The Transformation Problem : an Aleternative Solution with an Identical Aggregate Profit Rate in the Labor value and the Monetary Space.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic conclusions remain valid. the proposed alternative solution which is presented hare is based on the constraint of a common general profit rate in both spaces and a money wage level which will be determined simultaneously with prices.

The Transformation Problem : an Aleternative Solution with an Identical Aggregate Profit Rate in the Labor value and the Monetary Space.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic conclusions remain valid. the proposed alternative solution which is presented hare is based on the constraint of a common general profit rate in both spaces and a money wage level which will be determined simultaneously with prices.

Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.

Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: the Newsboy Problem Revisited.

In this article we study the effect of uncertainty on an entrepreneur who must choose the capacity of his business before knowing the demand for his product. The unit profit of operation is known with certainty but there is no flexibility in our one-period framework. We show how the introduction of global uncertainty reduces the investment of the risk neutral entrepreneur and, even more, that the risk averse one. We also show how marginal increases in risk reduce the optimal capacity of both the risk neutral and the risk averse entrepreneur, without any restriction on the concave utility function and with limited restrictions on the definition of a mean preserving spread. These general results are explained by the fact that the newsboy has a piecewise-linear, and concave, monetary payoff witha kink endogenously determined at the level of optimal capacity. Our results are compared with those in the two literatures on price uncertainty and demand uncertainty, and particularly, with the recent contributions of Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1991, 1995).

The Wage Rate and the Profit Rate in the Price of Production Equation: a New Solution to an Old Problem

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic concusions remain valid.

Credibility and Signaling in Disinflation- a Cross Country Examination

This paper develops a model of money demand where the opportunity cost of holding money is subject to regime changes. The regimes are fully characterized by the mean and variance of inflation and are assumed to be the result of alternative government policies. Agents are unable to directly observe whether government actions are indeed consistent with the inflation rate targeted as part of a stabilization program but can construct probability inferences on the basis of available observations of inflation and money growth. Government announcements are assumed to provide agents with additional, possibly truthful information regarding the regime. This specification is estimated and tested using data from the Israeli and Argentine high inflation periods. Results indicate the successful stabilization program implemented in Israel in July 1985 was more credible than either the earlier Israeli attempt in November 1984 or the Argentine programs. Government’s signaling might substantially simplify the inference problem and increase the speed of learning on the part of the agents. However, under certain conditions, it might increase the volatility of inflation. After the introduction of an inflation stabilization plan, the welfare gains from a temporary increase in real balances might be high enough to induce agents to raise their real balances in the short-term, even if they are uncertain about the nature of government policy and the eventual outcome of the stabilization attempt. Statistically, the model restrictions cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level.

Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: the Newsboy Problem Revisited.

In this article we study the effect of uncertainty on an entrepreneur who must choose the capacity of his business before knowing the demand for his product. The unit profit of operation is known with certainty but there is no flexibility in our one-period framework. We show how the introduction of global uncertainty reduces the investment of the risk neutral entrepreneur and, even more, that the risk averse one. We also show how marginal increases in risk reduce the optimal capacity of both the risk neutral and the risk averse entrepreneur, without any restriction on the concave utility function and with limited restrictions on the definition of a mean preserving spread. These general results are explained by the fact that the newsboy has a piecewise-linear, and concave, monetary payoff witha kink endogenously determined at the level of optimal capacity. Our results are compared with those in the two literatures on price uncertainty and demand uncertainty, and particularly, with the recent contributions of Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1991, 1995).

La monnaie en droit : nature d'une abstraction outre fondée : essai dialectique et logique sur la dualité dans la catégoricité juridique et sur l'abstraction d'hérédité monétaire

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit (LL.D.)"

Public Reason that Speaks to People : Iris Marion Young and the Problem of Internal Exclusion

Dossier : In Memoriam, Iris Marion Young (1949-2006)

The Money Question and the Good Life

This paper proposes a theory of the good life for use in answering the question how much money the rich should spend on fighting poverty. The paper moves from the abstract to the concrete. To begin with, it investigates various ways to get an answer to the question what is good, and finds itself drawn to objective theories of the good. It then develops, taking Bernard Williams and Martha Nussbaum as its guides, a broad outline of a theory of the good. It holds that something evil happens to people if they do not have a real choice from a reasonable number of projects that realize most of their key capacities to a certain degree, and in connection to this it points to the great importance of money. The paper goes on specifically to consider what criticisms of Nussbaum's version of the capability approach are implied in this outline of a theory of the good. Next, it gets more specific and asks how much money the rich can give -and how they can be restricted in spending their money- without suffering any evil. It does three suggestions: the tithe suggestion, the ecological (or footprint) suggestion, and the fair trade suggestion. To conclude, the paper returns to the question how much money the rich should spend on fighting poverty.

Leadership ethics and the problem of Dirty Hands in the political economy of contemporary Africa

Cet article discute des problèmes de gouvernance et de corruption en Afrique dans le cadre d’un débat politique et philosophique large entre universalisme et relativisme, idéalisme et réalisme, ainsi que entre individualisme et communautarisme. Premièrement, je défends que l’approche réaliste de l’éthique politique et du leadership ne permet pas de différencier entre les éléments descriptifs et prescriptifs de la gouvernance et peut aisément être utilisée pour justifier « les Mains Sales » des dirigeants au nom de l’intérêt supérieur de la nation, même dans les cas où l’intérêt personnel est la seule force motivationnelle pour les actions qui sapent les codes sociaux et éthiques ordinaires. Deuxièmement, l’article montre la faillite de la confiance publique dans le gouvernement et la faiblesse de l’Etat renforce les politiques communautariennes sub-nationales qui tendent à être fondées sur l’ethnie et exclusive, et par conséquent, qui viole le cœur de l’éthique publique, c’est-à-dire l’impartialité. Finalement, l’article suggère que les principes d’éthique universels pour les services publiques soient introduits en complément plutôt qu’en concurrence avec les éthiques locales, socialement et culturellement limitée au privé. Cela requière, d’une part, que nous comprenions mieux la complexité historique, les circonstances économiques et sociales et les arrangements politiques transitionnels dans les pays africains. D’autre part, un nous devons investir dans une éducation éthique civique et professionnel réflexive qui adopte un point de vue nuancé entre le réalisme politique et l’idéalisme comme point de départ des réformes institutionnelles, aussi bien que modalité de changement des comportements à long terme.

Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents). Budget-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the degree of manipulability which can be used to compare the ease of manipulation in allocation mechanisms. Our measure counts for each problem the number of agents who can manipulate the rule. Given this notion, the main result demonstrates that maximally linked fair allocation rules are the minimally manipulable rules among all budget-balanced and fair allocation mechanisms. Such rules link any agent to the bundle of a pre-selected agent through indifferences (which can be viewed as indirect egalitarian equivalence).

Models and algorithms for the capacitated location-routing problem

Le problème de localisation-routage avec capacités (PLRC) apparaît comme un problème clé dans la conception de réseaux de distribution de marchandises. Il généralisele problème de localisation avec capacités (PLC) ainsi que le problème de tournées de véhicules à multiples dépôts (PTVMD), le premier en ajoutant des décisions liées au routage et le deuxième en ajoutant des décisions liées à la localisation des dépôts. Dans cette thèse on dévelope des outils pour résoudre le PLRC à l’aide de la programmation mathématique. Dans le chapitre 3, on introduit trois nouveaux modèles pour le PLRC basés sur des flots de véhicules et des flots de commodités, et on montre comment ceux-ci dominent, en termes de la qualité de la borne inférieure, la formulation originale à deux indices [19]. Des nouvelles inégalités valides ont été dévelopées et ajoutées aux modèles, de même que des inégalités connues. De nouveaux algorithmes de séparation ont aussi été dévelopés qui dans la plupart de cas généralisent ceux trouvés dans la litterature. Les résultats numériques montrent que ces modèles de flot sont en fait utiles pour résoudre des instances de petite à moyenne taille. Dans le chapitre 4, on présente une nouvelle méthode de génération de colonnes basée sur une formulation de partition d’ensemble. Le sous-problème consiste en un problème de plus court chemin avec capacités (PCCC). En particulier, on utilise une relaxation de ce problème dans laquelle il est possible de produire des routes avec des cycles de longueur trois ou plus. Ceci est complété par des nouvelles coupes qui permettent de réduire encore davantage le saut d’intégralité en même temps que de défavoriser l’apparition de cycles dans les routes. Ces résultats suggèrent que cette méthode fournit la meilleure méthode exacte pour le PLRC. Dans le chapitre 5, on introduit une nouvelle méthode heuristique pour le PLRC. Premièrement, on démarre une méthode randomisée de type GRASP pour trouver un premier ensemble de solutions de bonne qualité. Les solutions de cet ensemble sont alors combinées de façon à les améliorer. Finalement, on démarre une méthode de type détruir et réparer basée sur la résolution d’un nouveau modèle de localisation et réaffectation qui généralise le problème de réaffectaction [48].