Nongenetic inheritance, linguistic competence, prenatal experience and behavior manipulation: recent contributions from behavioral neurobiology and neuropsychology to the explanation of behavior

This article gives an overview of presuppositions and explanations posed by behaviorist psychology (particularly its radical branch), cognitive–nativist sciences (i.e. psycholinguistics and a branch of cognitive psychology) and other disciplines regarding important psychological events such as anxiety, stress, fear, mood states and language. In relation to the discussion of environment versus genetics, contributions from behavioral neurobiology and neuropsychology are added, showing evidence of traits that can be multigenerationally inherited in a non-genetic way, which have an impact thought the life of organisms and on their way of interacting with the environment; ways in which behavior can be altered by recently unsuspected environmental agents or events, and the overlooked role of prenatal experiences in the explanation of behavior. The evidence calls into question presuppositions made by the academic disciplines listed above, and suggests alternative behavior reinterpretations and explanations

Allocation rules on networks

When allocating a resource, geographical and infrastructural constraints have to be taken into account. We study the problem of distributing a resource through a network from sources endowed with the resource to citizens with claims. A link between a source and an agent depicts the possibility of a transfer from the source to the agent. Given the supplies at each source, the claims of citizens, and the network, the question is how to allocate the available resources among the citizens. We consider a simple allocation problem that is free of network constraints, where the total amount can be freely distributed. The simple allocation problem is a claims problem where the total amount of claims is greater than what is available. We focus on consistent and resource monotonic rules in claims problems that satisfy equal treatment of equals. We call these rules fairness principles and we extend fairness principles to allocation rules on networks. We require that for each pair of citizens in the network, the extension is robust with respect to the fairness principle. We call this condition pairwise robustness with respect to the fairness principle. We provide an algorithm and show that each fairness principle has a unique extension which is pairwise robust with respect to the fairness principle. We give applications of the algorithm for three fairness principles: egalitarianism, proportionality and equal sacrifice.

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.