El conflicto organizacional desde una perspectiva psicológica y sociológica

Se destaca como problema central de esta investigación determinar que estilos de dirección hay y como son las relaciones de competencia, cooperación y depredación que se presentan dentro de las distintas clases de conflictos. Para esto se realiza en una descripción de la propuesta de investigación, la formulación del problema y su justificación, se establecen los objetivos tanto generales como específicos y se describirán cuáles han sido los investigadores relevantes y como aportan a esta investigación.

Estudio de las interacciones intra-específicas (la competición, la cooperación y la depredación) en las organizaciones: revisión de literatura

Las organizaciones son un ente social y económico que según la teoría clásica debe ser vista como una estructura administrativa. Para Mooney (1947) existen principios los cuales baso en la teoría organización, en donde busca establecer relaciones entre principios, procesos y efectos. Por lo que el satisfacer las necesidades de una población debe ser un proceso que involucre intereses particulares .En este caso la organización debe ser estudiada y evaluada como un sistema que tiene diferentes jerarquías y agentes que interactúan entre si, para cumplir un objetivo. Las relaciones que se generan dentro de una organización, y en este caso una organización privada tienden a dar respuesta a muchas necesidades que como procesos se presentan en el diario vivir; es así como se habla del éxito de las organizaciones basado en la competitividad que generan las habilidades y actitudes del personal, el número de variables, fenómenos y efectos, que busca que los empleados asuman actitudes que conlleven a tomar buenas decisiones (Garcia, 2009 ). Es importante resaltar en las organizaciones, los fenómenos de liderazgo, poder e influencia, cada concepto independiente pero visto conjuntamente desde un panorama organizacional, donde toda relación intraespecifica deben determinarse en los diferentes comportamientos, conductas y culturas del personal de la empresa (Fuentes, 2004). La depredación, competencia y cooperación, son conceptos que indudablemente están presentes en todos los procesos de la organización y serán determinantes en la perdurabilidad de la misma. Por último, la presente investigación pretende establecer los efectos de los fenómenos sociales de liderazgo, poder e influencia sobre las interacciones intra-especificas (competencia, cooperación y depredación) al interior de una organización, de tal manera que se logre explicar el efecto y la correlación que existe entre unos y otros fenómenos (Castro, 2012).

Agricultural sector and competition in Colombia

In this chapter we provide a summary description of Colombian Competition Policy with an emphasis on the agricultural sector. Key developments and recent changes in institutional arrangements affecting competition policy, as it applies to the agricultural sector, are highlighted. Illustrative case studies are depicted to show the richness and complexity of policy developments and enforcement. Some general conclusions are drawn from this examination.

Competition between HMO and PPO: A Two-Sided Market Approach

We set-up a two-sided market framework to model competition between a Prefered Provider Organization (PPO) and a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). Both health plans compete to attract policyholderson one side and providers on the other side. The PPO, which is characterized by a higher diversity of providers, attracts riskier policyholders. Our two-sided framework allows to examine the consequences of this risk segmentation on the providers’ side, especially in terms of remuneration. The outcome of competition mainly depends on two effects: a demand effect, influenced by the value put by policyholders on providers access and an adverse selection effect, captured by the characteristics of the health risk distribution. If the adverse selection effect is too strong, the HMO gets a higher profit in equilibrium. On the contrary, if the demand effect dominates, the PPO profit is higher in spite of the unfavorable risk segmentation. We believe that our model, by highlighting the two-sided market structure of the health plans’ competition, provides new insights to understand the increase in the PPOs’ market share observed during the last decade in the US.

Competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the standard inter-group e¤ects. This type of externality occurs when both groups bene t, possibly with di¤erent intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satis es an homogeneity condition then platforms pro ts and price structure have some speci c properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to other, according to the homogeneity degree. In the speci c but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platform s pro t do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This is in sharp contrast to conventional results stating that the presence of network externalities in a two-sided market structure increases the intensity of competition when the externality is positive (and decreases it when the externality is negative). Prices are a¤ected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers.

Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.