Sesenta años de disputas: análisis del conflicto entre India y Pakistán por Cachemira

La presente disertación tiene el objetivo de analizar por qué el conflicto entre India y Pakistán por Cachemira no ha sido solucionado a la luz del debate entre el realismo ofensivo y el constructivismo social surgido en 1994. La hipótesis de trabajo establece que la estructura anárquica, sumada a las capacidades ofensivas, la desconfianza mutua, la racionalidad, y el deseo de supervivencia entre los Estados, ha propiciado la configuración de un dilema de seguridad que es alimentado por la disparidad de intereses e identidades en contienda. El alcance del objetivo es de carácter analítico y el enfoque primario está basado en la teoría del realismo ofensivo de John Mearsheimer y el constructivismo social de Alexander Wendt.

Conflicto por el agua: un análisis geopolítico al sistema Tigris-Éufrates. 1990-2003

El interés de este estudio de caso es analizar la situación vivida entre los Estados de la cuenca del Sistema Tigris-Éufrates, un recurso hídrico transfronterizo entre 1990 y el 2003. Se estudia y explica cómo el Interés Nacional de Turquía, Siria e Irak, Estados ribereños del Sistema supuso un obstáculo para la implementación de la Gestión Integrada de Recursos Hídricos sobre la cuenca, al impedir la cooperación y coordinación de las políticas gubernamentales, dificultando la protección de la cuenca y la garantía del acceso al recurso de forma equitativa. Este trabajo se enmarca en los estudios sobre Seguridad Ambiental, particularmente en la teoría de la Escasez Ambiental de Thomas Homer-Dixon y el Grupo de Toronto, referente a la relación entre la escasez de un recurso natural renovable y el surgimiento de un conflicto.

Conflict and child labor: evidence from poor households in Colombia

Colombia suffers from one of the longest civil conflicts in the world, which is believed to have had several consequences on the country’s economic and development performance. This study uses measures of central government deterrence effort as instruments of conflict to estimate the impact of conflict on children’s time allocation to two different types of work: housework and work performed outside the household for poor families living in small municipalities in Colombia. I find that conflict significantly increases the amount of time children allocate to work. Both housework, for girls, and work outside the household, for boys, increase with Guerrilla attacks. However, the later effect is the opposite for Paramilitary attacks.

La piratería de Nigeria como una amenaza a la seguridad marítima del Golfo de Guinea (2007-2012). Una aproximación desde el crimen organizado

Desde finales de los 70 la piratería se convirtió en un problema para Nigeria. Con el tiempo adquirió características del crimen organizado y en 2010 se transformó en un problema transnacional, afectando a Estados del golfo de Guinea. Así, a través de una base conceptual, el estudio de caso concluyó que los factores internos –como la pobreza, debilidad estatal y marginalización- y externos –siendo ellos la falta de políticas internas destinadas a las aguas y la ausencia de estrategias marítimas en la región- de la piratería, crearon una dinámica para que dicha actividad se convirtiera en una amenaza a la seguridad marítima del golfo de Guinea, tomando como referencia a Benín y Togo. Siguiendo la línea argumentativa, se demuestra que la búsqueda de una solución a la delincuencia marítima ha generado interacciones de seguridad que sugieren las primeras fases de un posible complejo de seguridad regional.

Publicness of goods and violent conflict : evidence from Colombia

How the degree of publicness of goods affect violent conflict? Based on the theoretical model in Esteban and Ray (2001) we find that the effect of the degree of publicness depends on the group size. When the group is small (large), the degree of publicness increases (decreases) the likelihood of conflict. This opens an empirical question that we tackle using microdata from the Colombian conflict at the municipality level. We use three goods with different publicness degree to identify the sign of the effect of publicness on conflict. These goods are coca crops (private good), road density (public good subject to congestion) and average education quality (a purer public good). After dealing with endogeneity issues using an IV approach, we find that the degree of publicness reduces the likelihood of both paramilitary and guerrilla attacks. Moreover, coca production exacerbates conflict and the provision of both public goods mitigates conflict. These results are robust to size, geographical, and welfare controls. Policies that improve public goods provision will help to fight the onset of conflict.

The environmental impact of civil conflict : the deforestation effect of paramilitary expansion in Colombia

Despite a growing body of literature on how environmental degradation can fuel civil war, the reverse effect, namely that of conflict on environmental outcomes, is relatively understudied. From a theoretical point of view this effect is ambiguous, with some forces pointing to pressures for environmental degradation and some pointing in the opposite direction. Hence, the overall effect of conflict on the environment is an empirical question. We study this relationship in the case of Colombia. We combine a detailed satellite-based longitudinal dataset on forest cover across municipalities over the period 1990-2010 with a comprehensive panel of conflict-related violent actions by paramilitary militias. We first provide evidence that paramilitary activity significantly reduces the share of forest cover in a panel specification that includes municipal and time fixed effects. Then we confirm these findings by taking advantage of a quasi-experiment that provides us with an exogenous source of variation for the expansion of the paramilitary. Using the distance to the region of Urab´a, the epicenter of such expansion, we instrument paramilitary activity in each cross-section for which data on forest cover is available. As a falsification exercise, we show that the instrument ceases to be relevant after the paramilitaries largely demobilized following peace negotiations with the government. Further, after the demobilization the deforestation effect of the paramilitaries disappears. We explore a number of potential mechanisms that may explain the conflict-driven deforestation, and show evidence suggesting that paramilitary violence generates large outflows of people in order to secure areas for growing illegal crops, exploit mineral resources, and engage in extensive agriculture. In turn, these activities are associated with deforestation.

The persistent colombian conflict bubnational analysis of the duration of violence

The growing empirical literature on the analysis of civil war has recently included the study of conflict duration at the cross-country level. This paper presents, for the first time, a within-country analysis of the determinants of violence duration. I focus on the experience of the Colombian armed conflict. While the conflict has been active for about five decades, local violence ebbs and flows and areas experiencing continuous conflict coexist with places that have been able to resile and where violence is mostly absent. I examine a wide range of factors potentially associated with violence duration at the municipal level, including scale variables, geographical conditions, economic and social variables, institutions and state presence, inequality, government intervention, and victimization variables. I characterize a few variables robustly correlated with the persistence of localized conflict, both across specifications and using different econometric models of duration analysis.

Beyond divide and rule : weak dictators, natural resources and civil conflict

We propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The dictator selects the tax rate over domestic production and the nation’s natural resources to maximize his rents under the threat of a regime-switching revolution. We show that a weak ruler may let the country plunge in civil war to increase his personal rents. Inter-group fighting weakens potential opposition to the ruler, thereby allowing him to increase fiscal pressure. We show that the presence of natural resources exacerbates the incentives of the ruler to promote civil conflict for his own profit, especially if the resources are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the main predictions of the model using cross-country data over the period 1960-2007, and show that our empirical results are not likely to be driven by omitted observable determinants of civil war incidence or by unobservable country-specific heterogeneity.

Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach

We study economic conflicts using a game theoretical approach. We model a conflict between two agents where each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or neglect the truce. Under this setting, we use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game where agents commit to transfer a share of their output to the other agent (Sertel, 1992), and explain under which conditions a system of pre-donations can facilitate a truce. We find that for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, such that, the best strategy for both parties is Cease-Fire. However, in many cases there are no sufficient conditions for the scheme or pre-donations to be effective. We also analyze some limitations of this framework and extend the model in order to deal with some of these flaws. Finally, in order to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results we briefly describe some of the circumstances that characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and different illegal groups.

Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria

Firms’ compensation practices affect the protection of investors’ interests and the degree of economic inequality by changing the stakes of engaging in appropriation activities versus respecting the status quo. We use a general equilibrium model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. If workers are peaceful, they receive a competitive wage. If they join a guerrilla movement, they receive a share of the appropriated wealth, which depends positively on the number of guerrilla members. In this framework, we find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. The peaceful equilibrium can be reached through redistribution policies, which can be implemented at the firm level. In essence, through their compensation policies entrepreneurs, not the state might be able to protect their assets against expropriation and simultaneously control the internal principal-agent problem.

Between the headlines of the Israeli - Arabic conflict: the coverage of CNN and Al Jazeera

The purpose of this article is to analyze the coverage made by CNN and Al Jazeera (in Arabic) to operation Caste Lead and the Goldstone Report during 2008 and 2009. This investigation is based in the theory of Qualitative Analysis of Content, by Wildemuth and Zhang. The methodology follows up with the one proposed by the authors in the main theory, complementing it with the Gamson and Modigliani´s Framing theory. The methodology mention above display the different in the coverage development, determined by the geopolitical influences; being CNN more influenced by a Western pro USA and pro Israeli speech, while Al Jazeera is more prone to support the Palestinian cause, this is the thesis of this article. During the development of the investigation, the thesis was demonstrated to be only partially accurate as CNN was not completely supportive to the Israeli arguments during the coverage, but Al Jazeera did have preferential speech for the Palestinian cause.