this data and an inability to distinguish SME energy use. By modelling SME energy use, electrical loads are identified which could be shifted on demand, in a smart network. Initial analysis of consumption, not constrained by existing policies, identifies heating and cooling in retail and commercial offices as having potential for demand response. Hot water in hotel and catering and retail sectors may also be significant because of the energy storage potential. Areas to consider for energy efficiency schemes are also indicated.

Incentive effects on risk attitude in small probability prospects

We report between-subject results on the effect of monetary stakes on risk attitudes. While we find the typical risk seeking for small probabilities, risk seeking is reduced under high stakes. This suggests that utility is not consistently concave.

Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts: experimental evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.

MFN status and the choice of tariff regime

The gradualist approach to trade liberalization views the uniform tariffs implied by MFN status as an important step on the path to free trade. We investigate whether a regime of uniform tariffs will be preferable to discriminatory tariffs when countries engage in non-cooperative interaction in multilateral trade. The analysis includes product differentiation and asymmetric costs. We show that with the cost asymmetry the countries will disagree on the choice of tariff regime. When the choice of import tariffs and export subsidies is made sequentially the uniform tariff regime may not be sustainable, because of an incentive to deviate to a discriminatory regime. Hence, an international body is needed to ensure compliance with tariff agreement.

Informal finance and rural finance policy in India: historical and contemporary perspectives

From the 1950s up to the early 1990s the All-India data show an ever-declining share of informal credit in the total outstanding debt of rural households. Contemporaneous micro-level studies, using more qualitative research methodologies, provide evidence that questions the strength of this trend, and more recent All-India credit surveys show, first, a levelling, and then a rise, in the share of rural informal credit in 1990/91 and 2000/01, respectively. By reference to findings of a study of village moneylenders in Rajasthan, the paper notes lessons to be drawn. First, informal financial agents have not disappeared from the rural financial landscape in India. Second, formal-sector financial institutions can learn much about rural financial service needs from the financial products and processes of their informal counterparts. Third, a national survey of informal agents, similar to that of the 1921 Census survey of indigenous bankers and moneylenders, would provide valuable pointers towards policy options for the sector. A recent Reserve Bank of India Report on Moneylender Legislation not only explores incentive mechanisms to better ensure fair practice, but also proposes provision for a new category of loan providers that would explicitly link the rural informal and formal financial sectors.

Effect of Information about benefits of biotechnology on consumer acceptance of genetically modified food; evidence from experimental auctions in the United States, England, and France

This study investigates the effect of information about potential benefits of biotechnology on consumer acceptance of genetically modified (GM) foods. Consumer willingness to accept compensation to consume a GM food was elicited using an incentive compatible auction mechanism in three US states (California, Florida, and Texas) and in two European countries (England and France). Results indicate that information on environmental benefits, health benefits and benefits to the third world significantly decreased the amount of money consumers demanded to consume GM food; however, the effect of information varied by type of information and location. Consistent with prior research, we find that initial attitudes toward biotechnology have a significant effect on how individuals responded to new information.

Economic models and algorithms for distributed systems

Distributed computing paradigms for sharing resources such as Clouds, Grids, Peer-to-Peer systems, or voluntary computing are becoming increasingly popular. While there are some success stories such as PlanetLab, OneLab, BOINC, BitTorrent, and SETI@home, a widespread use of these technologies for business applications has not yet been achieved. In a business environment, mechanisms are needed to provide incentives to potential users for participating in such networks. These mechanisms may range from simple non-monetary access rights, monetary payments to specific policies for sharing. Although a few models for a framework have been discussed (in the general area of a "Grid Economy"), none of these models has yet been realised in practice. This book attempts to fill this gap by discussing the reasons for such limited take-up and exploring incentive mechanisms for resource sharing in distributed systems. The purpose of this book is to identify research challenges in successfully using and deploying resource sharing strategies in open-source and commercial distributed systems.

Uniform versus discriminatory tariffs

We analyze the non-cooperative interaction between two exporting countries producing differentiated products and one importing country when governments use optimal policies to maximize welfare. The analysis includes product differentiation, asymmetric costs, and Bertrand competition. For identical exporting countries we demonstrate that the importing country always prefers a uniform tariff regime while both exporting countries prefer a discriminatory tariff regime for any degree of product differentiation. If countries are asymmetric in terms of production cost then the higher-cost exporter always prefers the discriminatory regime but the lower-cost exporter prefers the uniform regime if there is a significant cost differential. With cost asymmetry the announcement of a uniform tariff regime by the importer is not a credible strategy since there is an incentive to deviate to discrimination. This implies an international body can play a role in ensuring that tariff agreements are respected.

Contracts and incentives in the construction sector

The aim of this chapter is to examine what the construction sector brings to our understanding of the procurement of complex performance. The chapter is divided into the following parts: fi rst, an overview of the various matters that contribute to the complexity of construction procurement is provided. Second, the most important contractual incentive schemes found in construction contracts are discussed, and this is followed by, third, an examination of the changes associated with the shift towards procuring complex performance (PCP) (service provision). Fourth, the main findings of the authors’ recent research on PCP contracts are summarised, followed by the conclusion. It should be noted that the procurement of services is referred to as ‘PCP’ in this chapter.

Climate change justice: getting motivated in the last chance saloon

A key reason for pessimism with respect to greenhouse gas emissions reduction relates to the ‘motivation problem’, whereby those who could make the biggest difference prima facie have the least incentive to act because they are most able to adapt: how can we motivate such people (and thereby everyone else) to accept, indeed to initiate, the changes to their lifestyles that are required for effective emissions reductions? This paper offers an account inspired by Rawls of the good of membership of ‘intergenerational cooperative union’ to achieve justice that provides a solution to the motivation problem.

Making the least active pay: a simulation of rewards and penalties under Demand Side Participation programs

The orthodox approach for incentivising Demand Side Participation (DSP) programs is that utility losses from capital, installation and planning costs should be recovered under financial incentive mechanisms which aim to ensure that utilities have the right incentives to implement DSP activities. The recent national smart metering roll-out in the UK implies that this approach needs to be reassessed since utilities will recover the capital costs associated with DSP technology through bills. This paper introduces a reward and penalty mechanism focusing on residential users. DSP planning costs are recovered through payments from those consumers who do not react to peak signals. Those consumers who do react are rewarded by paying lower bills. Because real-time incentives to residential consumers tend to fail due to the negligible amounts associated with net gains (and losses) or individual users, in the proposed mechanism the regulator determines benchmarks which are matched against responses to signals and caps the level of rewards/penalties to avoid market distortions. The paper presents an overview of existing financial incentive mechanisms for DSP; introduces the reward/penalty mechanism aimed at fostering DSP under the hypothesis of smart metering roll-out; considers the costs faced by utilities for DSP programs; assesses linear rate effects and value changes; introduces compensatory weights for those consumers who have physical or financial impediments; and shows findings based on simulation runs on three discrete levels of elasticity.

Executive pay and performance: did bankers’ bonuses cause the crisis?

This paper examines the pay-performance relationship between executive cash compensation (including bonuses) and company performance for a sample of large UK companies, focusing particularly on the financial services industry, since incentive misalignment has been blamed as one of the factors causing the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Although we find that pay in the financial services sector is high, the cash-plus-bonus pay-performance sensitivity of financial firms is not significantly higher than in other sectors. Consequently, we conclude that it unlikely that incentive structures could be held responsible for inducing bank executives to focus on short-term results.

‘Inherited commitments’: do changes in ownership affect corporate social responsibility (CSR) at African gold mines?

This paper critically examines the issue of ‘inherited corporate social responsibility’ in the gold mining industry, focusing specifically on the case of sub-Saharan Africa, a region plagued with excessive corruption, rampant poverty and weak governance. Whilst there appears to be little incentive to proactively engage with communities and implement cutting-edge environmental policies in the region, mine managers argue otherwise, highlighting a number of reasons for embracing corporate social responsibility (CSR). After briefly reviewing the philosophical underpinnings of CSR, the paper provides an in-depth analysis of these arguments, in the process, underscoring how tenuous the case for CSR in the extractive industries, and gold mining more specifically, is in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Following a change in ownership, new management faces few pressures to embrace CSR in its entirety and therefore, more often than not, finds itself in a position to implement programs and policies of its choice. More research is needed that further popularizes the issue of ‘inherited CSR’ in the gold mining sector and extractive industries more generally.