Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Low genetic diversity and functional constraint in loci encoding Plasmodium vivax P12 and P38 proteins in the Colombian population

Background Plasmodium vivax is one of the five species causing malaria in human beings, affecting around 391 million people annually. The development of an anti-malarial vaccine has been proposed as an alternative for controlling this disease. However, its development has been hampered by allele-specific responses produced by the high genetic diversity shown by some parasite antigens. Evaluating these antigens’ genetic diversity is thus essential when designing a completely effective vaccine. Methods The gene sequences of Plasmodium vivax p12 (pv12) and p38 (pv38), obtained from field isolates in Colombia, were used for evaluating haplotype polymorphism and distribution by population genetics analysis. The evolutionary forces generating the variation pattern so observed were also determined. Results Both pv12 and pv38 were shown to have low genetic diversity. The neutral model for pv12 could not be discarded, whilst polymorphism in pv38 was maintained by balanced selection restricted to the gene’s 5′ region. Both encoded proteins seemed to have functional/structural constraints due to the presence of s48/45 domains, which were seen to be highly conserved.

The impact of a minimum pension on old age poverty and its budgetary cost. Evidence from Latin America

This paper examines the impact on old age poverty and the fiscal cost of universal minimum oldage pensions in Latin America using recent household survey data for 18 countries. Alleviatingold age poverty requires different approach from other age groups and a minimum pension islikely to be the only alternative available. First we measure old age poverty rates for all countries.Second we discuss the design of minimum pensions schemes, means-tested or not, as wellas the disincentive effects that they are expected to have on the economic and social behavior ofhouseholds including labor supply, saving and family solidarity. Third we use the household surveysto simulate the fiscal cost and the impact on poverty rates of alternative minimum pensionschemes in the 18 countries. We show that a universal minimum pension would substantiallyreduce poverty among the elderly except in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay where minimumpension systems already exist and poverty rates are low. Such schemes have much tobe commended in terms of incentives, spillover effects and administrative simplicity but have ahigh fiscal cost. The latter is a function of the age at which benefits are awarded, the prevailinglongevity, the generosity of benefits, the efficacy of means testing, and naturally the fiscal capacityof the country.