3 resultados para Rank regression
em Universidad del Rosario, Colombia
Resumo:
Introducción: Determinamos la proporción de resolución espontánea de RVU primario en una población de niños menores de 5 años así como los factores que influyen y predicen tal resolución, con base en lo cual diseñamos un nomograma que permite determinar la posibilidad de resolución espontánea de cada grado de reflujo a los 3 años de su diagnóstico Metodología: Incluimos 407 niños con diagnóstico de RVU primario en un periodo de 10 años. Mediante análisis de asociación y comparaciones de promedios se determinaron las variables que se comportaron como factores de riesgo para fallar en obtener resolución espontanea y por un modelo de regresión logística binomial se confirmaron asociaciones. Se practicaron comparaciones mediante ANOVA o t-test y así como análisis de sobrevida mediante Log Rank Test para determinar las variables que influían también en el tiempo necesario para obtener resolución espontánea. Resultados: Las tasas de resolución espontánea fueron 92%, 85%, 56.4%, 21% y 5% para los grados I a V de reflujo respectivamente. En el análisis multivariado, Las variables nefropatía por reflujo (sig=0,000), Síndrome de evacuación disfuncional (SED) (sig=0,000) y bilateralidad (sig=0,006) fueron los factores de riesgo independientes para la falla del RVU en resolver espontáneamente. Sin embargo, en los análisis de sobrevida solo la variable SED demostró influir en el tiempo necesario para obtener resolución espontanea (sig=0,002). Discusión: Los hallazgos de este estudio ratifican la importancia de incluir variables como SED, nefropatía por reflujo y lateralidad en los modelos de predicción de resolución espontánea del RVU.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the measure of systemic importance ∆CoV aR proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009, 2010) within the context of a similar class of risk measures used in the risk management literature. In addition, we develop a series of testing procedures, based on ∆CoV aR, to identify and rank the systemically important institutions. We stress the importance of statistical testing in interpreting the measure of systemic importance. An empirical application illustrates the testing procedures, using equity data for three European banks.
Resumo:
In 2003, an electoral reform changed the mechanism to assign seats in the Colombian Congress. I simulate the 2006 Senate elections using the previous assignment mechanism to determine which senators benefited from the reform, i.e. would have not been elected had the reform not been made. With the results of the simulation, I use a regression discontinuity design to compare the senators that would have been barely elected anyways with those who would have lost, but were near to be elected. I check the differences in the amount of law drafts presented, the attendance to voting sessions, and a discipline index for each senator as proxy of their legislative behavior. I find that the senators benefiting from the reform present a different legislative behavior during the 4-year term with respect to the senators that would have been elected anyways. Since the differential legislative behavior cannot be interpreted as being better (worse) politician, I examine if the behavioral difference gives them an electoral advantage. I find no difference in the electoral result of 2010 Senate election in terms of the probability of being (re)elected in 2010, the share of votes, the share of votes within their party list, and the concentration of their votes. Additionally, I check the probability of being investigated for links with paramilitary groups and I find no differences. The results suggest that political reforms can change the composition of governing or legislative bodies in terms of performance, but it does not necessarily translate into an electoral advantage.