Contribuciones de la banca al desarrollo: aportes y dificultades en el caso del programa de transferencias condicionadas "familias en acción" de Colombia por parte del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo [BID] y del banco mundial [BM] durante el periodo 2001-2013.

El interés de este estudio de caso es explicar el rol del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo [BID] y el Banco Mundial [BM] en el programa de transferencias condicionadas Familias en Acción de Colombia durante el 2001-2013. Se identificará cómo a través de estos programas el BID y el BM han contribuido con Familias en Acción para la reducción de la pobreza, la desigualdad de ingresos y el desarrollo del capital humano de familias vulnerables con el fin de evitar la pobreza inter-generacional. La importancia y crecimiento de la cooperación internacional por mejorar los aspectos sociales y económicos de países en vías desarrollo es indispensable para generar progreso entre las naciones con la finalidad de hacer un sistema internacional más equitativo e inclusivo.

Congress composition and electoral advantage

In 2003, an electoral reform changed the mechanism to assign seats in the Colombian Congress. I simulate the 2006 Senate elections using the previous assignment mechanism to determine which senators benefited from the reform, i.e. would have not been elected had the reform not been made. With the results of the simulation, I use a regression discontinuity design to compare the senators that would have been barely elected anyways with those who would have lost, but were near to be elected. I check the differences in the amount of law drafts presented, the attendance to voting sessions, and a discipline index for each senator as proxy of their legislative behavior. I find that the senators benefiting from the reform present a different legislative behavior during the 4-year term with respect to the senators that would have been elected anyways. Since the differential legislative behavior cannot be interpreted as being better (worse) politician, I examine if the behavioral difference gives them an electoral advantage. I find no difference in the electoral result of 2010 Senate election in terms of the probability of being (re)elected in 2010, the share of votes, the share of votes within their party list, and the concentration of their votes. Additionally, I check the probability of being investigated for links with paramilitary groups and I find no differences. The results suggest that political reforms can change the composition of governing or legislative bodies in terms of performance, but it does not necessarily translate into an electoral advantage.