Self-defence: A state of mind for states?

This paper focuses upon a comparatively overlooked issue with regard to the scope of self-defence in international law: whether the subjective ‘psychological’ positions of the states concerned in a dispute involving the use force have any impact upon the lawfulness of an action avowedly taken in self-defence. There exists a long standing conception that the motives of a state responding in self-defence are relevant to the lawfulness of that response. The purity (or impurity) of a state's motive forms the basis of a distinction for many writers between a lawful self-defence action and an unlawful armed reprisal. Similarly, in recent decisions of the ICJ, the implication has been that the subjective intention of the attacking state may be relevant to the question of whether the attack perpetrated by that state can trigger the right of self-defence. The conclusion is reached here that the lawfulness of an avowed self-defence action should be premised upon objective criteria alone. Moreover, this reflects the law as it is in fact applied in practice. It is argued that the subjective ‘psychological’ position of either the responding or attacking state has no place in the final analysis of whether an action in self-defence was lawful or unlawful.

Theory of mind in children with traumatic brain injury

Objective: This study was designed to examine the existence of deficits in mentalizing or theory of mind (ToM) in children with traumatic brain injury (TBI). Research design: ToM functioning was assessed in 12 children aged 6-12 years with TBI and documented frontal lobe damage and compared to 12 controls matched for age, sex and verbal ability. Brief measures of attention and memory were also included. Main outcome and results: The TBI group was significantly impaired relative to controls on the advanced ToM measure and a measure of basic emotion recognition. No difference was found in a basic measure of ToM. Conclusion: Traumatic brain damage in childhood may disrupt the developmental acquisition of emotion recognition and advanced ToM skills. The clinical and theoretical importance of these findings is discussed and the implications for the assessment and treatment of children who have experienced TBI are outlined.

Theory of mind and attentional bias to facial emotional expressions: A preliminary study

Theory of mind ability has been associated with performance in interpersonal interactions and has been found to influence aspects such as emotion recognition, social competence, and social anxiety. Being able to attribute mental states to others requires attention to subtle communication cues such as facial emotional expressions. Decoding and interpreting emotions expressed by the face, especially those with negative valence, are essential skills to successful social interaction. The current study explored the association between theory of mind skills and attentional bias to facial emotional expressions. According to the study hypothesis, individuals with poor theory of mind skills showed preferential attention to negative faces over both non-negative faces and neutral objects. Tentative explanations for the findings are offered emphasizing the potential adaptive role of vigilance for threat as a way of allocating a limited capacity to interpret others’ mental states to obtain as much information as possible about potential danger in the social environment.

Language in genetic syndromes and cognitive modularity

In recent years, research into the impact of genetic abnormalities on cognitive development, including language, has become recognized for its potential to make valuable contributions to our understanding of the brain–behaviour relationships underlying language acquisition as well as to understanding the cognitive architecture of the human mind. The publication of Fodor’s ( 1983 ) book The Modularity of Mind has had a profound impact on the study of language and the cognitive architecture of the human mind. Its central claim is that many of the processes involved in comprehension are undertaken by special brain systems termed ‘modules’. This domain specificity of language or modularity has become a fundamental feature that differentiates competing theories and accounts of language acquisition (Fodor 1983 , 1985 ; Levy 1994 ; Karmiloff-Smith 1998 ). However, although the fact that the adult brain is modularized is hardly disputed, there are different views of how brain regions become specialized for specific functions. A question of some interest to theorists is whether the human brain is modularized from the outset (nativist view) or whether these distinct brain regions develop as a result of biological maturation and environmental input (neuroconstructivist view). One source of insight into these issues has been the study of developmental disorders, and in particular genetic syndromes, such as Williams syndrome (WS) and Down syndrome (DS). Because of their uneven profiles characterized by dissociations of different cognitive skills, these syndromes can help us address theoretically significant questions. Investigations into the linguistic and cognitive profiles of individuals with these genetic abnormalities have been used as evidence to advance theoretical views about innate modularity and the cognitive architecture of the human mind. The present chapter will be organized as follows. To begin, two different theoretical proposals in the modularity debate will be presented. Then studies of linguistic abilities in WS and in DS will be reviewed. Here, the emphasis will be mainly on WS due to the fact that theoretical debates have focused primarily on WS, there is a larger body of literature on WS, and DS subjects have typically been used for the purposes of comparison. Finally, the modularity debate will be revisited in light of the literature review of both WS and DS. Conclusions will be drawn regarding the contribution of these two genetic syndromes to the issue of cognitive modularity, and in particular innate modularity.

Mind-reading difficulties in the siblings of people with Asperger's syndrome: evidence for a genetic influence in the abnormal development of a specific cognitive domain

Background: Previous research suggests that the phenotype associated with Asperger's syndrome (AS) includes difficulties in understanding the mental states of others, leading to difficulties in social communication and social relationships. It has also been suggested that the first-degree relatives of those with AS can demonstrate similar difficulties, albeit to a lesser extent. This study examined 'theory of mind' (ToM) abilities in the siblings of children with AS relative to a matched control group. Method: 2 7 children who had a sibling with AS were administered the children's version of the 'Eyes Test'(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Stone, & Rutherford, 1999). The control group consisted of 27 children matched for age, sex, and a measure of verbal comprehension, and who did not have a family history of AS/autism. Results: A significant difference was found between the groups on the Eyes Test, the 'siblings' group showing a poorer performance on this measure of social cognition. The difference was more pronounced among female siblings. Discussion: These results are discussed in terms of the familial distribution of a neuro-cognitive profile associated with AS, which confers varying degrees of social handicap amongst first-degree relatives. The implication of this finding with regard to the autism/AS phenotype is explored, with some discussion of why this neuro-cognitive profile (in combination with corresponding strengths) may have an evolutionary imperative.

Phylloxera and the grapevine: a sense of common purpose?

The purpose of life is its continuation: survival is the reason things live. Here we explore this 'basic' of biology, by reference to the extraordinary life-cycle of the aphid-like pest phylloxera, and the complexity of its relationship with its host the grapevine. The effort and ingenuity that phylloxera employs to continue itself leads to a doubt that survival alone is sufficient reason. It has frequently been suggested that the reduction of life to a catalogue of facts (by science) creates this doubt, because it robs existence of its essence (which is something other than its mechanics). The part that science is said to steal is what Robert Pirsig calls Quality-the harmonious balance of things. Pirsig seems to imply that this is something inherent in things-and independent from us. A more mundane explanation is that the difference between facts and the complete reality is us-the tendency of mind to connect freely between different kinds of information. This possibility is briefly illustrated here by a myth based on the facts of phylloxera.

Regulation of the neural circuitry of emotion by compassion meditation: effects of meditative expertise

Recent brain imaging studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have implicated insula and anterior cingulate cortices in the empathic response to another's pain. However, virtually nothing is known about the impact of the voluntary generation of compassion on this network. To investigate these questions we assessed brain activity using fMRI while novice and expert meditation practitioners generated a loving-kindness-compassion meditation state. To probe affective reactivity, we presented emotional and neutral sounds during the meditation and comparison periods. Our main hypothesis was that the concern for others cultivated during this form of meditation enhances affective processing, in particular in response to sounds of distress, and that this response to emotional sounds is modulated by the degree of meditation training. The presentation of the emotional sounds was associated with increased pupil diameter and activation of limbic regions (insula and cingulate cortices) during meditation (versus rest). During meditation, activation in insula was greater during presentation of negative sounds than positive or neutral sounds in expert than it was in novice meditators. The strength of activation in insula was also associated with self-reported intensity of the meditation for both groups. These results support the role of the limbic circuitry in emotion sharing. The comparison between meditation vs. rest states between experts and novices also showed increased activation in amygdala, right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) in response to all sounds, suggesting, greater detection of the emotional sounds, and enhanced mentation in response to emotional human vocalizations for experts than novices during meditation. Together these data indicate that the mental expertise to cultivate positive emotion alters the activation of circuitries previously linked to empathy and theory of mind in response to emotional stimuli.

Intact imitation of emotional facial actions in autism spectrum conditions.

It has been proposed that there is a core impairment in autism spectrum conditions (ASC) to the mirror neuron system (MNS): If observed actions cannot be mapped onto the motor commands required for performance, higher order sociocognitive functions that involve understanding another person's perspective, such as theory of mind, may be impaired. However, evidence of MNS impairment in ASC is mixed. The present study used an 'automatic imitation' paradigm to assess MNS functioning in adults with ASC and matched controls, when observing emotional facial actions. Participants performed a pre-specified angry or surprised facial action in response to observed angry or surprised facial actions, and the speed of their action was measured with motion tracking equipment. Both the ASC and control groups demonstrated automatic imitation of the facial actions, such that responding was faster when they acted with the same emotional expression that they had observed. There was no difference between the two groups in the magnitude of the effect. These findings suggest that previous apparent demonstrations of impairments to the MNS in ASC may be driven by a lack of visual attention to the stimuli or motor sequencing impairments, and therefore that there is, in fact, no MNS impairment in ASC. We discuss these findings with reference to the literature on MNS functioning and imitation in ASC, as well as theories of the role of the MNS in sociocognitive functioning in typical development.