Climate Change and Transregional Convergence: Carbon Markets in North Amer ica

National policies in North America have not been drafted properly to address the problem of climate change, following the impasse of international negotiations. Facing this scenario, new alternatives emerge with the leadership and participation of new actors. Local governments in North America, especially of British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec, have been developing strategies to face climate change and emissions reduction in parallel to the national efforts and the global governance strategies. These local governments have developed a transregional approach that has resulted in the creation of regional institutions such as the Western Climate Initiative, the Regional Greenhouse GasInitiative and the Midwestern GreenhouseGas Reduction Accord.Their main goal is to establish regional carbon markets to mitigate and adapt to climate change impacts in a cost-effective way. In spite of these efforts, these initiatives have faced the overlapping problem among them and with national and globalstrategies. The goal of this research is to explore how these carbon markets have developed convergence policies. Convergence among these markets is expressed in their offset system and in secondary markets.

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.

Testing the law of one price in food markets: evidence for Colombia using disaggregated data

This paper applies stationarity tests to examine evidence of market integration for a relatively large sample of food products in Colombia. We Önd little support for market integration when using the univariate KPSS tests for stationarity. However, within a panel context and after allowing for cross sectional dependence, the Hadri tests provide much more evidence supporting the view that food markets are integrated or, in other words, that the law of one price holds for most products.

Competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the standard inter-group e¤ects. This type of externality occurs when both groups bene t, possibly with di¤erent intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satis es an homogeneity condition then platforms pro ts and price structure have some speci c properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to other, according to the homogeneity degree. In the speci c but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platform s pro t do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This is in sharp contrast to conventional results stating that the presence of network externalities in a two-sided market structure increases the intensity of competition when the externality is positive (and decreases it when the externality is negative). Prices are a¤ected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers.

Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.

Dynamic conditional correlation in Latin-American asset markets

In this paper we reviewed the models of volatility for a group of five Latin American countries, mainly motivated by the recent periods of financial turbulence. Our results based on high frequency data suggest that Dynamic multivariate models are more powerful to study the volatilities of asset returns than Constant Conditional Correlation models. For the group of countries included, we identified that domestic volatilities of asset markets have been increasing; but the co-volatility of the region is still moderate.

Dynamic programming for stochastic target problems, Viscosity solutions and hedging in markets with Portfolio constraints and large investors

The purpose of this expository arti le is to present a self- ontained overview of some results on the hara terization of the optimal value fun tion of a sto hasti target problem as (dis ontinuous) vis osity solution of a ertain dynami programming PDE and its appli ation to the problem of hedging ontingent laims in the presen e of portfolio onstraints and large investors

A simple test of momentum in foreign exchange markets

This study proposes a new method for testing for the presence of momentum in nominal exchange rates, using a probabilistic approach. We illustrate our methodology estimating a binary response model using information on local currency / US dollar exchange rates of eight emerging economies. After controlling for important variables a§ecting the behavior of exchange rates in the short-run, we show evidence of exchange rate inertia; in other words, we Önd that exchange rate momentum is a common feature in this group of emerging economies, and thus foreign exchange traders participating in these markets are able to make excess returns by following technical analysis strategies. We Önd that the presence of momentum is asymmetric, being stronger in moments of currency depreciation than of appreciation. This behavior may be associated with central bank intervention

Investment in transport capacity and regulation of regional monopolies in natural gas commodity markets

This paper develops a model of the regulator-regulated firm relationship in a regional natural gas commodity market which can be linked to a competitive market by a pipeline. We characterize normative policies under which the regulator, in addition to setting the level of the capacity of the pipeline, regulates the price of gas, under asymmetric information on the firm’s technology, and may (or may not) operate (two-way) transfers between consumers and the firm. We then focus on capacity and investigate how its level responds to the regulator’s taking account of the firm’s incentive compatibility constraints. The analysis yields some insights on the role that transport capacity investments may play as an instrument to improve the efficiency of geographically isolated markets.

Quantil Hedging for telegraph markets and its applications to a pricing of equity-linked life insurance contracts

En este documento está desarrollado un modelo de mercado financiero basado en movimientos aleatorios con tiempo continuo, con velocidades constantes alternantes y saltos cuando hay cambios en la velocidad. Si los saltos en la dirección tienen correspondencia con la dirección de la velocidad del comportamiento aleatorio subyacente, con respecto a la tasa de interés, el modelo no presenta arbitraje y es completo. Se construye en detalle las estrategias replicables para opciones, y se obtiene una presentación cerrada para el precio de las opciones. Las estrategias de cubrimiento quantile para opciones son construidas. Esta metodología es aplicada al control de riesgo y fijación de precios de instrumentos de seguros.