Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.

Political intervention in economic activity

This paper proposes a political economy explanation of bailouts to declining industries. A model of probabilistic voting is developed, in which two candidates compete for the vote of two groups of the society through tactical redistribution. We allow politicians to have core support groups they understand better, this implies politicians are more or less effective to deliver favors to some groups. This setting is suited to reproduce pork barrels or machine politics and patronage. We use this model to illustrate the case of an economy with both an efficient industry and a declining one, in which workers elect their government. We present the conditions under which the political process ends up with the lagged-behind industry being allowed to survive.

Low genetic diversity and functional constraint in loci encoding Plasmodium vivax P12 and P38 proteins in the Colombian population

Background Plasmodium vivax is one of the five species causing malaria in human beings, affecting around 391 million people annually. The development of an anti-malarial vaccine has been proposed as an alternative for controlling this disease. However, its development has been hampered by allele-specific responses produced by the high genetic diversity shown by some parasite antigens. Evaluating these antigens’ genetic diversity is thus essential when designing a completely effective vaccine. Methods The gene sequences of Plasmodium vivax p12 (pv12) and p38 (pv38), obtained from field isolates in Colombia, were used for evaluating haplotype polymorphism and distribution by population genetics analysis. The evolutionary forces generating the variation pattern so observed were also determined. Results Both pv12 and pv38 were shown to have low genetic diversity. The neutral model for pv12 could not be discarded, whilst polymorphism in pv38 was maintained by balanced selection restricted to the gene’s 5′ region. Both encoded proteins seemed to have functional/structural constraints due to the presence of s48/45 domains, which were seen to be highly conserved.