Assessing the Precision of Compositional Data in a Stratified Double Stage Cluster Sample: Application to the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey

Precision of released figures is not only an important quality feature of official statistics, it is also essential for a good understanding of the data. In this paper we show a case study of how precision could be conveyed if the multivariate nature of data has to be taken into account. In the official release of the Swiss earnings structure survey, the total salary is broken down into several wage components. We follow Aitchison's approach for the analysis of compositional data, which is based on logratios of components. We first present diferent multivariate analyses of the compositional data whereby the wage components are broken down by economic activity classes. Then we propose a number of ways to assess precision

One-sided jet at milliarcsecond scales in LS I +61˚ 303

We present Very Long Baseline Interferometry (VLBI) observations of the high mass X-ray binary LS I +61˚303, carried out with the European VLBI Network (EVN). Over the 11 hour observing run, performed ~10 days after a radio outburst, the radio source showed a constant flux density, which allowed sensitive imaging of the emission distribution. The structure in the map shows a clear extension to the southeast. Comparing our data with previous VLBI observations we interpret the extension as a collimated radio jet as found in several other X-ray binaries. Assuming that the structure is the result of an expansion that started at the onset of the outburst, we derive an apparent expansion velocity of 0:003 c, which, in the context of Doppler boosting, corresponds to an intrinsic velocity of at least 0:4 c for an ejection close to the line of sight. From the apparent velocity in all available epochs we are able to establish variations in the ejection angle which imply a precessing accretion disk. Finally we point out that LS I +61˚303, like SS 433 and Cygnus X-1, shows evidence for an emission region almost orthogonal to the relativistic jet

Selecting Scientific Papers for Publication via Citation Auctions

The scientific community has been suffering from peer review for decades. This process (also called refereeing) subjects an author's scientific work or ideas to the scrutiny of one or more experts in the field. Publishers use it to select and screen manuscript submissions, and funding agencies use it to award research funds. The goal is to get authors to meet their discipline's standards and thus achieve scientific objectivity. Publications and awards that haven't undergone peer review are often regarded with suspicion by scholars and professionals in many fields. However, peer review, although universally used, has many drawbacks. We propose replacing peer review with an auction-based approach: the better the submitted paper, the more scientific currency the author likely bid to have it published. If the bid correctly reflects the paper's quality, the author is rewarded in this new scientific currency; otherwise, the author loses this currency. We argue that citations are an appropriate currency for all scientists. We believe that citation auctions encourage scientists to better control their submissions' quality. It also inspire them to prepare more exciting talks for accepted papers and to invite discussion of their results at congresses and conferences and among their colleagues. In the long run, citation auctions could have the power to greatly improve scientific research

Citation auctions as a method to improve selection of scientific papers

This paper describes the basis of citation auctions as a new approach to selecting scientific papers for publication. Our main idea is to use an auction for selecting papers for publication through - differently from the state of the art - bids that consist of the number of citations that a scientist expects to receive if the paper is published. Hence, a citation auction is the selection process itself, and no reviewers are involved. The benefits of the proposed approach are two-fold. First, the cost of refereeing will be either totally eliminated or significantly reduced, because the process of citation auction does not need prior understanding of the paper's content to judge the quality of its contribution. Additionally, the method will not prejudge the content of the paper, so it will increase the openness of publications to new ideas. Second, scientists will be much more committed to the quality of their papers, paying close attention to distributing and explaining their papers in detail to maximize the number of citations that the paper receives. Sample analyses of the number of citations collected in papers published in years 1999-2004 for one journal, and in years 2003-2005 for a series of conferences (in a totally different discipline), via Google scholar, are provided. Finally, a simple simulation of an auction is given to outline the behaviour of the citation auction approach

Blackbody emission under laser excitation of silicon nanopowder produced by plasma-enhanced chemical-vapor deposition

Previous results concerning radiative emission under laser irradiation of silicon nanopowder are reinterpreted in terms of thermal emission. A model is developed that considers the particles in the powder as independent, so under vacuum the only dissipation mechanism is thermal radiation. The supralinear dependence observed between the intensity of the emitted radiation and laser power is predicted by the model, as is the exponential quenching when the gas pressure around the sample increases. The analysis allows us to determine the sample temperature. The local heating of the sample has been assessed independently by the position of the transverse optical Raman mode. Finally, it is suggested that the photoluminescence observed in porous silicon and similar materials could, in some cases, be blackbody radiation

Oxidation of silicon: further tests for the interfacial silicon emission model

The classical description of Si oxidation given by Deal and Grove has well-known limitations for thin oxides (below 200 Ã). Among the large number of alternative models published so far, the interfacial emission model has shown the greatest ability to fit the experimental oxidation curves. It relies on the assumption that during oxidation Si interstitials are emitted to the oxide to release strain and that the accumulation of these interstitials near the interface reduces the reaction rate there. The resulting set of differential equations makes it possible to model diverse oxidation experiments. In this paper, we have compared its predictions with two sets of experiments: (1) the pressure dependence for subatmospheric oxygen pressure and (2) the enhancement of the oxidation rate after annealing in inert atmosphere. The result is not satisfactory and raises serious doubts about the model’s correctness

Dynamic task allocation and coordination in cooperative multi-agent environments

La coordinació i assignació de tasques en entorns distribuïts ha estat un punt important de la recerca en els últims anys i aquests temes són el cor dels sistemes multi-agent. Els agents en aquests sistemes necessiten cooperar i considerar els altres agents en les seves accions i decisions. A més a més, els agents han de coordinar-se ells mateixos per complir tasques complexes que necessiten més d'un agent per ser complerta. Aquestes tasques poden ser tan complexes que els agents poden no saber la ubicació de les tasques o el temps que resta abans de que les tasques quedin obsoletes. Els agents poden necessitar utilitzar la comunicació amb l'objectiu de conèixer la tasca en l'entorn, en cas contrari, poden perdre molt de temps per trobar la tasca dins de l'escenari. De forma similar, el procés de presa de decisions distribuït pot ser encara més complexa si l'entorn és dinàmic, amb incertesa i en temps real. En aquesta dissertació, considerem entorns amb sistemes multi-agent amb restriccions i cooperatius (dinàmics, amb incertesa i en temps real). En aquest sentit es proposen dues aproximacions que permeten la coordinació dels agents. La primera és un mecanisme semi-centralitzat basat en tècniques de subhastes combinatòries i la idea principal es minimitzar el cost de les tasques assignades des de l'agent central cap als equips d'agents. Aquest algoritme té en compte les preferències dels agents sobre les tasques. Aquestes preferències estan incloses en el bid enviat per l'agent. La segona és un aproximació d'scheduling totalment descentralitzat. Això permet als agents assignar les seves tasques tenint en compte les preferències temporals sobre les tasques dels agents. En aquest cas, el rendiment del sistema no només depèn de la maximització o del criteri d'optimització, sinó que també depèn de la capacitat dels agents per adaptar les seves assignacions eficientment. Addicionalment, en un entorn dinàmic, els errors d'execució poden succeir a qualsevol pla degut a la incertesa i error de accions individuals. A més, una part indispensable d'un sistema de planificació és la capacitat de re-planificar. Aquesta dissertació també proveeix una aproximació amb re-planificació amb l'objectiu de permetre als agent re-coordinar els seus plans quan els problemes en l'entorn no permeti la execució del pla. Totes aquestes aproximacions s'han portat a terme per permetre als agents assignar i coordinar de forma eficient totes les tasques complexes en un entorn multi-agent cooperatiu, dinàmic i amb incertesa. Totes aquestes aproximacions han demostrat la seva eficiència en experiments duts a terme en l'entorn de simulació RoboCup Rescue.

Egalitarian behaviour in multi unit combinatorial auctions

En entornos donde los recursos son precederos y la asignación de recursos se repite en el tiempo con el mismo conjunto o un conjunto muy similar de agentes, las subastas recurrentes pueden ser utilizadas. Una subasta recurrente es una secuencia de subastas donde el resultado de una subasta puede influenciar en las siguientes. De todas formas, este tipo de subastas tienen problemas particulares cuando la riqueza de los agentes esta desequilibrada y los recursos son precederos. En esta tesis se proponen algunos mecanismos justos o equitativos para minimizar los efectos de estos problemas. En una subasta recurrente una solución justa significa que todos los participantes consiguen a largo plazo sus objetivos en el mismo grado o en el grado más parecido posible, independientemente de su riqueza. Hemos demostrado experimentalmente que la inclusión de justicia incentiva a los bidders en permanecer en la subasta minimizando los problemas de las subastas recurrentes.