Asymmetries in Business Cycles

Esta disertación busca estudiar los mecanismos de transmisión que vinculan el comportamiento de agentes y firmas con las asimetrías presentes en los ciclos económicos. Para lograr esto, se construyeron tres modelos DSGE. El en primer capítulo, el supuesto de función cuadrática simétrica de ajuste de la inversión fue removido, y el modelo canónico RBC fue reformulado suponiendo que des-invertir es más costoso que invertir una unidad de capital físico. En el segundo capítulo, la contribución más importante de esta disertación es presentada: la construcción de una función de utilidad general que anida aversión a la pérdida, aversión al riesgo y formación de hábitos, por medio de una función de transición suave. La razón para hacerlo así es el hecho de que los individuos son aversos a la pérdidad en recesiones, y son aversos al riesgo en auges. En el tercer capítulo, las asimetrías en los ciclos económicos son analizadas junto con ajuste asimétrico en precios y salarios en un contexto neokeynesiano, con el fin de encontrar una explicación teórica de la bien documentada asimetría presente en la Curva de Phillips.

Ownership structure and risk at Colombian banks

The separation between ownership and the control of capital in banks generates differences in the preferences for risk among shareholders and the manager. These differences could imply a corporate governance problem in banks with a dispersed ownership, since owners fail to exert control in the allocation of capital. In this paper we examine the relationship between the ownership structure and risk for Colombian banks. Our results suggest that a high ownership concentration leads to higher levels of risk.

Poor people and risky business

We try to explain why economic conflicts and illegal business often take place in poor countries. We use the concept of subsistence level of consumption (d) and assume a regular concave utility function for consumption levels higher than d. For consumption levels lower than d utility is constant and equal to zero. Under this framework poor agents are risk-lovers. This result helps to explain why economic conflicts are more likely to appear in poor economies and why poor agents are more willing to undertake illegal business.

A DSGE model with loss aversion in consumption and leisure: an explanation for business cycles asymmetries

In this chapter, an asymmetric DSGE model is built in order to account for asymmetries in business cycles. One of the most important contributions of this work is the construction of a general utility function which nests loss aversion, risk aversion and habits formation by means of a smooth transition function. The main idea behind this asymmetric utility function is that under recession the agents over-smooth consumption and leisure choices in order to prevent a huge deviation of them from the reference level of the utility; while under boom, the agents simply smooth consumption and leisure, but trying to be as far as possible from the reference level of utility. The simulations of this model by means of Perturbations Method show that it is possible to reproduce asymmetrical business cycles where recession (on shock) are stronger than booms and booms are more long-lasting than recession. One additional and unexpected result is a downward stickiness displayed by real wages. As a consequence of this, there is a more persistent fall in employment in recession than in boom. Thus, the model reproduces not only asymmetrical business cycles but also real stickiness and hysteresis.