Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market

I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.

Alteraciones en el material genético de pintores de carros expuestos a solventes orgánicos en una localidad de Bogotá

Los solventes orgánicos son sustancias químicas que por sus propiedades físico-químicas son fácilmente inhalados o absorbidos por la piel, pueden causar daños de diversa índole en la salud. En Colombia existen normas que contemplan las medidas de protección, sin embargo persiste la informalidad en el sector de pintores de autos, por lo cual los trabajadores expuestos, a largo plazo pueden ver afectada su salud. En este estudio se analizó la relación entre individuos expuestos laboralmente a los solventes orgánicos versus no expuestos con respecto a la longitud de sus telómeros y formación de fragilidades. Se emplearon muestras de sangre extraídas por venopunción, recolectada en dos tubos: uno con Heparina, destinado al cultivo de linfocitos, para obtener cromosomas metafásicos y evaluar en ellos la presencia de fragilidades; el otro tubo con EDTA, fue empleado para la extracción de ADN y se utilizó para obtener los valores de longitud telomérica mediante la técnica de PCR cuantitativa. Los análisis estadísticos se realizaron aplicando la prueba de rangos de Wilcoxon, en el caso de la presencia de fragilidades se analizó la razón No.Fragilidades/No.Metafases, aplicando el método de Wilcoxon se encontró que existe diferencia estadísticamente significativa entre expuestos y no expuestos (p = 0,036), en donde los expuestos presentan mayor frecuencia de fragilidades. Por otra parte el valor relativo de longitud telomérica del grupo de expuestos fue mayor que el observado en el grupo de no expuestos, esta diferencia fue estadísticamente significativa (Wilcoxon, p = 0.002).

Measuring and testing for the systemically important financial institutions

This paper analyzes the measure of systemic importance ∆CoV aR proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009, 2010) within the context of a similar class of risk measures used in the risk management literature. In addition, we develop a series of testing procedures, based on ∆CoV aR, to identify and rank the systemically important institutions. We stress the importance of statistical testing in interpreting the measure of systemic importance. An empirical application illustrates the testing procedures, using equity data for three European banks.

Statistical inference for testing Gini coefficients: an application for Colombia

This paper uses Colombian household survey data collected over the period 1984-2005 to estimate Gini coe¢ cients along with their corresponding standard errors. We Önd a statistically signiÖcant increase in wage income inequality following the adoption of the liberalisation measures of the early 1990s, and mixed evidence during the recovery years that followed the economic recession of the late 1990s. We also Önd that in several cases the observed di§erences in the Gini coe¢ cients across cities have not been statistically signiÖcant.

Testing for Stock Market Integration in a Developing Economy: Colombia

This paper examines the linkage between two parallel stock exchanges trading the same shares in Colombia, namely the Bogotá Stock Exchange and the Medellín Stock Exchange. We provide empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that these two markets can be best described as fully integrated over a period of almost four decades, which is consistent with the view that arbitrage opportunities are only possible in the short but not in the long run. In addition, we find evide

Testing the law of one price in food markets: evidence for Colombia using disaggregated data

This paper applies stationarity tests to examine evidence of market integration for a relatively large sample of food products in Colombia. We Önd little support for market integration when using the univariate KPSS tests for stationarity. However, within a panel context and after allowing for cross sectional dependence, the Hadri tests provide much more evidence supporting the view that food markets are integrated or, in other words, that the law of one price holds for most products.

Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard

We develop a model where a free genetic test reveals whether the individual tested has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease the probability of developing the disease. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers. Insurers offer separating contracts which take into account the individual risk, so that taking the test is associated to a discrimination risk. We study the individual decisions to take the test and to undertake the prevention effort as a function of the effort cost and of its e¢ ciency. We obtain that, if effort is observable by insurers, agents undertake the test only if the effort cost is neither too large nor too low. If the effort cost is not observable by insurers, they face a moral hazard problem which induces them to under-provide insurance. We obtain the counterintuitive result that moral hazard increases the value of the test if the effort cost is low enough. Also, agents may perform the test for lower levels of prevention e¢ ciency when effort is not observable