Information provision in procurement auctions

We analyze the optimal provision of information in a procurement auction with horizontally differentiated goods. The buyer has private information about her preferred location on the product space and has access to a costless communication device. A seller who pays the entry cost may submit a bid comprising a location and a minimum price. We characterize the optimal information structure and show that the buyer prefers to attract only two bids. Further, additional sellers are inefficient since they reduce total and consumer surplus, gross of entry costs. We show that the buyer will not find it optimal to send public information to all sellers. On the other hand, she may profit from setting a minimum price and that a severe hold-up problem arises if she lacks commitment to set up the rules of the auction ex-ante.

Synthetic portfolio for event studies: Estimating the effects of volatility call auctions

We propose a method denoted as synthetic portfolio for event studies in market microstructure that is particularly interesting to use with high frequency data and thinly traded markets. The method is based on Synthetic Control Method and provides a robust data driven method to build a counterfactual for evaluating the effects of the volatility call auctions. We find that SMC could be used if the loss function is defined as the difference between the returns of the asset and the returns of a synthetic portfolio. We apply SCM to test the performance of the volatility call auction as a circuit breaker in the context of an event study. We find that for Colombian Stock Market securities, the asynchronicity of intraday data reduces the analysis to a selected group of stocks, however it is possible to build a tracking portfolio. The realized volatility increases after the auction, indicating that the mechanism is not enhancing the price discovery process.

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Does uncertainty cause inertia in decision making? An experimental study of the role of regret aversion and indecisiveness

Previous research has shown that often there is clear inertia in individual decision making---that is, a tendency for decision makers to choose a status quo option. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate two potential determinants of inertia in uncertain environments: (i) regret aversion and (ii) ambiguity-driven indecisiveness. I use a between-subjects design with varying conditions to identify the effects of these two mechanisms on choice behavior. In each condition, participants choose between two simple real gambles, one of which is the status quo option. I find that inertia is quite large and that both mechanisms are equally important.