Performance and prediction: Bayesian modelling of fallible choice in chess

Evaluating agents in decision-making applications requires assessing their skill and predicting their behaviour. Both are well developed in Poker-like situations, but less so in more complex game and model domains. This paper addresses both tasks by using Bayesian inference in a benchmark space of reference agents. The concepts are explained and demonstrated using the game of chess but the model applies generically to any domain with quantifiable options and fallible choice. Demonstration applications address questions frequently asked by the chess community regarding the stability of the rating scale, the comparison of players of different eras and/or leagues, and controversial incidents possibly involving fraud. The last include alleged under-performance, fabrication of tournament results, and clandestine use of computer advice during competition. Beyond the model world of games, the aim is to improve fallible human performance in complex, high-value tasks.

Skilloscopy: Bayesian modeling of decision makers' skill

This paper proposes and demonstrates an approach, Skilloscopy, to the assessment of decision makers. In an increasingly sophisticated, connected and information-rich world, decision making is becoming both more important and more difficult. At the same time, modelling decision-making on computers is becoming more feasible and of interest, partly because the information-input to those decisions is increasingly on record. The aims of Skilloscopy are to rate and rank decision makers in a domain relative to each other: the aims do not include an analysis of why a decision is wrong or suboptimal, nor the modelling of the underlying cognitive process of making the decisions. In the proposed method a decision-maker is characterised by a probability distribution of their competence in choosing among quantifiable alternatives. This probability distribution is derived by classic Bayesian inference from a combination of prior belief and the evidence of the decisions. Thus, decision-makers’ skills may be better compared, rated and ranked. The proposed method is applied and evaluated in the gamedomain of Chess. A large set of games by players across a broad range of the World Chess Federation (FIDE) Elo ratings has been used to infer the distribution of players’ rating directly from the moves they play rather than from game outcomes. Demonstration applications address questions frequently asked by the Chess community regarding the stability of the Elo rating scale, the comparison of players of different eras and/or leagues, and controversial incidents possibly involving fraud. The method of Skilloscopy may be applied in any decision domain where the value of the decision-options can be quantified.

How reliable is internet-based self-reported identity, socio-demographic and obesity measures in European adults?

In e-health intervention studies, there are concerns about the reliability of internet-based, self-reported (SR) data and about the potential for identity fraud. This study introduced and tested a novel procedure for assessing the validity of internet-based, SR identity and validated anthropometric and demographic data via measurements performed face-to-face in a validation study (VS). Participants (n = 140) from seven European countries, participating in the Food4Me intervention study which aimed to test the efficacy of personalised nutrition approaches delivered via the internet, were invited to take part in the VS. Participants visited a research centre in each country within 2 weeks of providing SR data via the internet. Participants received detailed instructions on how to perform each measurement. Individual’s identity was checked visually and by repeated collection and analysis of buccal cell DNA for 33 genetic variants. Validation of identity using genomic information showed perfect concordance between SR and VS. Similar results were found for demographic data (age and sex verification). We observed strong intra-class correlation coefficients between SR and VS for anthropometric data (height 0.990, weight 0.994 and BMI 0.983). However, internet-based SR weight was under-reported (Δ −0.70 kg [−3.6 to 2.1], p < 0.0001) and, therefore, BMI was lower for SR data (Δ −0.29 kg m−2 [−1.5 to 1.0], p < 0.0001). BMI classification was correct in 93 % of cases. We demonstrate the utility of genotype information for detection of possible identity fraud in e-health studies and confirm the reliability of internet-based, SR anthropometric and demographic data collected in the Food4Me study.

Profits, malversations, restitutions. Les bénéfices des financiers durant la guerre de la Ligue d’Augsbourg et la taxe de Chamillart

Profit, embezzlement, restitution. The role of the traitants in the Nine Years War and Chamillart’s tax on financial benefits The aim of this article is to revisit the question of the financiers in Old Regime France. It starts with an analysis of the discourses about the financiers under the Absolute monarchy that underlines the complexity of their relationship with the government and the public. It then reviews the secondary literature and highlights the existence of competing historical interpretations (functional, political, utilitarian), which raise the question of their overall capacity to account for the role and impact of the financiers at different times. On this ground, the article focuses on a specific group of financiers, the so-called traitants d’affaires extraordinaires, during the Nine Years War. Further to a description of the specific role and scope of the activities of the various financiers responsible for helping the monarchy to raise the funds it needed to pay for its peace and wartime expenditure, the article examines the conditions and profits granted by the king in his contracts with the traitants whose services were hired for the purpose of selling royal offices in the public and advancing the revenue to the Treasury. It also explores the contractual arrangements of the companies established by the financiers to manage their operations as well as the rights and the responsibilities of their various stakeholders. These bases being laid, the article relies on the administrative correspondence relating to the traités during the Nine Years War to address a range of issues, in particular the extent to which these contracts, and other control procedures, were robust enough to deter fraud. The accounts of two traitants’ companies offer an opportunity to analyse and compare the structure of their income and expenditure (including the volume and cost of the promissory notes sold in the public to finance their payments to the Treasury), to explore the strategies of the contractors, to calculate their net profits and further discuss the problem of embezzlement. The article ends with the study of the context and debates which led to the introduction by finance minister Michel Chamillart, in 1700, of a shortfall tax on the financial profits of the gens d’affaires or traitants, the method used to determine its rate (50 % of the net benefits), its distribution among the various stakeholders (including the bailleurs de fonds or backers), and the related procedures. In total, the article argues that the relationship between the monarchy, society and the financiers under the Ancien Regime was not static and, therefore, suggests that the broad question of control and fraud must be examined against changing circumstances. With regard specifically to the Nine Years War, the article concludes that within the constraints of the Absolute monarchy, contractors offered valuable services by raising capital for the benefit of a king who ruled over a country which, at the time, was by far the wealthiest in Europe, and where ministers failed to foresee long wars of attrition and whose financial strategy was limited by the very existence of privilege. Overall, the traités were too costly to be a viable system of war financing. In these conditions, the substantial fortunes made by a handful of very successful traitants suffice to explain that the government easily gave in to public criticism against the wealth of the financiers and felt compelled, when peace resumed, to cancel the advantageous conditions offered in the treaties by taxing financial profits.