The “War on Terror” and the Principle of Distinction in International Humanitarian La

Las nuevas amenazas a la seguridad que han surgido en los últimos años están poniendo seriamente en juego la importancia y la implementación del derecho internacional humanitario. Este artículo investiga el impacto de la guerra del terror en el principio de distinción en el derecho internacional humanitario. Examina, de forma específica, prácticas estatales, por ejemplo, de los Estados Unidos, que han cedido frente al surgimiento de nuevas reglas relativas al principio de distinción. Para esto, se hace un análisis de dicho principio bajo dos perspectivas: blancos concretos y captura

Corrective Justice vs. Social Justice in the Aftermath of War

How do we justify the practice of corrective justice for losses suffered during armed conflicts? This article seeks to show the force and relevance of this question, and to argue that, in cases of massively destructive wars, social justice should gain priority over corrective justice. Starting from a liberal Rawlsian conception of the relationship between corrective and social justice, it is argued that, paradoxically, the more destructive a war is, the less normative force corrective rights have and the higher priority policies of social justice, which guarantee basic rights to all citizens, should have.

Transformación de la Doctrina de Seguridad de la OTAN, en la Post- Guerra Fría, y sus efectos en la intervención en Macedonia (2001-2003)

El objetivo de esta monografía es examinar la transformación de la doctrina de seguridad de la OTAN en la Post-Guerra Fría y sus efectos en la intervención en la República de Macedonia. La desintegración del bloque soviético implicó la variación en la definición de las amenazas que atentan contra la supervivencia de los países miembro de la Alianza Atlántica. A partir de la década de los noventa, los conflictos de naturaleza interétnica pasaron a formar parte de los riesgos que transgreden la seguridad de los Aliados y la estabilidad del área Euro-Atlántica. Por lo anterior, la OTAN intervino en aquellos Estados en los que prevalecían las confrontaciones armadas interétnicas, como por ejemplo: en Macedonia. Allí, la Alianza Atlántica ejecutó operaciones de gestión de crisis para contrarrestar la amenaza. El fenómeno a estudiar en esta investigación será analizado a partir del Realismo Subalterno y de la Teoría de la Seguridad Colectiva.

Military empowerment and civilian targeting in civil war

Civilians constitute a large share of casualties in civil wars across the world. They are targeted to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This maximizes collaboration with the perpetrator and strengthens the support network necessary to consolidate control over contested regions. I develop a model of the magnitude and structure of civilian killings in civil wars involving two armed groups who Öght over territorial control. Armies secure compliance through a combination of carrots and sticks. In turn, civilians di§er from each other in their intrinsic preference towards one group. I explore the e§ect of the empowerment of one of the groups in the civilian death toll. There are two e§ects that go in opposite directions. While a direct e§ect makes the powerful group more lethal, there is an indirect e§ect by which the number of civilians who align with that group increases, leaving less enemy supporters to kill. I study the conditions under which there is one dominant e§ect and illustrate the predictions using sub-national longitudinal data for Colombiaís civil war.

Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war

Why do some civil wars terminate soon, with victory of one party over the other? What determines if the winner is the incumbent or the rebel group? Why do other conáicts last longer? We propose a simple model in which the power of each armed group depends on the number of combatants it is able to recruit. This is in turn a function of the relative ëdistanceíbetween group leaderships and potential recruits. We emphasize the moral hazard problem of recruitment: Öghting is costly and risky so combatants have the incentive to defect from their task. They can also desert altogether and join the enemy. This incentive is stronger the farther away the Öghter is from the principal, since monitoring becomes increasingly costly. Bigger armies have more power but less monitoring capacity to prevent defection and desertion. This general framework allows a variety of interpretations of what type of proximity matters for building strong cohesive armies ranging from ethnic distance to geographic dispersion. Di§erent assumptions about the distribution of potential Öghters along the relevant dimension of conáict lead to di§erent equilibria. We characterize these, discuss the implied outcome in terms of who wins the war, and illustrate with historical and contemporaneous case studies.

Don't make war, make elections : Franchise extension and violence in XIXth-century Colombia

This paper studies the effect of strengthening democracy, as captured by an increase in voting rights, on the incidence of violent civil conflict in nineteenth-century Colombia. Empirically studying the relationship between democracy and conflict is challenging, not only because of conceptual problems in defining and measuring democracy, but also because political institutions and violence are jointly determined. We take advantage of an experiment of history to examine the impact of one simple, measurable dimension of democracy (the size of the franchise) on con- flict, while at the same time attempting to overcome the identification problem. In 1853, Colombia established universal male suffrage. Using a simple difference-indifferences specification at the municipal level, we find that municipalities where more voters were enfranchised relative to their population experienced fewer violent political battles while the reform was in effect. The results are robust to including a number of additional controls. Moreover, we investigate the potential mechanisms driving the results. In particular, we look at which components of the proportion of new voters in 1853 explain the results, and we examine if results are stronger in places with more political competition and state capacity. We interpret our findings as suggesting that violence in nineteenth-century Colombia was a technology for political elites to compete for the rents from power, and that democracy constituted an alternative way to compete which substituted violence.