The transaction cost economics theory of the family firm: family-based human asset specificity and the bifurcation bias

We develop a transaction cost economics theory of the family firm, building upon the concepts of family-based asset specificity, bounded rationality, and bounded reliability. We argue that the prosperity and survival of family firms depend on the absence of a dysfunctional bifurcation bias. The bifurcation bias is an expression of bounded reliability, reflected in the de facto asymmetric treatment of family vs. nonfamily assets (especially human assets). We propose that absence of bifurcation bias is critical to fostering reliability in family business functioning. Our study ends the unproductive divide between the agency and stewardship perspectives of the family firm, which offer conflicting accounts of this firm type's functioning. We show that the predictions of the agency and stewardship perspectives can be usefully reconciled when focusing on how family firms address the bifurcation bias or fail to do so.

The impact of contractor selection method on transaction costs: a review

The basic premise of transaction-cost theory is that the decision to outsource, rather than to undertake work in-house, is determined by the relative costs incurred in each of these forms of economic organization. In construction the "make or buy" decision invariably leads to a contract. Reducing the costs of entering into a contractual relationship (transaction costs) raises the value of production and is therefore desirable. Commonly applied methods of contractor selection may not minimise the costs of contracting. Research evidence suggests that although competitive tendering typically results in the lowest bidder winning the contract this may not represent the lowest project cost after completion. Multi-parameter and quantitative models for contractor selection have been developed to identify the best (or least risky) among bidders. A major area in which research is still needed is in investigating the impact of different methods of contractor selection on the costs of entering into a contract and the decision to outsource.

Making internalization theory good for practice: the essence of Alan Rugman’s contributions to international business

This perspectives paper and its associated commentaries examine Alan Rugman's conceptual contribution to international business scholarship. Most significantly, we highlight Rugman's version of internalization theory as an approach that integrates transaction cost economics and ‘classical’ internalization theory with elements from the resource-based view, such that it is especially relevant to strategic management. In reviewing his oeuvre, we also offer observations on his ideas for ‘new internalization theory’. We classify his other novel insights into four categories: Network Multinationals; National competitiveness; Development and public policy; and Emerging Economy MNEs. This special section offers multiple views on how his work informed the larger academic debate and considers how these ideas might evolve in the longer term.

The end of the opportunism vs trust debate: bounded reliability as a new envelope concept in research on MNE governance

Modern transaction cost economics (TCE) thinking has developed into a key intellectual foundation of international business (IB) research, but the Williamsonian version has faced substantial criticism for adopting the behavioral assumption of opportunism. In this paper we assess both the opportunism concept and existing alternatives such as trust within the context of IB research, especially work on multinational enterprise (MNE) governance. Case analyses of nine global MNEs illustrate an alternative to the opportunism assumption that captures more fully the mechanisms underlying failed commitments inside the MNE. As a substitute for the often-criticized assumption of opportunism, we propose the envelope concept of bounded reliability (BRel), an assumption that represents more accurately and more completely the reasons for failed commitments, without invalidating the other critical assumption in conventional TCE (and internalization theory) thinking, namely the widely accepted envelope concept of bounded rationality (BRat). Bounded reliability as an envelope concept includes two main components, within the context of global MNE management: opportunism as intentional deceit, and benevolent preference reversal. The implications for IB research of adopting the bounded reliability concept are far reaching, as this concept may increase the legitimacy of comparative institutional analysis in the social sciences.

Global, local, or regional? The locus of MNE strategies

This paper provides an overview of the main insights arising from the ‘regional strategy’ literature. It also develops the contours of a new, rich research agenda for future international strategy scholarship, whereby the region should be introduced as an explicit, third geographic level of analysis, in addition to the country-level and the global level. Regional strategy analysis requires a fundamental rethink of mainstream theories in the international strategy sphere. This rethink involves, inter alia, internalization theory, with its resource-based view and transaction cost economics components, as well as the integration (I) – national responsiveness (NR) framework.

The impact of procurement method on costs of procurement

Collaborative working methods offer the hope of reduced waste, lower tendering costs and improved outputs. The costs of tendering may be influenced by the introduction of different working methods. Transaction cost economics appears to offer an analytical framework for studying the costs of tendering, but it is more to do with providing explanations at the institutional/industry level, not at the level of individual projects. Surveys and interviews were carried out with small samples in UK. The data show that that while tendering costs are not necessarily higher in collaborative working arrangements, there is no correlation between costs of tendering and the way the work is organized. Practitioners perceive that the benefits of working in collaborative procurement routes far outweigh the costs. Tendering practices can be improved to avoid waste, and the suggested improvements include restricting selective tendering lists to 23 bidders, letting bidders know who they are competing with, reimbursing tendering costs for aborted projects and ensuring that timely and comprehensive information is provided to bidders.

Comparative costs of the commercial process in different construction procurement methods

The commercial process in construction projects is an expensive and highly variable overhead. Collaborative working practices carry many benefits, which are widely disseminated, but little information is available about their costs. Transaction Cost Economics is a theoretical framework that seeks explanations for why there are firms and how the boundaries of firms are defined through the “make-or-buy” decision. However, it is not a framework that offers explanations for the relative costs of procuring construction projects in different ways. The idea that different methods of procurement will have characteristically different costs is tested by way of a survey. The relevance of transaction cost economics to the study of commercial costs in procurement is doubtful. The survey shows that collaborative working methods cost neither more nor less than traditional methods. But the benefits of collaboration mean that there is a great deal of enthusiasm for collaboration rather than competition.

Choosing international linkage strategies in the electronics industry: the role of multinational experience

This paper examines how different aspects of multinational experience affect the choice of international linkage strategy. Integrating transaction cost and dynamic efficiency considerations, we empirically test the determinants of the choice between acquisitions, joint ventures (JV), and strategic alliances (SA) for the world’s largest electronics corporations in 1993–1997. We show that “country specific experience” increases the probability of commitment intensive linkage modes (such as acquisitions and joint ventures), while a positive effect on strategic alliances is caused by “variety experience”, deriving from the heterogeneity of international contexts, and by “internationalisation experience” reflecting overall involvement in international markets.

The impact of harvesting on a formerly endangered tropical bird: insights from life-history theory

1. Life-history theory assumes that trade-offs exist between an individual's life-history components, such that an increased allocation of a resource to one fitness trait might be expected to result in a cost for a conflicting fitness trait. Recent evidence from experimental manipulations of wild individuals supports this assumption. 2. The management of many bird populations involves harvesting for both commercial and conservation purposes. One frequently harvested life-history stage is the egg, but the consequences of repeated egg harvesting for the individual and the long-term dynamics of the population remain poorly understood. 3. We used a well-documented restored population of the Mauritius kestrel Falco punctatus as a model system to explore the consequences of egg harvesting (and associated management practices) for an individual within the context of life-history theory. 4. Our analysis indicated that management practices enhanced both the size and number of clutches laid by managed females, and improved mid-life male and female adult survival relative to unmanaged adult kestrels. 5. Although management resulted in an increased effort in egg production, it reduced parental effort during incubation and the rearing of offspring, which could account for these observed changes. 6. Synthesis and applications. This study demonstrates how a commonly applied harvesting strategy, when examined within the context of life-history theory, can identify improvements in particular fitness traits that might alleviate some of the perceived negative impact of harvesting on the long-term dynamics of a managed population.

Identifying and understanding factors influencing the uptake of new technologies on dairy farms in SW England using the theory of reasoned action

Whilst much is known of new technology adopters, little research has addressed the role of their attitudes in adoption decisions; particularly, for technologies with evident economic potential that have not been taken up by farmers. This paper presents recent research that has used a new approach which examines the role that adopters' attitudes play in identifying the drivers of and barriers to adoption. The study was concerned with technologies for livestock farming systems in SW England, specifically oestrus detection, nitrogen supply management, and, inclusion of white clover. The adoption behaviour is analysed using the social-psychology theory of reasoned action to identify factors that affect the adoption of technologies, which are confirmed using principal components analysis. The results presented here relate to the specific adoption behaviour regarding the Milk Development Council's recommended observation times for heat detection. The factors that affect the adoption of this technology are: cost effectiveness, improved detection and conception rates as the main drivers, whilst the threat to demean the personal knowledge and skills of a farmer in 'knowing' their cows is a barrier. This research shows clearly that promotion of a technology and transfer of knowledge for a farming system need to take account of the beliefs and attitudes of potential adopters. (C) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Theory and practice in value management: a reply to Ellis et al (2005)

The constructivist model of 'soft' value management (VM) is contrasted with the VM discourse appropriated by cost consultants who operate from within UK quantity surveying (QS) practices. The enactment of VM by cost consultants is shaped by the institutional context within which they operate and is not necessarily representative of VM practice per se. Opportunities to perform VM during the formative stages of design are further constrained by the positivistic rhetoric that such practitioners use to conceptualize and promote their services. The complex interplay between VM theory and practice is highlighted and analysed from a non-deterministic perspective. Codified models of 'best practice' are seen to be socially constructed and legitimized through human interaction in the context of interorganizational networks. Published methodologies are seen to inform practice in only a loose and indirect manner, with extensive scope for localized improvization. New insights into the relationship between VM theory and practice are derived from the dramaturgical metaphor. The social reality of VM is seen to be constituted through scripts and performances, both of which are continuously contested across organizational arenas. It is concluded that VM defies universal definition and is conceptualized and enacted differently across different localized contexts.

Understanding construction consortia: Theory, practice and opinions

Firms form consortia in order to win contracts. Once a project has been awarded to a consortium each member then concentrates on his or her own contract with the client. Therefore, consortia are marketing devices, which present the impression of teamworking, but the production process is just as fragmented as under conventional procurement methods. In this way, the consortium forms a barrier between the client and the actual construction production process. Firms form consortia, not as a simple development of normal ways of working, but because the circumstances for specific projects make it a necessary vehicle. These circumstances include projects that are too large or too complex to undertake alone or projects that require on-going services which cannot be provided by the individual firms inhouse. It is not a preferred way of working, because participants carry extra risk in the form of liability for the actions of their partners in the consortium. The behaviour of members of consortia is determined by their relative power, based on several factors, including financial commitment and ease of replacement. The level of supply chain visibility to the public sector client and to the industry is reduced by the existence of a consortium because the consortium forms an additional obstacle between the client and the firms undertaking the actual construction work. Supply chain visibility matters to the client who otherwise loses control over the process of construction or service provision, while remaining accountable for cost overruns. To overcome this separation there is a convincing argument in favour of adopting the approach put forward in the Project Partnering Contract 2000 (PPC2000) Agreement. Members of consortia do not necessarily go on to work in the same consortia again because members need to respond flexibly to opportunities as and when they arise. Decision-making processes within consortia tend to be on an ad hoc basis. Construction risk is taken by the contractor and the construction supply chain but the reputational risk is carried by all the firms associated with a consortium. There is a wide variation in the manner that consortia are formed, determined by the individual circumstances of each project; its requirements, size and complexity, and the attitude of individual project leaders. However, there are a number of close working relationships based on generic models of consortia-like arrangements for the purpose of building production, such as the Housing Corporation Guidance Notes and the PPC2000.

How contractors price risk in bids: theory and practice

Formal and analytical models that contractors can use to assess and price project risk at the tender stage have proliferated in recent years. However, they are rarely used in practice. Introducing more models would, therefore, not necessarily help. A better understanding is needed of how contractors arrive at a bid price in practice, and how, and in what circumstances, risk apportionment actually influences pricing levels. More than 60 proposed risk models for contractors that are published in journals were examined and classified. Then exploratory interviews with five UK contractors and documentary analyses on how contractors price work generally and risk specifically were carried out to help in comparing the propositions from the literature to what contractors actually do. No comprehensive literature on the real bidding processes used in practice was found, and there is no evidence that pricing is systematic. Hence, systematic risk and pricing models for contractors may have no justifiable basis. Contractors process their bids through certain tendering gateways. They acknowledge the risk that they should price. However, the final settlement depends on a set of complex, micro-economic factors. Hence, risk accountability may be smaller than its true cost to the contractor. Risk apportionment occurs at three stages of the whole bid-pricing process. However, analytical approaches tend not to incorporate this, although they could.