Does uncertainty cause inertia in decision making? An experimental study of the role of regret aversion and indecisiveness

Previous research has shown that often there is clear inertia in individual decision making---that is, a tendency for decision makers to choose a status quo option. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate two potential determinants of inertia in uncertain environments: (i) regret aversion and (ii) ambiguity-driven indecisiveness. I use a between-subjects design with varying conditions to identify the effects of these two mechanisms on choice behavior. In each condition, participants choose between two simple real gambles, one of which is the status quo option. I find that inertia is quite large and that both mechanisms are equally important.

Problemas y consecuencias del resurgir del pragmatismo norteamericano: 1952-1976

Revisión crítica de la ‘versión heredada’ sobre el resurgir del pragmatismo norteamericano. Aquí sostengo que ésta es una narrativa sobre la historia de la filosofía que puede ser usada para “reivindicar” la continuidad o para “añorar” la pérdida de esa tradición. Presento tres argumentos a favor de mi tesis sobre la versión heredada: i) es insuficiente para explicar el surgimiento del pragmatismo; ii) es un tipo de narrativa que hace plausible una imagen de la filosofía; iii) impide apreciar que la formación del canon obedece a los propósitos de los seguidores del movimiento.

Risk, ambiguity, and diversification

Attitudes toward risk influence the decision to diversify among uncertain options. Yet, because in most situations the options are ambiguous, attitudes toward ambiguity may also play an important role. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the effect of ambiguity on the decision to diversify. I find that diversification is more prevalent and more persistent under ambiguity than under risk. Moreover, excess diversification under ambiguity is driven by participants who stick with a status quo gamble when diversification among gambles is not feasible. This behavioral pattern cannot be accommodated by major theories of choice under ambiguity.