Controlling market power of vertically integrated firms in electricity networks: demand response of aggregator agents

This article reports the results of an experiment that examined how demand aggregators can discipline vertically-integrated firms - generator and distributor-retailer holdings-, which have a high share in wholesale electricity market with uniform price double auction (UPDA). We initially develop a treatment where holding members redistribute the profit based on the imposition of supra-competitive prices, in equal proportions (50%-50%). Subsequently, we introduce a vertical disintegration (unbundling) treatment with holding-s information sharing, where profits are distributed according to market outcomes. Finally, a third treatment is performed to introduce two active demand aggregators, with flexible interruptible loads in real time. We found that the introduction of responsive demand aggregators neutralizes the power market and increases market efficiency, even beyond what is achieved through vertical disintegration.

Revisiting the 'modern' multinational enterprise theory: an emerging-market multinational perspective

Using Triad-based multinational enterprises as their empirical setting, influential scholars in international management uncovered key organizational characteristics needed to create globally integrated and locally responsive multinationals. They proposed a “modern” theory of multinationals' organization (Hedlund, 1994). But recently, a new generation of multinationals from emerging markets has appeared. Little is known about their organizational choices and some scholars even doubt that they leverage organizational capabilities altogether. Does the “modern” theory still hold in their case? This exploratory study of three emerging-market multinationals (EMNEs) discloses that for reasons related to their origin in emerging economies and to the competitive specificities of these economies, EMNEs approach the global and local conundrum in ways which are both similar – and vastly different – from recommendations of the “modern” theory. We inductively develop a new theory that accounts for the evolution of organizational capabilities in EMNEs to reconcile global integration and local responsiveness. We discuss its implications for the executives of both emerging and Triad-based multinationals.

The IT outsourcing market-place: vendors and their selection

This paper focuses on outsourcing vendors, their characteristics and the vendor selection process. It draws on current research and two research studies, one specifi- cally examining outsourcing vendors and the other examining vendor-client issues. We first outline the development of the market for the outsourcing of information technology/information systems services and activities, then detail the characteristics of different types of vendor companies and their competitive positions, before providing a client perspective to the issue of vendor selection.

Asymmetric information, credit market condition, and entrepreneurial finance

The issue of imperfect information plays a much more important role in financing “informationally opaque” small businesses than in financing large companies.1 This chapter examines the asymmetric information issue in entrepreneurial finance from two perspectives: the effects of relationship lending and the impacts of credit market concentration on entrepreneurial financial behavior. These two perspectives are strongly linked to each other via the asymmetric information issue in entrepreneurial finance. Existing literature has recognized the important role played by relationship lending in alleviating the problem of asymmetric information. However, mixed empirical results have been reported. For example, it has been found that the development of relationship lending can improve the availability of finance for small businesses borrowers (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and reduce the costs of finance (Berger and Udell, 1995). Meanwhile, with monopoly power, banks may extract rents, in terms of charging higher-than-market interest rates, from small businesscustomers who have very concentrated banking relationships (Ongena and Smith, 2001). In addition, both favorable and unfavorable effects of credit market concentration on financing small businesses have been acknowledged. Small business borrowers may have to pay a higher-than-market price on loans (Degryse and Ongena, 2005) and are more likely to be financially constrained (Cetorelli, 2004) than in competitive markets. On the other hand, empirical studies have shown that market concentration create a strong motive for lenders to invest in private information from small business customers, and therefore a concentrated market is more efficient in terms of private information acquisition (Han et al., 2009b). The objective of this chapter is to investigate, by reviewing existing literature, the role played by relationship lending and the effects of market concentration on financing entrepreneurial businesses that are supposed to be informationally opaque. In the first section we review literature on the important role played by asymmetric information in entrepreneurial finance from two perspectives: asymmetric information and relationship lending, and the theoretical modeling of asymmetric information. Then we examine the relationship between capital market conditions and entrepreneurial finance and attempt to answer two questions: Why is the capital market condition important for entrepreneurial finance? and What are the effects of capital market conditions on entrepreneurial financial behavior in terms of discouraged borrowers, cash holding, and the availability and costs of finance?