The transaction cost economics theory of the family firm: family-based human asset specificity and the bifurcation bias

We develop a transaction cost economics theory of the family firm, building upon the concepts of family-based asset specificity, bounded rationality, and bounded reliability. We argue that the prosperity and survival of family firms depend on the absence of a dysfunctional bifurcation bias. The bifurcation bias is an expression of bounded reliability, reflected in the de facto asymmetric treatment of family vs. nonfamily assets (especially human assets). We propose that absence of bifurcation bias is critical to fostering reliability in family business functioning. Our study ends the unproductive divide between the agency and stewardship perspectives of the family firm, which offer conflicting accounts of this firm type's functioning. We show that the predictions of the agency and stewardship perspectives can be usefully reconciled when focusing on how family firms address the bifurcation bias or fail to do so.

The impact of procurement method on costs of procurement

Collaborative working methods offer the hope of reduced waste, lower tendering costs and improved outputs. The costs of tendering may be influenced by the introduction of different working methods. Transaction cost economics appears to offer an analytical framework for studying the costs of tendering, but it is more to do with providing explanations at the institutional/industry level, not at the level of individual projects. Surveys and interviews were carried out with small samples in UK. The data show that that while tendering costs are not necessarily higher in collaborative working arrangements, there is no correlation between costs of tendering and the way the work is organized. Practitioners perceive that the benefits of working in collaborative procurement routes far outweigh the costs. Tendering practices can be improved to avoid waste, and the suggested improvements include restricting selective tendering lists to 23 bidders, letting bidders know who they are competing with, reimbursing tendering costs for aborted projects and ensuring that timely and comprehensive information is provided to bidders.

Comparative costs of the commercial process in different construction procurement methods

The commercial process in construction projects is an expensive and highly variable overhead. Collaborative working practices carry many benefits, which are widely disseminated, but little information is available about their costs. Transaction Cost Economics is a theoretical framework that seeks explanations for why there are firms and how the boundaries of firms are defined through the “make-or-buy” decision. However, it is not a framework that offers explanations for the relative costs of procuring construction projects in different ways. The idea that different methods of procurement will have characteristically different costs is tested by way of a survey. The relevance of transaction cost economics to the study of commercial costs in procurement is doubtful. The survey shows that collaborative working methods cost neither more nor less than traditional methods. But the benefits of collaboration mean that there is a great deal of enthusiasm for collaboration rather than competition.

The end of the opportunism vs trust debate: bounded reliability as a new envelope concept in research on MNE governance

Modern transaction cost economics (TCE) thinking has developed into a key intellectual foundation of international business (IB) research, but the Williamsonian version has faced substantial criticism for adopting the behavioral assumption of opportunism. In this paper we assess both the opportunism concept and existing alternatives such as trust within the context of IB research, especially work on multinational enterprise (MNE) governance. Case analyses of nine global MNEs illustrate an alternative to the opportunism assumption that captures more fully the mechanisms underlying failed commitments inside the MNE. As a substitute for the often-criticized assumption of opportunism, we propose the envelope concept of bounded reliability (BRel), an assumption that represents more accurately and more completely the reasons for failed commitments, without invalidating the other critical assumption in conventional TCE (and internalization theory) thinking, namely the widely accepted envelope concept of bounded rationality (BRat). Bounded reliability as an envelope concept includes two main components, within the context of global MNE management: opportunism as intentional deceit, and benevolent preference reversal. The implications for IB research of adopting the bounded reliability concept are far reaching, as this concept may increase the legitimacy of comparative institutional analysis in the social sciences.

Making internalization theory good for practice: the essence of Alan Rugman’s contributions to international business

This perspectives paper and its associated commentaries examine Alan Rugman's conceptual contribution to international business scholarship. Most significantly, we highlight Rugman's version of internalization theory as an approach that integrates transaction cost economics and ‘classical’ internalization theory with elements from the resource-based view, such that it is especially relevant to strategic management. In reviewing his oeuvre, we also offer observations on his ideas for ‘new internalization theory’. We classify his other novel insights into four categories: Network Multinationals; National competitiveness; Development and public policy; and Emerging Economy MNEs. This special section offers multiple views on how his work informed the larger academic debate and considers how these ideas might evolve in the longer term.

Global, local, or regional? The locus of MNE strategies

This paper provides an overview of the main insights arising from the ‘regional strategy’ literature. It also develops the contours of a new, rich research agenda for future international strategy scholarship, whereby the region should be introduced as an explicit, third geographic level of analysis, in addition to the country-level and the global level. Regional strategy analysis requires a fundamental rethink of mainstream theories in the international strategy sphere. This rethink involves, inter alia, internalization theory, with its resource-based view and transaction cost economics components, as well as the integration (I) – national responsiveness (NR) framework.

The impact of contractor selection method on transaction costs: a review

The basic premise of transaction-cost theory is that the decision to outsource, rather than to undertake work in-house, is determined by the relative costs incurred in each of these forms of economic organization. In construction the "make or buy" decision invariably leads to a contract. Reducing the costs of entering into a contractual relationship (transaction costs) raises the value of production and is therefore desirable. Commonly applied methods of contractor selection may not minimise the costs of contracting. Research evidence suggests that although competitive tendering typically results in the lowest bidder winning the contract this may not represent the lowest project cost after completion. Multi-parameter and quantitative models for contractor selection have been developed to identify the best (or least risky) among bidders. A major area in which research is still needed is in investigating the impact of different methods of contractor selection on the costs of entering into a contract and the decision to outsource.

Choosing international linkage strategies in the electronics industry: the role of multinational experience

This paper examines how different aspects of multinational experience affect the choice of international linkage strategy. Integrating transaction cost and dynamic efficiency considerations, we empirically test the determinants of the choice between acquisitions, joint ventures (JV), and strategic alliances (SA) for the world’s largest electronics corporations in 1993–1997. We show that “country specific experience” increases the probability of commitment intensive linkage modes (such as acquisitions and joint ventures), while a positive effect on strategic alliances is caused by “variety experience”, deriving from the heterogeneity of international contexts, and by “internationalisation experience” reflecting overall involvement in international markets.

What are the costs of procurement and who bears them?

The costs of procurement are transaction costs which are separate from the direct costs of a project. In this paper discussion is concentrated on costs of tendering. Types of cost, including money costs and opportunity costs, short-term and long-term costs, private and social costs are defined and examined in relation to various types of product and methods of procurement. The costs of the contractor and of the client are considered and tentative conclusions drawn as to who bears these costs in the short-run and in the long run. They may fall on the parties to the process for the particular project, on other contractors and clients or on society as a whole.

The impact of contract duration on the cost of cash retention

Cash retention is a common means of protecting an employer from a contractor's insolvency as well as ensuring that contractors finish the work that they start. Similarly, contractors withhold part of payments due to their sub-contractors. Larger contracts tend to be subjected to smaller rates of retention. By calculating the cost of retention as an amount per year of a contract, it is shown that retention is far more expensive for firms whose work consists of short contracts. The extra cost is multiplied when the final payment is delayed, as it often is for those whose work takes place at the beginning of a project. This may explain why it is that main contractors are a lot less interested than sub-contractors in alternatives to cash retention, such as retention bonds