2 resultados para incentives

em Universitat de Girona, Spain


Relevância:

10.00% 10.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Traditionally, school efficiency has been measured as a function of educational production. In the last two decades, however, studies in the economics of education have indicated that more is required to improve school efficiency: researchers must explore how significant changes in school organization affect the performance of at-risk students. In this paper we introduce Henry Levin’s adoption of the X-efficiency approach to education and we describe the efficient and cost-effective characteristics of one Learning Communities Project School that significantly improved its student outcomes and enrollment numbers and reduced its absenteeism rate to zero. The organizational change that facilitated these improvements defined specific issues to address. Students’ school success became the focus of the school project, which also offered specific incentives, selected teachers, involved parents and community members in decisions, and used the most efficient technologies and methods. This case analysis reveals new two elements—family training and community involvement—that were not explicit parts of Levin’s adaptation. The case of the Antonio Machado Public School should attract the attention of both social scientists and policy makers

Relevância:

10.00% 10.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

En entornos donde los recursos son precederos y la asignación de recursos se repite en el tiempo con el mismo conjunto o un conjunto muy similar de agentes, las subastas recurrentes pueden ser utilizadas. Una subasta recurrente es una secuencia de subastas donde el resultado de una subasta puede influenciar en las siguientes. De todas formas, este tipo de subastas tienen problemas particulares cuando la riqueza de los agentes esta desequilibrada y los recursos son precederos. En esta tesis se proponen algunos mecanismos justos o equitativos para minimizar los efectos de estos problemas. En una subasta recurrente una solución justa significa que todos los participantes consiguen a largo plazo sus objetivos en el mismo grado o en el grado más parecido posible, independientemente de su riqueza. Hemos demostrado experimentalmente que la inclusión de justicia incentiva a los bidders en permanecer en la subasta minimizando los problemas de las subastas recurrentes.