Effects of In-Kind transfers on female labor supply: evidence from the food supply program comedores comunitarios

En la literatura se argumenta que las transferencias en especie podrían tener efectos positivos sobre la oferta laboral. En este trabajo utilizamos el programa de nutrición de la ciudad de Bogotá, Comedores Comunitarios, para esclarecer dicho punto. El programa otorga un almuerzo diario a las personas pobres que son vecinas de los comedores. Utilizando la técnica de emparejamiento con la Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 2007, una encuesta de corte transversal, se encuentra tanto efectos significativos positivos como negativos en la oferta laboral femenina para diferentes grupos de mujeres (con diferencias en edad, composición del hogar y acceso a redes sociales). Estos resultados son relevantes para entender los incentivos al trabajo heterogéneos generados cuando se aplica esta clase de programas.

Publicness of goods and violent conflict : evidence from Colombia

How the degree of publicness of goods affect violent conflict? Based on the theoretical model in Esteban and Ray (2001) we find that the effect of the degree of publicness depends on the group size. When the group is small (large), the degree of publicness increases (decreases) the likelihood of conflict. This opens an empirical question that we tackle using microdata from the Colombian conflict at the municipality level. We use three goods with different publicness degree to identify the sign of the effect of publicness on conflict. These goods are coca crops (private good), road density (public good subject to congestion) and average education quality (a purer public good). After dealing with endogeneity issues using an IV approach, we find that the degree of publicness reduces the likelihood of both paramilitary and guerrilla attacks. Moreover, coca production exacerbates conflict and the provision of both public goods mitigates conflict. These results are robust to size, geographical, and welfare controls. Policies that improve public goods provision will help to fight the onset of conflict.

Corporate valuation and governance: evidence from Colombia

We examine for the first time the association of different measures of ownership and control, and separation ratios with firm’s value and performance for 108 non-financial firms that traded their stock during the period 1998 to 2002. We found that large blockholders exert a positive influence upon firm’s valuation and performance, which validates the positive monitoring approach of large shareholders, but also found that this relation is not monotone implying that when separation of control and ownership tends to increase, a negative effect is exerted on firm’s valuation. Furthermore, we report first estimates of a survey of corporate governance practices conducted in 2004 for 43 Colombian non-financial companies. The index’s scores suggest that implementation of good governance in Colombian firms has been slow and poor as measured by the average of the Index that is below half the maximum attainable value. Regrettably, we did not find any support to recent theories that predict a positive association between good governance practices, measured by the CGI, and performance. At most there exists a positive relationship for sub-index but the results were not statistically significant in general.

The impact of a minimum pension on old age poverty and its budgetary cost. Evidence from Latin America

This paper examines the impact on old age poverty and the fiscal cost of universal minimum oldage pensions in Latin America using recent household survey data for 18 countries. Alleviatingold age poverty requires different approach from other age groups and a minimum pension islikely to be the only alternative available. First we measure old age poverty rates for all countries.Second we discuss the design of minimum pensions schemes, means-tested or not, as wellas the disincentive effects that they are expected to have on the economic and social behavior ofhouseholds including labor supply, saving and family solidarity. Third we use the household surveysto simulate the fiscal cost and the impact on poverty rates of alternative minimum pensionschemes in the 18 countries. We show that a universal minimum pension would substantiallyreduce poverty among the elderly except in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay where minimumpension systems already exist and poverty rates are low. Such schemes have much tobe commended in terms of incentives, spillover effects and administrative simplicity but have ahigh fiscal cost. The latter is a function of the age at which benefits are awarded, the prevailinglongevity, the generosity of benefits, the efficacy of means testing, and naturally the fiscal capacityof the country.

Economic shocks and crime: evidence from the crash of ponzi schemes

In November 2008, Colombian authorities dismantled a network of Ponzi schemes, making hundreds of thousands of investors lose tens of millions of dollars throughout the country. Using original data on the geographical incidence of the Ponzi schemes, this paper estimates the impact of their break down on crime. We find that the crash of Ponzi schemes differentially exacerbated crime in affected districts. Confirming the intuition of the standard economic model of crime, this effect is only present in places with relatively weak judicial and law enforcement institutions, and with little access to consumption smoothing mechanisms such as microcredit. In addition, we show that, with the exception of economically-motivated felonies such as robbery, violent crime is not affected by the negative shock.

Natural resource windfalls and efficiency of local government expenditures: evidence from Peru

We study the role of natural resource windfalls in explaining the efficiency of public expenditures. Using a rich dataset of expenditures and public good provision for 1,836 municipalities in Peru for period 2001-2010, we estimate a non-monotonic relationship between the efficiency of public good provision and the level of natural resource transfers. Local governments that were extremely favored by the boom of mineral prices were more efficient in using fiscal windfalls whereas those benefited with modest transfers were more inefficient. These results can be explained by the increase in political competition associated with the boom. However, the fact that increases in efficiency were related to reductions in public good provision casts doubts about the beneficial effects of political competition in promoting efficiency.