Administrative authorization for the demolition of urban rental units pursuant to the law of 1964: a spanish example of problematic over-activity in the application of transitional laws

Transitional provisions are defined as the set of regulations that rule juridical relationships on the occasion of a legislative change. Out of this context of law succession, their indiscriminate application can lead to serious inconsistencies. The analysis of a Spanish private law example is offered to illustrate this fact. It concerns the administrative authorization for the demolition of rented buildings in the cities. A regulation repealed more than fifteen years ago and however widespread utilised on ancient constructions that, after recent urban development, have acquired great economic value; something that in the end explains the current importance of such provisions. What is happening in Spain: denaturalization of the original  figure due to a mixture of formalist interpretations and speculative market interests, is presented here to call the attention on the necessary limitation of transitional provisions’ effects.

Military empowerment and civilian targeting in civil war

Civilians constitute a large share of casualties in civil wars across the world. They are targeted to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This maximizes collaboration with the perpetrator and strengthens the support network necessary to consolidate control over contested regions. I develop a model of the magnitude and structure of civilian killings in civil wars involving two armed groups who Öght over territorial control. Armies secure compliance through a combination of carrots and sticks. In turn, civilians di§er from each other in their intrinsic preference towards one group. I explore the e§ect of the empowerment of one of the groups in the civilian death toll. There are two e§ects that go in opposite directions. While a direct e§ect makes the powerful group more lethal, there is an indirect e§ect by which the number of civilians who align with that group increases, leaving less enemy supporters to kill. I study the conditions under which there is one dominant e§ect and illustrate the predictions using sub-national longitudinal data for Colombiaís civil war.