10 resultados para Preventive war
em Universidad del Rosario, Colombia
Resumo:
Esta disertación busca analizar y contrastar los argumentos sobre una posible intervención en el campo de refugiados de Srebrenica en 1995 bajo el concepto de Seguridad Humana.
Resumo:
Se tiene como meta analizar, teniendo en cuenta el alcance global que alcanza la política de guerra preventiva, en qué medida un grupo social específico ha logrado recibir el impacto que fomenta la difusión de esta política.
Resumo:
La monografía buscó realizar un análisis crítico del concepto de Seguridad Humana en relación con la actuación de la MINUEE en el período de guerra(1998-2000) y luego del retiro de la Misión (Julio de 2008), para establecer una crítica constructiva al funcionamiento de las OMP de la ONU, determinar los aciertos y desaciertos de la Misión en el uso del concepto de Seguridad Humana y sus múltiples dimensiones definidas en el PNUD(Seguridad: de la comunidad, de la salud, política, alimentaria, ambiental y personal) y comprender por qué la Misión fracasó en su intento de dirimir la crisis humanitaria y dar fin al conflicto.
Resumo:
La presente monografía tiene por objetivo analizar a través de la corriente constructivista de Alexander Wendt, cómo a partir de la política exterior de la Unión Europea, se crea una identidad europea que tiene efectos sobre Colombia a través de los Laboratorios de Paz. La creación de dicha identidad estuvo condicionada por la apropiación de ciertos mecanismos dentro de su política exterior, como la ayuda para el desarrollo y la diplomacia preventiva. Es de esta manera como la identidad europea afecta a Colombia a través de la creación de los Laboratorios de Paz por medio de mecanismos como actividades económicas alternativas y fuente de ingresos y empleo, sustitución de cultivos ilícitos, transferencia de conocimientos tecnológicos y administrativos, apoyo a procesos de paz al interior de la población, fortalecimiento institucional y participación ciudadana.
Resumo:
Las nuevas amenazas a la seguridad que han surgido en los últimos años están poniendo seriamente en juego la importancia y la implementación del derecho internacional humanitario. Este artículo investiga el impacto de la guerra del terror en el principio de distinción en el derecho internacional humanitario. Examina, de forma específica, prácticas estatales, por ejemplo, de los Estados Unidos, que han cedido frente al surgimiento de nuevas reglas relativas al principio de distinción. Para esto, se hace un análisis de dicho principio bajo dos perspectivas: blancos concretos y captura
Resumo:
How do we justify the practice of corrective justice for losses suffered during armed conflicts? This article seeks to show the force and relevance of this question, and to argue that, in cases of massively destructive wars, social justice should gain priority over corrective justice. Starting from a liberal Rawlsian conception of the relationship between corrective and social justice, it is argued that, paradoxically, the more destructive a war is, the less normative force corrective rights have and the higher priority policies of social justice, which guarantee basic rights to all citizens, should have.
Resumo:
Los textos que conforman este volumen iluminan muchas conexiones entre el desarrollo local y el global y su manera de afectar algunos conflictos específicos. El autor le otorga particular atención al complejo conflicto dominante en Colombia, con sus características especiales, su geografía, su demografía y su cultura particular.Cuidadosamente, él examina las tendencias mundiales y cómo este conflicto se relaciona con una seguridad internacional extremadamente desafiante que opera en contextos cambiantes. En esta labor, el autor traza ciertos lineamientos acerca de las vías, mecanismos y fórmulas para entender, abordar y hasta emprender conflictos de manera constructiva en vez de hacerlo de manera destructiva.
Resumo:
Civilians constitute a large share of casualties in civil wars across the world. They are targeted to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This maximizes collaboration with the perpetrator and strengthens the support network necessary to consolidate control over contested regions. I develop a model of the magnitude and structure of civilian killings in civil wars involving two armed groups who Öght over territorial control. Armies secure compliance through a combination of carrots and sticks. In turn, civilians di§er from each other in their intrinsic preference towards one group. I explore the e§ect of the empowerment of one of the groups in the civilian death toll. There are two e§ects that go in opposite directions. While a direct e§ect makes the powerful group more lethal, there is an indirect e§ect by which the number of civilians who align with that group increases, leaving less enemy supporters to kill. I study the conditions under which there is one dominant e§ect and illustrate the predictions using sub-national longitudinal data for Colombiaís civil war.
Resumo:
Why do some civil wars terminate soon, with victory of one party over the other? What determines if the winner is the incumbent or the rebel group? Why do other conáicts last longer? We propose a simple model in which the power of each armed group depends on the number of combatants it is able to recruit. This is in turn a function of the relative ëdistanceíbetween group leaderships and potential recruits. We emphasize the moral hazard problem of recruitment: Öghting is costly and risky so combatants have the incentive to defect from their task. They can also desert altogether and join the enemy. This incentive is stronger the farther away the Öghter is from the principal, since monitoring becomes increasingly costly. Bigger armies have more power but less monitoring capacity to prevent defection and desertion. This general framework allows a variety of interpretations of what type of proximity matters for building strong cohesive armies ranging from ethnic distance to geographic dispersion. Di§erent assumptions about the distribution of potential Öghters along the relevant dimension of conáict lead to di§erent equilibria. We characterize these, discuss the implied outcome in terms of who wins the war, and illustrate with historical and contemporaneous case studies.
Resumo:
This paper studies the effect of strengthening democracy, as captured by an increase in voting rights, on the incidence of violent civil conflict in nineteenth-century Colombia. Empirically studying the relationship between democracy and conflict is challenging, not only because of conceptual problems in defining and measuring democracy, but also because political institutions and violence are jointly determined. We take advantage of an experiment of history to examine the impact of one simple, measurable dimension of democracy (the size of the franchise) on con- flict, while at the same time attempting to overcome the identification problem. In 1853, Colombia established universal male suffrage. Using a simple difference-indifferences specification at the municipal level, we find that municipalities where more voters were enfranchised relative to their population experienced fewer violent political battles while the reform was in effect. The results are robust to including a number of additional controls. Moreover, we investigate the potential mechanisms driving the results. In particular, we look at which components of the proportion of new voters in 1853 explain the results, and we examine if results are stronger in places with more political competition and state capacity. We interpret our findings as suggesting that violence in nineteenth-century Colombia was a technology for political elites to compete for the rents from power, and that democracy constituted an alternative way to compete which substituted violence.