Contemporary ordinary language philosophy

There is a widespread assumption that ordinary language philosophy was killed off sometime in the 1960s or 70s by a combination of Gricean pragmatics and the rapid development of systematic semantic theory. Contrary to that widespread assumption, however, contemporary versions of ordinary language philosophy are alive and flourishing, but going by various aliases—in particular (some versions of) "contextualism" and (some versions of) "experimental philosophy". And a growing group of contemporary philosophers are explicitly embracing the methods as well as the title of ordinary language philosophy and arguing that it has been unfairly maligned and was never decisively refuted. In this overview, I will outline the main projects and arguments employed by contemporary ordinary language philosophers, and make the case that updated versions of the arguments made by ordinary language philosophers in the middle of the twentieth century are attracting renewed attention.

Production and on-line comprehension of definite articles and clitic pronouns by Greek sequential bilingual children and monolingual children with specific language impairment

The present study compared production and on-line comprehension of definite articles and third person direct object clitic pronouns in Greek-speaking typically developing, sequential bilingual (L2-TD) children and monolingual children with specific language impairment (L1-SLI). Twenty Turkish Greek L2-TD children, 16 Greek L1-SLI children, and 31 L1-TD Greek children participated in a production task examining definite articles and clitic pronouns and, in an on-line comprehension task, involving grammatical sentences with definite articles and clitics and sentences with grammatical violations induced by omitted articles and clitics. The results showed that the L2-TD children were sensitive to the grammatical violations despite low production. In contrast, the children with SLI were not sensitive to clitic omission in the on-line task, despite high production. These results support a dissociation between production and on-line comprehension in L2 children and for impaired grammatical representations and lack of automaticity in children with SLI. They also suggest that on-line comprehension tasks may complement production tasks by differentiating between the language profiles of L2-TD children and children with SLI.

Rule-based morphological processing in a second language: a behavioural investigation

According to dual-system accounts of English past-tense processing, regular forms are decomposed into their stem and affix (played=play+ed) based on an implicit linguistic rule, whereas irregular forms (kept) are retrieved directly from the mental lexicon. In second language (L2) processing research, it has been suggested that L2 learners do not have rule-based decomposing abilities, so they process regular past-tense forms similarly to irregular ones (Silva & Clahsen 2008), without applying the morphological rule. The present study investigates morphological processing of regular and irregular verbs in Greek-English L2 learners and native English speakers. In a masked-priming experiment with regular and irregular prime-target verb pairs (playedplay/kept-keep), native speakers showed priming effects for regular pairs, compared to unrelated pairs, indicating decomposition; conversely, L2 learners showed inhibitory effects. At the same time, both groups revealed priming effects for irregular pairs. We discuss these findings in the light of available theories on L2 morphological processing.

Language in genetic syndromes and cognitive modularity

In recent years, research into the impact of genetic abnormalities on cognitive development, including language, has become recognized for its potential to make valuable contributions to our understanding of the brain–behaviour relationships underlying language acquisition as well as to understanding the cognitive architecture of the human mind. The publication of Fodor’s ( 1983 ) book The Modularity of Mind has had a profound impact on the study of language and the cognitive architecture of the human mind. Its central claim is that many of the processes involved in comprehension are undertaken by special brain systems termed ‘modules’. This domain specificity of language or modularity has become a fundamental feature that differentiates competing theories and accounts of language acquisition (Fodor 1983 , 1985 ; Levy 1994 ; Karmiloff-Smith 1998 ). However, although the fact that the adult brain is modularized is hardly disputed, there are different views of how brain regions become specialized for specific functions. A question of some interest to theorists is whether the human brain is modularized from the outset (nativist view) or whether these distinct brain regions develop as a result of biological maturation and environmental input (neuroconstructivist view). One source of insight into these issues has been the study of developmental disorders, and in particular genetic syndromes, such as Williams syndrome (WS) and Down syndrome (DS). Because of their uneven profiles characterized by dissociations of different cognitive skills, these syndromes can help us address theoretically significant questions. Investigations into the linguistic and cognitive profiles of individuals with these genetic abnormalities have been used as evidence to advance theoretical views about innate modularity and the cognitive architecture of the human mind. The present chapter will be organized as follows. To begin, two different theoretical proposals in the modularity debate will be presented. Then studies of linguistic abilities in WS and in DS will be reviewed. Here, the emphasis will be mainly on WS due to the fact that theoretical debates have focused primarily on WS, there is a larger body of literature on WS, and DS subjects have typically been used for the purposes of comparison. Finally, the modularity debate will be revisited in light of the literature review of both WS and DS. Conclusions will be drawn regarding the contribution of these two genetic syndromes to the issue of cognitive modularity, and in particular innate modularity.