Análisis de las relaciones bilaterales entre Pakistán y Estados Unidos en materia de seguridad (Periodo 2007 - 2010)

Después de los ataques del 11 de septiembre de 2001, Pakistán se ha convertido en uno de los principales aliados de Estados Unidos para combatir las fuerzas terroristas de Al-Qaeda y los talibán en el centro y sur de Asia. La alianza bilateral no ha manifestado resultados determinantes para aliviar los problemas de seguridad en Pakistán, por el contrario, la yihad islámica se ha fortalecido en su población y los ataques terroristas que atentan contra la población civil y el aparato estatal se vuelven cada vez mas frecuentes, en razón de lo anterior, los grupos insurgentes en Pakistán han fortalecido su capacidad operativa y expandido su escenario de influencia.

Learning how (not) to fire a gun: combatant training and civilian victimization

What is the relationship between the type of training combatants receive upon recruitment into an armed group and their propensity to abuse civilians in civil war? Does military training or political training prevent or exacerbate the victimization of civilians by armed non-state actors? While the literature on civilian victimization has expanded rapidly, few studies have examined the correlation between abuse of civilians and the modes of training that illegal armed actors receive. Using a simple formal model, we develop hypotheses regarding this connection and argue that while military training should not decrease the probability that a combatant engages in civilian abuse, political training should. We test these hypotheses using a new survey consisting of a representative sample of approximately 1,500 demobilized combatants from the Colombian conflict, which we match with department-level data on civilian casualties. The empirical analysis confirms our hypotheses about the connection between training and civilian abuse and the results are robust to adding a full set of controls both at the department and at the individual level

Military empowerment and civilian targeting in civil war

Civilians constitute a large share of casualties in civil wars across the world. They are targeted to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This maximizes collaboration with the perpetrator and strengthens the support network necessary to consolidate control over contested regions. I develop a model of the magnitude and structure of civilian killings in civil wars involving two armed groups who Öght over territorial control. Armies secure compliance through a combination of carrots and sticks. In turn, civilians di§er from each other in their intrinsic preference towards one group. I explore the e§ect of the empowerment of one of the groups in the civilian death toll. There are two e§ects that go in opposite directions. While a direct e§ect makes the powerful group more lethal, there is an indirect e§ect by which the number of civilians who align with that group increases, leaving less enemy supporters to kill. I study the conditions under which there is one dominant e§ect and illustrate the predictions using sub-national longitudinal data for Colombiaís civil war.