Freedom of contract and the coexistence of trademark registrations in Colombia

In trademark systems such as the Andean Community, a state authority verifiesthat the marks are distinctive, lawful and do not affect third parties, and after that,given their ownership. In this context, particular interest has sparked the possibilityof individuals by agreements or statements of co-existence, are who ensure that theirsigns meet the conditions for simultaneous registrations.Such agreements for the coexistence of marks are problematic if one thinks thatthe holders of interests that would be available also seem to matter to consumers,competitors and the market. Therefore, define the scope of contractual freedom inthe field of trademark law, whose rules are considered imperative, acquire practicaland theoretical importance because its realization i) recognizes the risks that maybe relevant to evaluating trade agreements and ii) contributes to debates on the roleof private autonomy in areas reserved for non-derogable norms. Thus, this researchputs the declarations of consent for the coexistence of registrations in Colombia, ina larger scope of the limits of freedom of contract.

Indirect expropriation in concession contract

 The work aims to demonstrate that an indirect expropriation of rights occurs when mining concession agreements are made for subsoil exploitation. The article looks at examples such as when administrative divesture for public utilities or for social interest is decreed to implement projects or environmental works; when any regulation or administrative action is taken determining protected areas or environment control of type; and when environmental control plans are implemented. The indirect expropriation occurs because a conflict exists between general interests and equality principles of the burdens, the contractual right of adherence to agreed upon provisions and the legality of prior legal regulations for the carrying out of such expropriation. 

Equilibrium Principle in Colombian Public Contracting

Public contracting in Colombia is conflicting and inefficient. It frequently leads to damage to State property. The Colombian legal system cannot assure efficient and transparent public contracting. The cause is the institutional environment characterized by high transaction costs. Colombian law worsens the process by recognizing the principle of economic equilibrium in public contracts. This principle increasese contract incompleteness and renders impossible the use of economic incentives to control the opportunism of the economic agents. The authors present the hypothesis that the economic equilibrium principle increases the conflictive nature of public contracting. They test the hypothesis empirically. The first section of the paper presents a summary of the literature on transaction costs economics, as well as the legal literature on the historical origin and the content of the economic equilibrium principle. The second section describes the methodology of the empirical study. The third section shows the empirical evidence of the effects that the economic equilibrium principle exerts over the public contracting. The last section presents the conclusions.